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ARTICLES 
CONTRACTUALIZING CUSTODY 
Sarah Abramowicz*
 
 
Many scholars otherwise in favor of the enforcement of family contracts 
agree that parent-child relationships should continue to prove the exception 
to any contractualized family law regime.  This Article instead questions the 
continued refusal to enforce contracts concerning parental rights to 
children’s custody.  It argues that the refusal to enforce such contracts 
contributes to a differential treatment of two types of families:  those 
deemed “intact”—typically consisting of two married parents and their 
offspring—and those deemed non-intact.  Intact families are granted a 
degree of freedom from government intervention, provided that there is no 
evidence that children are in any danger of harm.  Non-intact families, by 
contrast, are subject to the perpetual threat of intervention, even in the 
absence of harm.  The result of this two-tier system is that non-intact 
families are denied the autonomy and stability that intact families enjoy, to 
the detriment of parents and children alike. 
The goal of this Article is to address inconsistent scholarly approaches to 
custody agreements, on the one hand, and parentage agreements, on the 
other.  Marital agreements about children are largely unenforceable, and 
even scholars who otherwise favor the enforcement of marital agreements 
largely approve of this approach, concurring that a court should be able to 
override a contract concerning children’s custody if it finds that 
enforcement is not in the children’s best interests.  By contrast, those who 
write about parentage agreements, such as those made in the context of 
assisted reproductive technology or by unmarried, single, or multiple (i.e., 
more than two) parents, are more likely to favor the enforcement of such 
agreements.  This Article argues that many of the rationales for enforcing 
parentage agreements extend to custody agreements as well. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars otherwise in favor of the enforcement of family contracts 
agree that parent-child relationships should prove the exception to any 
contractualized family law regime.1
This Article addresses the potential benefits of enforcing custody 
contracts by drawing on discussions of another subset of parental-rights 
contracts that has received greater attention in recent years:  parentage 
contracts.  While custody contracts allocate rights and responsibilities 
among those who are parents, parentage contracts determine who is a parent 
in the first place by creating or terminating parental rights. 
  This Article questions the continued 
refusal to enforce contracts concerning parental rights.  It does so by 
focusing on a subset of parental-rights contracts that have received little 
attention or support in recent scholarship:  custody contracts. 
Custody contracts are typically understood as a subset of marital 
agreements, and have thus been addressed primarily by scholars of marital 
contracts.2  Marital agreements about the custody of children are largely 
unenforceable.3  Even scholars who otherwise favor the enforcement of 
marital contracts largely approve of this approach, concurring that a court 
should be able to override a contract concerning children’s custody if it 
finds that enforcement is not in the children’s best interests.4  By contrast, 
those who write about parentage agreements, such as those made in the 
context of assisted reproductive technology5
 
 1. See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:  
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 475 (1998) (advocating greater 
enforcement of marital contracts, with the exception of provisions relating to custody or 
otherwise affecting children’s interests); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 
1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1554–56 (proposing greater limits on privatization in families with 
children); Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals:  From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern 
Marriage Law, 89 CALIF.  L. REV. 1479, 1525–26 (2001) (recommending continued judicial 
determination of children’s best interests in proposed regime facilitating greater 
customization of marriage); Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS.  L. 
REV. 827, 830 (advocating greater enforcement of postnuptial contracts, with the exception 
of provisions related to child custody or child support). 
 or by unmarried, single, or 
 2. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. 
L. REV. 65, 90–91, 105–07 (1998) (contending that the parental interest in custody is an 
integral component of the family economy within which marital bargains are formed). 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. See infra Part II.A. 
 5. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood:  An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 323 
(recommending making “bargained-for intentions” determinative of parentage for children 
born through assisted reproductive technology); Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a 
Parenthood Market?  A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 
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multiple (i.e., more than two) parents,6 are comparatively more likely to 
favor the enforcement of such agreements.7  Parentage scholars, however, 
have not generally considered custody agreements to be a species of 
parentage agreement, and thus these scholars for the most part have not 
explicitly disagreed with those who endorse the unenforceability of custody 
agreements.8
On closer examination, these two strands of the literature are in tension 
with each other. This Article argues that many of the rationales for 
enforcing parentage agreements extend to custody agreements as well, and 
that custody contracts have a currently unrecognized potential to work in 
tandem with parentage contracts to provide families with benefits such as 
stability, certainty, and freedom from state intervention. 
 
This argument is advanced as follows.  Part I of the Article reviews 
current judicial approaches to custody contracts and to parentage contracts.  
Custody contracts are not typically enforceable.  Courts are least likely to 
enforce custody contracts entered into when the parents’ relationship is 
intact, even though such contracts have the most promise of any custody 
contracts for providing certainty and stability, and are less likely than 
contracts agreed to at separation or divorce to be the product of a bargaining 
imbalance created by a primary caregiver’s fear of losing custody.  Judicial 
attitudes are a function both of judges’ view that they must ensure the best 
interests of children and of their concern that agreements may not be truly 
voluntary.  But the best interests of children might be best advanced by 
rules that privilege parental agreements over judicial supervision, at least 
absent evidence of unequal bargaining power or harm to children.  Courts 
are more likely to defer to custody agreements entered into at or after 
separation, but only if the courts find them to be in the children’s best 
interests (or, in some states, not adverse to their interests), thus maintaining 
a central judicial role in the lives of non-intact families even where those 
families are able to come to an agreement about custody. 
Courts are more likely to enforce parentage agreements, though certainly 
not uniformly, and there is considerable resistance to the enforcement of 
certain types of such agreements.  Judicial approaches to parentage 
 
22–26 (2003) (describing benefits of privatization in the context of assisted reproductive 
technology). 
 6. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?):  Marriage, Gender, and 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1222 (2010) (arguing that 
defining parenthood with reference to consent in the context of assisted reproductive 
technology would better protect children born to single or unmarried parents); Nancy D. 
Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have To Adopt Her Own Child:  Parentage Laws for Lesbian 
Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 243–46 (2009) 
(recommending recognition of agreements extending parental status to a third parent, such as 
a sperm donor who agrees to raise a child along with lesbian co-parents); Katharine K. 
Baker, Bargaining or Biology?  The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental 
Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 38–61 (2004) (arguing for contractual approach to 
parental status, and for recognition on this basis of both single parenthood and parenthood by 
unmarried same-sex couples). 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
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agreements vary tremendously depending on both the jurisdiction and the 
type of agreement; responses can range from enforcing parentage 
agreements without any reference to children’s interests to refusing to take 
such agreements into account at all.  Parentage agreements include co-
parenting agreements, often employed by same-sex couples, whereby a 
child’s legally recognized parent agrees to jointly raise the child with a co-
parent;9 gamete donation agreements, where anonymous or known donors 
of ova or sperm agree either to relinquish or to retain their parental status;10 
and surrogacy agreements,11
Part II describes the divergence of scholarly approaches to custody and 
parentage agreements.  Since the 1980s, the scholarly consensus has 
increasingly been in favor of using contracts to define family rights and 
obligations, at least where agreements are fairly procured.
 including gestational surrogacy, where the 
ovum is not the surrogate’s.  Part I shows that the differences between 
custody and parentage agreements are not as stark as may appear, and that 
both lie on a spectrum of parental agreements. 
12  Contract has 
facilitated arrangements not only between spouses but also between those 
who cannot marry or prefer not to.13  Some scholars have worried that these 
contracts may be unfair to women, particularly if they are pressured into 
signing prenuptial agreements, but most have viewed such problems as 
demanding oversight rather than wholesale invalidation of such contracts.14  
The literature, however, has largely assumed that this approach has no 
applicability to custody agreements,15 both because children are not parties 
to these agreements16 and because parents are unlikely to be able to predict 
their children’s interests, especially before their children are born.17
At the same time, however, a robust literature on parentage agreements 
has been significantly more favorable toward enforcing such agreements.  
The literature on custody and marital contracts has ignored the fact that the 
literature on parentage agreements provides counterarguments that extend 
easily into the custody context, addressing concerns about unpredictability, 
duress, and child welfare that are common to both contexts.  Moreover, it 
has ignored that parentage and custody agreements are often intertwined.  
For example, co-parenting agreements often include provisions relating to 
custody.
 
18
 
 9. See infra notes 
  Scholars have given no defense of the implicit claim that it is 
acceptable to contract about whether one will have the status of a co-parent, 
136–55 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 157–73 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 174–200 and accompanying text. 
 12. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage:  A New 
Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 328–34 (1982) (proposing contractual 
ordering of marriage). 
 13. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 14. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 15. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 12, at 211 (excepting agreements affecting children 
from proposed regime of contractualized marriage). 
 16. See infra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 262–63 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text. 
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but unacceptable to contract about the portion of co-parenting rights each 
parent will have should they raise their children in separate households. 
The argument in Part II leaves open the possibility that the best course is 
for the courts to enforce neither custody nor parentage agreements, but Part 
III offers an affirmative argument for enforcing custody contracts along 
with parentage contracts.  The principal argument is that the current judicial 
refusal to enforce custody contracts contributes to a differential treatment of 
two types of families:  those deemed “intact”—typically consisting of two 
married parents and their offspring—and those deemed non-intact.  Intact 
families are granted a degree of freedom from government intervention as 
long as there is no evidence that children are in any danger of harm.  Non-
intact families, by contrast, are subject to the perpetual threat of 
intervention, even in the absence of harm.  The result of this two-tier system 
is that non-intact families are denied the autonomy and the stability that 
intact families enjoy, to the detriment of parents and children alike. 
In an age of serial divorce, unmarried parentage, new family forms, and 
assisted reproductive technology, marriage can no longer suffice to render 
families intact.  Rather than force parent-child relationships into a marital 
paradigm that is increasingly out of touch with current realities, we should 
permit and encourage parents to use contract to create the intact status that 
marriage can no longer provide.  While children’s welfare and relationship 
security should be the primary consideration here, enforcement of custody 
contracts can promote other values as well, such as gender neutrality, 
diversity of family forms, and parental autonomy. 
Finally, Part IV advances a concrete proposal for enforcement of child 
custody agreements.  A modified version of the American Law Institute’s 
(ALI) approach toward enforcing prenuptial agreements should be extended 
to the custody context,19 as should the ALI’s view that such contracts merit 
more stringent policing than commercial contracts.20  This proposal 
resembles the ALI’s approach toward enforcing parenting agreements 
reached when the parents’ relationship dissolves21 (which currently has 
been adopted by only one state),22
 
 19. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.07 (2000) (excepting custody agreements from ALI provisions on 
premarital agreements). 
 while extending this approach to prior 
agreements between the parents and modifying it accordingly.  
Procedurally, courts should ensure that custody contracts are made with 
voluntary and informed consent, rather than under undue pressure or duress.  
Substantively, courts should not enforce custody agreements that would 
 20. See id. § 7.04 (requiring party seeking enforcement of premarital agreement to 
establish that it was voluntary and knowing); id. § 7.05 (requiring party contesting 
enforcement of premarital agreement to establish that enforcement would inflict a substantial 
injustice). 
 21. See id. § 2.06 (providing for enforcement of post-dissolution custody arrangements 
to which both parents agree as long as these are knowing and voluntary and do not pose a 
risk of harm to the child). 
 22. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-201(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2009) (adopting ALI approach 
to parenting agreements). 
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harm a child’s emotional, intellectual, or physical development; this is a 
considerably higher bar than a best-interests analysis.  Concerns about 
insufficient judicial scrutiny of custody agreements under this more 
deferential standard can be addressed through presumptions that certain 
situations are harmful to children, such as an award of custody to a parent 
who has engaged in domestic violence. 
This Article also questions the commonplace view that custody contracts 
made after the parents’ relationship has dissolved should be given the 
greatest deference.  Vulnerable parents may have greater leverage prior to 
or during a marriage than afterward.  While it may be difficult to anticipate 
the needs of a child, premarital or marital custody agreements can be 
negotiated as those needs evolve.  Meanwhile, agreements should continue 
to be enforced post-dissolution, or at least to receive substantial deference, 
even as a child’s needs and situation change.  The value of such agreements 
is that they provide predictability and security, not just for the parents, but 
also for the child. 
I.   CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO PARENTAL AGREEMENTS 
This part will review current judicial approaches to enforcing custody 
and parentage agreements, respectively.  Part I.A provides an overview of 
judicial enforcement of custody agreements.  As Part I.A demonstrates, 
courts are especially reluctant to enforce custody agreements reached before 
the parents’ relationship has dissolved, but are beginning to give greater 
deference to certain types of post-dissolution custody agreements that are 
seen as promoting parental cooperation, such as agreements to share 
custody.  Even such favored custody agreements, however, are largely 
unenforceable if a court finds them to be at odds with a child’s interests. 
Part I.B then surveys judicial approaches to three types of parentage 
agreements:  co-parenting agreements, gamete donation agreements, and 
surrogacy agreements.  As Part I.B shows, the judicial approach to 
parentage agreements varies widely according to both jurisdiction and type 
of agreement.  There is a trend toward the enforcement, or at least the 
recognition, of certain such agreements.  But courts nonetheless exhibit 
considerable reluctance to countenance the contractualization of 
parenthood. 
A.   Custody Contracts 
The traditional rule has long been that agreements regarding the custody 
of children are unenforceable.  When courts were first confronted with 
custody agreements in the early nineteenth century, the prevailing default 
rule was that fathers possessed superior rights to the custody of their 
children.23
 
 23. See, e.g., People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) 
(“[T]he mother, as such, is entitled to no power over [her child], but only to reverence and 
respect.”) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *478–79); People ex rel. Brooks 
v. Brooks, 35 Barb. 85, 92 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861) (“If the husband is in all respects fit and 
  The custody agreements that made their way to court thus 
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tended to involve the transfer of custodial rights to someone other than the 
father, typically either the children’s mother or a third party, such as a 
grandparent.  Such agreements were held unenforceable for a number of 
reasons—because a husband could not contract with his wife;24 because 
agreements contemplating separation were unenforceable as a matter of 
public policy;25 and because parents could not contract away rights that 
they possessed for the benefit of their children.26
Even as courts refused to enforce custody agreements, however, they 
would at times award custody in accordance with the terms of such 
agreements nonetheless.
 
27  They did so on the basis of the doctrine that over 
the course of the nineteenth century emerged as the paramount 
consideration in child custody decision making:  the welfare of the child.28  
Initially a factor that permitted courts to award custody to mothers in cases 
involving children of “tender years”29
 
proper to have the care of the child and to superintend its education, and other things are 
equal between the two, the recognized paramount right of the father must prevail over the 
otherwise equal claims of the mother.”); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 305 (1877) (“As a 
general rule, the father is considered as being entitled to the custody of his minor 
children . . .”). 
—typically, under the age of seven—
 24. See Mercein, 3 Hill at 408 (“A man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into 
covenant with her; for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence; and to covenant 
with her would be only to covenant with himself.” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *468)). 
 25. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 1 Barb. Ch. 639, 645 (N.Y. Ch. 1846) (expressing concern 
that enforcement of custody agreement would encourage collusion between divorcing 
spouses); People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 8 Paige Ch. 47, 67 (N.Y. Ch. 1839) (citing cases 
in support of proposition that an agreement for future separation is void as a matter of public 
policy); see also Brooks, 35 Barb. at 91, 93 (holding it necessary to “the interests of 
society . . . and good order” to find that “whenever the wife, without just cause, lives apart 
from her husband, she is deemed to have forfeited her claim to her children”). 
 26. See Mercein, 3 Hill at 410 (“I deny that he has, therefore, the right still farther to 
violate his duty by selling his children . . . .  These he holds under the duty of a personal 
trust, inalienable even to [his wife].”); Mercein, 8 Paige Ch. at 67 (asserting that the parental 
duties imposed by virtue of the marriage contract “are imposed as much for the sake of 
public policy as of private happiness”). 
 27. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 6 Me. 462, 468–69 (1830) (noting that the father had 
voluntarily transferred custody to the mother under a postmarital agreement providing that 
the mother could separate and retain children’s custody in the event of ill treatment, but 
resting refusal to grant the father’s petition for custody on a finding that such an award 
would be contrary to the “permanent interest of the infant[s],” which required that they be 
left in the care of their mother). 
 28. See id. (refusing to enforce parental custody agreement but awarding custody in a 
manner consistent with that agreement nonetheless, on the basis of children’s interests); 
Sarah Abramowicz, Childhood and the Limits of Contract, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 60–
62 (2009) (describing resistance of nineteenth-century English courts to enforcing 
contractual transfers of parental rights, and their concomitant willingness to endorse the 
transfers of custody provided for by such contracts where to do so was consistent with a 
judicial assessment of children’s welfare). 
 29. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 238–40 (1985); MARY ANN 
MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS:  THE HISTORY OF CHILD 
CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 61–62 (1994). 
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the welfare of the child by the end of the nineteenth century became the 
predominant factor in child custody disputes.30
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the doctrine of 
coverture was slowly dismantled
 
31 and separation and divorce became more 
common,32 courts showed increasing willingness to take separation deeds 
and other forms of custody contracts into account in determining who 
should raise a child.33  Some courts even deemed such contracts 
“binding.”34  But they insisted in the same breath that such agreements 
could not “impede . . . that wide discretionary power given to courts in the 
disposition of the custody of children, in accord with their best interests.”35
Despite considerable development of custody and parentage law over the 
course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries,
  
The agreements were relevant only insofar as they had bearing on, or were 
consistent with, children’s interests.  They thus were not enforceable in any 
meaningful sense. 
36
This section provides an overview of current judicial approaches to the 
enforcement of custody contracts.  It begins by discussing those custody 
contracts that courts are most resistant to enforcing—premarital or mid-
marriage custody agreements—and then proceeds to discuss the prevailing 
 the enforceability of 
custody contracts remains much the same today:  such agreements are 
largely superfluous, in that courts retain the jurisdiction to override them in 
the name of children’s interests. 
 
 30. See GROSSBERG, supra note 29, at 234–59 (charting emergence of the best-interests 
standard in nineteenth-century American custody law). 
 31. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work:  The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning 
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082–85 (1994) (tracing history 
of legislation that enabled married women to own property and to engage in legal 
transactions, while arguing that the structural inequalities of coverture persisted despite such 
changes). 
 32. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”:  Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2133–34 (1996) (describing expansion of grounds for divorce in the 
post-Civil War period). 
 33. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 157 N.Y.S. 821, 823 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (“The right of the father 
to transfer the custody of his child to his wife, where they have separated, and where there is 
nothing in the agreement inconsistent with the welfare of the child, is generally recognized 
by the leading text-book writers and leading cases in other states and in England.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Sargent v. Sargent, 39 P. 931, 932 (Cal. 1895) (“Parents have a right to 
contract with each other as to the custody and control of their offspring, and to stipulate 
away their respective parental rights, and such contracts are binding upon them.”). 
 35. Id. at 933; see also, e.g., Bonnett ex rel. Newmeyer v. Bonnett, 16 N.W. 91, 93 
(Iowa 1883) (awarding custody to grandparents over father on the basis that “[w]hen a parent 
has, either by abandonment or contract, surrendered his present legal right to the custody of a 
child, in all controversies subsequently arising respecting its custody, the matter of primary 
importance is the interest and welfare of the child”); Cunningham v. Barnes, 17 S.E. 308, 
312 (W. Va. 1893) (same); cf. Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 305–06 (1877) (holding, in 
case concerning whether custodial grandfather could bring kidnapping action against third 
parties, that where “parents have . . . transferred their [child’s] custody to another” and “the 
custodian is, in every way, a proper person to have the care, training, and education of the 
infant, and the court is satisfied its social, moral, and educational interests will be best 
promoted by remaining in the custody of the person to whom it was transferred . . . the new 
custody will be treated as lawful and exclusive”). 
 36. See generally, e.g., MASON, supra note 29. 
76 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
approaches to custody agreements made at separation or divorce, both 
generally and with respect to certain types of such agreements, such as 
agreements governing modification of custody, agreements to arbitrate 
custody, parenting plans, and agreements for joint custody.  As we shall 
see, it is precisely those agreements that attempt to provide certainty into 
the future—such as premarital custody agreements and agreements 
governing modification—that courts are least likely to enforce in awarding 
custody. 
1.   Premarital and Postmarital Custody Agreements 
There are few published cases involving the enforceability of premarital 
custody agreements, perhaps because courts have consistently refused to 
enforce such agreements.  Courts have been equally reluctant to enforce 
postmarital custody agreements, that is, custody agreements reached during 
an intact marriage, before separation occurs.  In the handful of published 
cases on premarital and postmarital custody provisions, courts have been in 
accord that these are not enforceable.37  As with custody agreements 
generally, the rule articulated in such cases is that parents cannot bind the 
courts by their private contracts when it comes to custody, because a court 
making a custody decision must be given the discretion to protect children’s 
interests.38
A further objection expressed in the context of premarital agreements is 
that a premarital custody agreement should be given especially little 
deference by custody courts, because it is highly unlikely to be either 
knowing or voluntary.  How, it is asked, can a parent possibly know what is 
best for a child who has not yet been born?  And how can a parent 
voluntarily consent to forgo custody of a child with whom she has not yet 
developed a relationship?  Courts are quick to assert the absurdity of 
permitting parents to bind themselves, and to limit the discretionary power 
of the courts on matters of custody, on the basis of “an agreement entered 
into before the child in question has come into the world.”
 
39
Premarital custody agreements are rarely contemplated in state statutory 
schemes regulating child custody.  This neglect is visible in one of the more 
prominent cases to address such agreements, In re Marriage of Littlefield.
 
40
 
 37. See In re Marriage of Garrity, 226 Cal. Rptr. 485, 489 n.8 (Ct. App. 1986); Spires v. 
Spires, 743 A.2d 186 (D.C. 1999); Alves v. Alves, 262 A.2d 111 (D.C. 1970); In re 
Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1997); Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50 
(Wyo. 1993).  Courts are similarly unwilling to enforce pre-birth custody agreements 
between unmarried cohabitants. See, e.g., In re Custody of Wendy, 898 N.E.2d 889 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2008). 
  
In Littlefield, the Supreme Court of Washington addressed the 
enforceability of a premarital custody provision under a statute intended to 
 38. See, e.g., Spires, 743 A.2d at 190 (“[T]he parents cannot by their agreement deprive 
[the court] of power to control the custody and maintenance of the child.” (quoting Emrich v. 
McNeil, 126 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1942))). 
 39. Wood v. Wood, 168 A.2d 102, 104 (Del. Ch. 1961); see also, e.g., Littlefield, 940 
P.2d at 1371 n.9. 
 40. 940 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1997). 
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govern parenting plans made at the time of separation or divorce.41  The 
custody provision at stake in Littlefield had little in common with the types 
of parenting plans that the statute envisioned.  It was part of a more general 
premarital agreement that the father had presented to his fiancée three days 
before their wedding.  The father was immensely wealthy—he had trust 
funds worth more than $50 million—and, at the time of his marriage, his 
future wife, as the court noted, had “a guitar, a pickup truck, her clothing, 
and some furniture.”42  Among the provisions in the premarital agreement 
that he presented to her—and she signed—was that any child of the 
marriage would spend equal residential time with both parents in the event 
of divorce.  It was this aspect of the agreement that the father sought to 
enforce, along with what he argued was an implicit agreement that the 
mother would remain in Seattle as a condition of custody.43
Under the Parenting Act of 1987,
 
44 then in effect in Washington, courts 
could only order equally shared residential custody if both parents 
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to such an arrangement.45  The trial court 
in Littlefield took the mother’s signing of the premarital agreement as 
indicating her consent to equally shared custody, to which she strongly 
objected at the time of separation.  The court ordered that the child spend 
equal residential time with each parent, as well as that the mother, who had 
by then moved to California, relocate to Washington as a condition of 
custody, and that she live no more than an hour from the father’s 
residence.46  In reversing the trial court, the Washington Supreme Court 
emphasized that the Parenting Act did not make parenting agreements 
enforceable.  Instead, the Act provided that courts should consider such 
agreements as one among several factors relevant to determining the 
paramount concern in awarding custody—the best interests of the child.47
The discussion of the custody agreements in Littlefield does not apply a 
distinct standard to premarital custody agreements.  Instead, it primarily 
emphasizes the obligation of a custody court to override any parental 
custody agreement that is at odds with a child’s best interests.  But the 
Littlefield court observes that a premarital custody agreement is unlikely to 
meet the statutory requirement that a court consider only those custody 
agreements that are “knowing and voluntary”: 
 
The agreement in this case did not contemplate the needs of any particular 
child . . . and was made without the knowledge of how either party would 
act toward a child.  Based on this record, we find it unlikely that these 
 
 41. See id. at 1368 (“The Parenting Act represents a unique legislative attempt to reduce 
the conflict between parents who are in the midst of dissolving their marriage . . . .  The 
concept of a working ‘parenting plan’ is the primary focus of the Parenting Act.”). 
 42. Id. at 1363. 
 43. See id. at 1364. 
 44. 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 460 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.002–.913). 
 45. See Littlefield, 940 P.2d at 1369 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a)(ii) 
(1989)). 
 46. See id. at 1365 n.2. 
 47. See id. at 1371–72. 
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parties could have knowingly provided for the parenting of a child at the 
time the agreement was signed.48
The court suggests here that any custody agreement made before a child is 
born is unlikely to be sufficiently “knowing” for a court to consider it as an 
important factor in awarding custody, let alone for a court to enforce it.  To 
be “knowing,” the court indicates here, a custody agreement must be based 
on the needs of a particular, existing child, as well as on the relationship of 
each parent toward that child. 
 
Littlefield thus demonstrates both the judicial reluctance to enforce 
custody agreements made ex ante—especially before a child is born—and 
some of the good reasons for that reluctance:  the custody agreement in 
Littlefield was problematic in a number of ways.  The agreed-to custody 
arrangement was unlikely to protect the child’s interests, and in fact 
arguably was likely to inflict harm on the child by exposing him to constant 
conflict.  The agreement was adverse to the mother, who was the child’s 
primary caretaker and would likely have been awarded primary physical 
custody absent any agreement.  And the agreement was obtained under 
unfair conditions that brought into question the mother’s ability to freely 
and knowingly consent to its terms:  it was presented to her shortly before 
her wedding as part of a premarital agreement drafted by the attorney of her 
much wealthier fiancé, at a time when she had significantly fewer resources 
available to protect her interests. 
But the fact that a premarital custody agreement may be unfairly 
obtained, or may contain terms that would harm a child, is not necessarily 
reason to dismiss premarital custody agreements generally.  It is, instead, an 
argument for ensuring that such agreements are not enforced if they are 
obtained under duress or undue influence or if they contain terms that will 
be harmful to a child.  As Mary Anne Case has argued in the context of 
enforcing agreements in an ongoing marriage, the very inequity of some 
such agreements argues for making courts the appropriate forum for 
determining whether they are to be enforced.49  The prospect of legal 
enforcement will encourage couples to bring such agreements into courts of 
law instead of before religious tribunals or other nonlegal forums,50
Thus, custody case law periodically involves premarital or postnuptial 
contracts in which a wife has agreed to cede custody to her husband in the 
event of divorce, as part of a more general agreement by the wife to 
subjugate herself to her husband.  This was the situation in Spires v. 
Spires,
 thereby 
giving courts an opportunity to review the agreements and—as the court did 
in Littlefield, and could have done even without reference to the best-
interests standard—reject them as oppressive to the more vulnerable spouse 
and potentially harmful to the children involved. 
51
 
 48. Id. at 1371 n.9. 
 discussed by Case, where, after marriage but several years prior to 
 49. Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 225, 247–49 (2011). 
 50. See id. 
 51. 743 A.2d 186 (D.C. 1999). 
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divorce, a wife agreed to submit to her husband in all respects during their 
marriage, including by “conduct[ing] herself in accordance with all 
scriptures in the Holy Bible applicable to marital relationships germane to 
wives and in accordance with the husband’s specific requests.”52  She also 
agreed, in the event of breach, to cede to her husband both complete 
custody of their children and possession of all marital property.53  
Similarly, in Moran v. Moran,54 a would-be husband and wife agreed to be 
married (an agreement the court refused to enforce) under the laws of 
religion rather than of the state, and the “wife” bound herself, inter alia, to 
give her “husband” sole custody in the event that their relationship 
dissolved, as part of a more general program of wifely subjugation.55
These agreements bring to light the extent to which private premarital 
custody agreements, like private marital agreements more generally, may 
contain troubling terms.  However, the custody terms in each of these three 
agreements—in Spires, Moran, or Littlefield—would be unlikely to be 
enforced even if we granted sufficiently greater deference to such 
agreements than we currently do.  Each contains terms that seem 
detrimental to the children in question (either by separating children from 
their primary caretaker or by imposing shared residential custody between 
highly conflicted parents), and all three agreements were arguably the 
product of sufficient pressure to vitiate a finding of voluntary and knowing 
consent. 
 
While in each of these cases the parties seem to have settled their claims 
regarding property division and support, roughly half of the states will 
supervise premarital agreements on such matters for both procedural and 
substantive fairness before permitting enforcement.56
2.   Custody Agreements Made at Separation or Divorce 
  This suggests that 
contract law—especially, for instance, as it has been modified to apply to 
premarital or postmarital contracts—is well-equipped to facilitate greater 
enforceability of premarital custody provisions than we currently permit, 
while still ensuring sufficient oversight of such agreements to protect 
children from harm and to prevent enforcement of those that are the product 
of undue pressure or duress. 
a.   Generally 
Most custody agreements are arrived at after the parental relationship has 
dissolved.  The traditional rule in most jurisdictions is that courts are not 
bound by parents’ custody agreements even when reached at the time of 
separation or divorce, and instead must look to the welfare of the child.  In a 
 
 52. Id. at 188 n.2. 
 53. See id. at 188. 
 54. 933 P.2d 1207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 
 55. See id. at 1209–10 (refusing to enforce a custody provision in a private contract 
purporting to create a marital union). 
 56. See Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL 
LAW. 249, 264 (2010). 
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typical formulation of this rule, “No agreement of the parties can bind the 
court presiding over custody matters to a disposition other than that which a 
weighing of all the factors involved shows to be in the child’s best 
interest.”57
Even where separation agreements regarding custody are not binding, 
however, courts can consider them in awarding custody, and often award 
custody in accordance with the parents’ agreement, particularly where 
neither parent has decided to contest the agreement at the time the court 
makes its order.  A number of custody decisions have emphasized the 
importance of considering the wishes of the parents in awarding custody, 
even while holding that the ultimate decision about custody rests with the 
trial court’s determination of the child’s interests.
 
58
There are two main approaches to considering such agreements.  Under 
the more prevalent approach, followed by the majority of the states, courts 
will enforce custody agreements made by divorced or separated parents 
only if to do so is consistent with the child’s interests.  Here, an agreement 
may be a factor to consider in assessing children’s interests, but is given no 
deference.
 
59  A substantial minority of states, on the other hand, require 
courts to enforce such agreements unless they find that to do so is adverse 
to the child’s interests.60
 
 57. Hutter v. Hutter, 839 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Friederwitzer v. 
Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. 1982)). 
  Under this approach, the parental determination is 
 58. See, e.g., Z.S. v J.F., 918 N.E.2d 636, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Though the wishes 
of the parent are to be given great weight, it is the duty of the trial court to determine if any 
agreement is in the best interests of the child.” (quoting In re Paternity of T.G.T., 803 N.E.2d 
1225, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004))); Wist v. Wist, 503 A.2d 281, 282 n.1 (N.J. 1986) (holding 
that while the trial court was required to consider the parents’ custody agreement in 
assessing the child’s best interests, “[w]hatever the agreement of the parents, the ultimate 
determination of custody lies with the court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction as 
parens patriae” (quoting Sheehan v. Sheehan, 118 A.2d 89, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1955))). 
 59. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1)(a) (2006) (providing that parents’ wishes as 
to custody are simply one factor to be considered in assessing children’s best interests); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3) (West 2001) (requiring court to determine whether parents’ 
agreed-upon joint custody arrangement is in child’s best interests); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 403.270(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (providing that parents’ wishes as to custody are simply 
one factor to be considered in assessing children’s best interests); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 452.375(2)(1) (West 2003) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(a) (West 2009) 
(same); Zahl v. Zahl, 736 N.W.2d 365, 373 (Neb. 2007) (“[A] trial court has an independent 
responsibility to determine questions of custody and visitation of minor children according to 
their best interests, which responsibility cannot be controlled by an agreement or stipulation 
of the parties.”). 
 60. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(f) (West 2009) (providing that 
parenting plan agreed to by both parents “shall be approved by the court . . . unless the court 
finds that such plan as submitted and agreed to is not in the best interests of the child”); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 23-3202 (West 2011) (presuming that parents’ custody agreement is in the best 
interests of the child); Keen v. Keen, 629 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
parental custody agreement should be enforced unless adverse to child’s interests); Watson 
v. Watson, 46 So. 3d 218 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (“If the parents agree who is to have custody, 
the court shall award custody in accordance with their agreement unless the best interest of 
the child requires a different award.”); Luce v. Cushing, 868 A.2d 672, 676 (Vt. 2004) 
(holding that parental custody agreements entered into voluntarily are enforceable unless 
facts and circumstances establish that an agreement is not in the best interests of the child). 
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given greater deference.  A number of states, moreover, have found that 
courts can agree with the parents regarding custody without holding a full 
hearing about the child’s interests, which increases the likelihood that the 
courts will not have the information or inclination to review the agreement 
carefully.61
Only one state, West Virginia, follows the recommendation of the ALI to 
give greater deference to parental custody agreements reached at separation 
or divorce.
  But courts in all of these states nonetheless retain the authority 
to refuse enforcement of the parents’ agreement on the basis that the child’s 
interests require a different custodial arrangement. 
62  The West Virginia/ALI approach provides for the 
enforcement of such agreements—termed “parenting plans”—unless a court 
finds that an agreement was not knowing or voluntary or that enforcement 
will impose harm on the child.63  Even under the more deferential West 
Virginia/ALI approach to parental custody agreements, however, this 
deference seems limited to situations where parents have agreed to a 
parenting plan and then jointly asked the court to incorporate the plan into a 
court order.  The West Virginia statute, following the ALI, indicates that a 
“prior agreement” regarding custody—an agreement to which one of the 
parents presumably no longer wants to adhere—is not enforceable, but 
instead only a factor for courts to consider in the event that the parents 
cannot agree on custody.64
 
 61. See, e.g., Koron v. Melendy, 523 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (“[I]n 
cases where the parties are in agreement regarding custody and visitation and present the 
court with such an agreement, the trial court need not expressly articulate each of the best 
interest factors.”); Luhman v. Beecher, 424 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
that court does not need to engage in fact-finding to accept stipulation modifying custody). 
 
 62. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-201(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2009); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (2000). 
 63. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-201(a)(2); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08. West Virginia is the only state to 
have adopted the ALI approach to child custody. Along with giving more deference to 
parental custody agreements, the ALI approach adopted by West Virginia rejects the best-
interests approach to custody itself in favor of the approximation rule, under which courts 
allocate custody in a manner that approximates the time each parent spent performing 
caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents’ separation. See PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (adopted by W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 48-9-206(a)).  Among the goals of the approximation standard is to provide a 
predictable background rule that, by reducing the uncertainty of litigation and allocating 
parental bargaining power in a manner consistent with parents’ expectations, encourages 
parental agreements with respect to custody while minimizing strategic behavior, on the 
theory that negotiated custody agreements are more likely to be satisfactory to parents, and 
to reduce conflict between them, than judicially-imposed arrangements. See Elizabeth S. 
Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 643–56 
(1992) (contending that the approximation approach to custody, with its predictability and its 
mirroring of parental preferences, would encourage custody settlements while reducing the 
opportunities for strategic behavior that might disadvantage the parent more invested in 
obtaining custody). 
 64. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.08(e) (adopted by W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 48-9-206(a)(5)). Moreover, the commentary to the ALI explicitly rejects 
enforcement of premarital or marital custody agreements, indicating that the provision 
encouraging enforcement of parenting plans “does not govern agreements made during or 
before marriage.” See id. § 206 cmt. a. 
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Indeed, a court’s decision to reject the parents’ custody agreement often 
occurs when one of the parents has contested the arrangement that he or she 
formerly agreed to.  Sometimes, a court may reject an earlier agreement on 
the basis that it has proved “unworkable,” as courts have done, for instance, 
where parents initially agreed to offer each other the option to babysit for 
their child before making any other caretaking arrangements, but one of the 
parents found this arrangement too cumbersome to carry out,65 or, more 
typically, where parents have agreed to share decision-making authority but 
have not been able to do so without generating conflict.66
Some contested custody agreements are unenforceable on constitutional 
or public policy grounds.  Thus, the majority of courts have refused to 
enforce agreements regarding children’s religious upbringing, on the basis 
that to do so would infringe on the resistant parent’s First Amendment right 
of free exercise.
 
67  A minority of jurisdictions, on the other hand, find that 
the First Amendment does not prohibit the enforcement of agreements 
concerning religion, and will enforce religious upbringing agreements—and 
take them into account in awarding custody—where to do so is consistent 
with a child’s interests.68  Courts have refused as a matter of public policy 
to enforce certain agreements that express prejudice or stereotypes about 
race or gender, such as an agreement conditioning a mother’s visitation on 
her not having African-American male companions in the child’s 
presence,69 or an agreement allocating custody on the basis of gender alone, 
with girls going to the mother and boys to the father.70
More often, courts refuse to enforce contested custody agreements 
simply on the basis that enforcement would not be in the children’s 
interests.  Sometimes the court finds fault with the details of the agreed-
upon arrangement rather than with the custody award itself.  In one case, for 
instance, the court refused to enforce an agreement under which the 
children were given the right to have the final say about whether each of 
 
 
 65. See Keen, 629 N.E.2d at 939, 941. 
 66. See, e.g., Howard v. Fortuna, No. A-6304-06T3, 2009 WL 2031060, at *6 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (upholding modification of consent judgment giving father 
shared decision-making authority, where parents demonstrated continued hostility and 
conflict). 
 67. See, e.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“The great 
weight of legal authority is against enforcement of such [religious training] agreements over 
the objections of one of the parties.”); see also In re Marriage of Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
339, 347 (Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to enforce religious upbringing agreement); McLaughlin 
v. McLaughlin, 132 A.2d 420, 421–22 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1957) (same); Sotnick v. Sotnick, 
650 So. 2d 157, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (same); In re Marriage of Bennett, 587 
N.E.2d 577, 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (same); Hackett v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431, 439–40 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1958) (same). 
 68. See, e.g., Rownak v. Rownak, 288 S.W.3d 672, 674–75 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) 
(enforcing agreement to raise child in Protestant church, where incorporated into divorce 
judgment); Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (App. Div. 1982) (finding religious 
upbringing agreements generally enforceable unless adverse to child’s interests); see also 
Stevenot v. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that for a religious 
upbringing agreement to be enforceable, it must be in writing and must contemplate post-
divorce status). 
 69. See Turman v. Boleman, 510 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). 
 70. See Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 54 (Wyo. 1993). 
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their parents could have a romantic partner in their presence, finding that it 
was neither appropriate nor beneficial to give children the power to veto 
their parents’ romantic arrangements.71
In other instances, a court may find that it is in a child’s interests to live 
with the parent who agreed to forgo primary physical custody, or to have 
more or different visitation than the parents initially agreed to.  A number 
of early judicial decisions to reject custody agreements when awarding or 
modifying custody rested on the court’s determination that the mother’s 
“promiscuous” behavior rendered maternal custody adverse to her 
children’s interests.
 
72  Other grounds for rejecting parents’ custody 
agreements have included a finding that one or the other parent has a “bad 
temper,”73 that the parents were too conflicted to carry out an agreement to 
share custody,74 or that a parent had entered into a same-sex intimate 
relationship.75
In the situation where parents come to court in agreement about custody, 
courts are apt to approve the parents’ agreement.  However, courts can—
and sometimes do—reject a custody arrangement even at a time when both 
parents agree to it.  Thus, for instance, a court might reject the parents’ 
proposed visitation schedule, and instead impose the standard schedule 
recommended for a comparable situation, on the basis that the parents’ 
arrangement is not appropriate given the age and developmental needs of 
their children.
 
76  Courts are especially resistant to custody arrangements 
that require too much back-and-forth for the children77 and, at the other 
extreme, to arrangements where one parent forgoes custody or visitation 
rights altogether.78  Courts have also consistently held that parents cannot 
bargain away their children’s right to child support,79 or agree to forgo all 
parental rights in exchange for a waiver of child support.80
 
 71. See Giangeruso v. Giangeruso, 708 A.2d 1232, 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997). 
 
 72. See, e.g., Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1982) 
(removing custody from mother despite earlier agreement in part because she had an 
overnight male guest); Forbes v. Forbes, 672 P.2d 428, 430 (Wyo. 1983) (awarding custody 
to father because shared custody arrangement harmed children where mother engaged in 
numerous “affairs”). 
 73. See Forbes, 672 P.2d at 430. 
 74. See, e.g., Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
 75. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding transfer 
of primary custody to father, despite agreement that mother would be primary custodian, on 
basis of mother’s same-sex relationship). 
 76. See, e.g., Kelley v. Kelley, 656 So. 2d 1343, 1346  (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) 
(upholding trial court’s rejection of parents’ custody agreement). 
 77. See, e.g., Peek v. Berning, 622 N.W.2d 186, 193 (N.D. 2001) (“Generally, it is not in 
the best interests of the child to bandy the child back and forth between parents in a rotating 
physical custody arrangement.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Blisset v. Blisset, 526 N.E.2d 125, 129 (Ill. 1988) (refusing to enforce 
agreement terminating paternal visitation); see also In re Marriage of Goodarzirad, 230 Cal. 
Rptr. 203, 207–08 (Ct. App. 1986) (same). 
 79. See, e.g., Ortman v. Ortman, 695 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (App. Div. 1999) (“Because it 
is the right of every child to be supported by his or her parents, caution should be taken to 
ensure that the rights of children are not bargained away by their parents.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Blisset, 526 N.E.2d at 129. 
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b.   Agreements Regarding Modification of Custody 
The rules governing deference toward parental custody agreements work 
in tandem with the rules governing modification of custody.  Once a 
custody order has been issued, the courts retain continuing jurisdiction to 
modify custody until the child reaches the age of majority.81  A few states 
make it relatively easy for a parent to reopen the question of custody, 
permitting modification upon a showing that a change in custody is in the 
child’s best interests.82  More typically, a parent wishing to modify custody 
must meet an initial evidentiary burden before a court will revisit the 
custody arrangement.  This initial burden often involves establishing both a 
substantial change of circumstances and that this change renders it against a 
child’s interests83—or in some cases harmful to a child’s welfare84—to 
continue in the existing arrangement.  State statutes or case law may also 
provide that certain events automatically establish the change of 
circumstances necessary to trigger a new best-interests analysis.  For 
instance, Michigan law provides that, where both parents share legal 
custody, a parental move more than 100 miles away from a current place of 
residence requires a court to determine whether it is in the child’s best 
interests to remain in the custody of the relocating parent.85
The prevailing rule is that the same modification standard applies to all 
custody orders regardless of how they were arrived at, such that judicial 
custody decrees that incorporate an agreement of the parties are subject to 
the same modification standard as custody decrees that are the product of an 
adversarial hearing.
 
86
 
 81. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.510(1)(a) (West 2010) (“[T]he court 
may . . . . [d]uring the pendency of the action, at the final hearing or at any time thereafter 
during the minority of any of the children of the marriage, make such an order for the 
custody, care, education, maintenance and support of the minor children as appears in their 
best interest.”); Guss v. Guss, 472 A.2d 790, 792 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (asserting “[t]he 
continuing jurisdiction of the Superior Court over the custody of minor children of a 
dissolved marriage”). 
  However, some states give less deference to a 
 82. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.510(1). 
 83. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.135(10) (West 2003); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 26.09.260(1) (West 2005).  Many jurisdictions place more stringent restrictions on 
modification for the first two years following the initial custody order. See, e.g., 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/610(a) (2009) (“[N]o motion to modify a custody judgment may be made 
earlier than 2 years after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of 
affidavits that there is reason to believe the child’s present environment may endanger 
seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health.”). 
 84. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18(d)(iv) (West 2006) (providing that, in the 
absence of a parental agreement to the contrary or other special circumstances, custody can 
be modified only upon a finding that “the child’s present environment endangers the child’s 
physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development and the harm 
likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change 
to the child”). 
 85. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.31(4) (West 2011). 
 86. See, e.g., Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 934 (Fla. 2005) (“A decree for 
purposes of the substantial change test includes both a decree that has incorporated a 
stipulated agreement concerning child custody and a decree awarding custody after an 
adversarial hearing.”); Sally Burnett Sharp, Modification of Agreement-Based Custody 
Decrees:  Unitary or Dual Standard?, 68 VA. L. REV. 1263, 1265 (1982).  However, some 
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custody decree arrived at by stipulation of the parties.87  Thus, for instance, 
the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that where a child custody decree 
is the product of the parents’ agreement, modification can occur upon a 
showing that the child’s interests require a change in custody, whereas 
custody orders that result from litigation can be modified only upon a 
showing of a substantial change of circumstances.88
One issue that arises in the modification context is whether parents can 
make enforceable agreements that govern future modifications of the initial 
custody arrangement.  Some parents try to contract around the default 
modification rules.  Thus, for instance, in jurisdictions that make it easier to 
modify a parentally-agreed-upon custody arrangement than a judicially 
imposed one, parents may agree that should either of them wish to modify 
their agreed-upon custody arrangement, that parent must meet the heavier 
burden of proof that would typically apply only to court-ordered custody.
 
89  
Other parents, by contrast, provide in their initial custody agreement that 
custody can be modified under a less stringent standard than would 
ordinarily apply.90  For instance, in a 1999 Minnesota case, when the 
prevailing modification standard made it relatively difficult to modify 
custody—a court was required to find the child endangered by the existing 
arrangement in order to revisit the issue of custody—the parents had agreed 
to make modification easier by stipulating that a court could order a change 
of custody upon finding that to do so would be in the child’s best 
interests.91  The Minnesota Supreme Court found the agreement 
unenforceable, on the basis that a parent cannot contract around the 
prevailing modification standard.92
 
courts have held that stipulated custody arrangements approved by court order are subject to 
a lesser modification standard—modification upon best interests rather than upon a change 
in circumstances—if the parents did not intend their arrangement to constitute a final 
custody determination. See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz, 27 P.3d 289, 295 (Cal. 2001) (“[A] 
stipulated custody order is a final judicial custody determination for purposes of the changed 
circumstance rule only if there is a clear, affirmative indication the parties intended such a 
result.”). 
  The legislature responded by enacting a 
 87. See, e.g., Glaser v. McFadden, 731 N.Y.S.2d 576, 579 (App. Div. 2001) (“When the 
existing custody arrangement arises out of a stipulation between the parties, that arrangement 
‘is entitled to less weight than a disposition after a plenary trial.’” (quoting Carl J.B. v. 
Dorothy T., 589 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 1992))). 
 88. Stavig v. Stavig, 774 N.W.2d 454, 458 (S.D. 2009) (“When a judgment and decree 
of divorce is based upon the parties’ agreement, custody may be modified in subsequent 
proceedings without the necessity of a ‘substantial change in circumstances’ . . . [such that] 
‘the party seeking modification must only show that the best interests and welfare of the 
child requires a change of custody.’” (quoting Hulm v. Hulm, 44 N.W.2d 303, 305 (S.D. 
1992))). 
 89. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 899 So. 2d 726, 729 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (enforcing 
parental stipulation making custody modification subject to the heavy burden of proof that 
under state law applied only to custody orders based on judicial consideration of evidence of 
parental fitness). 
 90. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 591 P.2d 1043, 1043 (Colo. App. 1979) 
(refusing to enforce agreement that modification of custody arrangement would be governed 
by the best-interests standard rather than by the prevailing standard, which required a change 
of circumstances before the child’s best interests could be considered). 
 91. See Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 1999). 
 92. See id. 
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statute that explicitly permitted parents to agree that custody could be 
modified upon a showing that to do so would be in a child’s best interests, 
rather than under the default standard requiring that a court find a child to 
be endangered before ordering a change of an existing arrangement.93
Parents may also attempt to provide for a change in custody upon the 
occurrence of a certain event.  A number of such agreements involve 
parental relocation.  Sometimes the agreements are meant to prevent the 
custodial parent from relocating by either prohibiting relocation altogether
 
94 
or providing that custody will be transferred to the noncustodial parent 
should the custodian relocate out of a particular county, state, or region.95  
Parents contemplating relocation have also used agreements to set the terms 
of such relocation, for instance by delineating areas within which relocation 
can occur without an alteration of custody;96 by prohibiting relocation 
without permission of the other parent97; or by setting forth a procedure for 
arriving at future agreements in the event of relocation.98
Some parental custody agreements provide for an automatic change in 
custody once the child reaches a certain age.  In some cases, for instance, 
the parents initially agreed that the mother would have custody during the 
child’s younger years, and that the child would then begin living with the 
father upon reaching a predetermined age.
 
99  Other parental custody 
agreements have used automatic reversion provisions to monitor or control 
a parent’s behavior, such as by providing that custody would revert to the 
father if the mother should fail to attend alcohol abuse counseling,100
 
 93. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18 (West 2006). 
 or that 
 94. See, e.g., Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417, 418–19 (Fla. 1993); Moore v. McIntosh, 
128 So. 3d 985, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 95. See, e.g., Zeller v. Zeller, 640 N.W.2d 53, 59 (N.D. 2002) (refusing to enforce 
agreement that custody would automatically change from mother to father if mother moved 
out of state); Guss v. Guss, 472 A.2d 790, 792–93 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (same). 
 96. See, e.g., Frizzell v. Frizzell, 597 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515 (App. Div. 1993) (refusing to 
enforce agreement providing that mother residing in Albany could only relocate to Iowa, 
Boston, Washington, D.C., and New York City, where father had already relocated to Iowa 
and mother wanted to relocate to California). 
 97. See, e.g., Porter v. Fryer, 530 N.Y.S.2d 327 (App. Div. 1988) (permitting mother to 
relocate and to retain custody despite agreement providing she would not relocate without 
father’s consent). 
 98. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 263 P.3d 49, 51 (Alaska 2011) (involving agreement 
providing that “[i]f a parent moves in the future, which the parents agree will occur 
eventually, they will have to create a parenting agreement for different communities. Until 
they have that agreement the children cannot be moved from their current community”). 
 99. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jacobsen, 735 P.2d 627, 627–28 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) 
(refusing to enforce stipulated dissolution judgment that child would live with mother from 
infancy through the age of twelve, and that custody would then transfer to father); Knutsen 
v. Cegalis, 989 A.2d 1010 (Vt. 2009) (refusing to enforce what the father contended was an 
agreed-upon court order providing that the child would remain with his mother until starting 
kindergarten and would then live with his father); Herstine v. Herstine, No. 13873, 1994 WL 
37209 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1994) (refusing to enforce separation agreement providing for 
transfer of custody to mother after one year of initial residence with father). 
 100. See Mundon v. Mundon, 703 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to 
enforce agreement providing that custody would revert to father if mother violated 
conditions related to alcohol abuse and related counseling). 
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a mother would lose visitation rights should she expose her children to 
African-American male companions.101
Courts have largely refused to enforce agreements providing for an 
automatic change of custody upon an agreed-upon event, even where the 
agreement has been incorporated into a court order.  As the Vermont 
Supreme Court explained in refusing to enforce what the father contended 
was an agreement providing that custody would switch automatically from 
the mother to the father when the child started kindergarten, “changes in 
custody must be based on real-time determinations of a child’s best 
interests.”
 
102  It went on to note that there was no way to know in advance 
how the child, the parents, and the relationships between them would 
develop over the years after the agreement was entered into, and that any 
number of new developments could affect the best-interests calculus at the 
time the child stood to enter kindergarten.103  The dissent argued that 
refusing to enforce such agreements would make parents more reluctant to 
compromise and would increase litigation.104  The majority, however, 
found it irrelevant that the father had acquiesced to the initial arrangement 
only upon the condition that the child start living with him upon starting 
school, because “a court is not bound by that agreement when the evidence 
demonstrates that the best interests of a child requires a different result.”105
Courts have been similarly reluctant to enforce agreements that attempt 
to bypass the usual rules of parental relocation by providing for automatic 
transfer of custody should a parent move beyond a certain agreed-upon 
geographical boundary.
 
106  However, some courts have applied a more 
stringent standard to a custodial parent’s request to relocate where the 
parents had agreed that relocation would not occur.107
 
 101. See Turman v. Boleman, 510 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to 
enforce agreement on the basis both that it relied on an impermissible racial classification 
and that it was at odds with the preference for a child’s continued contact with the 
noncustodial parent). 
  Similarly, while 
 102. Knutsen, 989 A.2d at 1014 (citing cases in other jurisdictions refusing to enforce 
automatic custody transfer provisions); see also Mundon, 703 N.E.2d at 1133 (refusing to 
enforce agreement providing that custody would revert to father if mother failed to meet 
conditions relating to alcohol abuse, and holding that “[d]ivorcing parties are free to 
anticipate many future events and contingencies in maintenance and property 
agreements. . . .  But where provisions are made in the interest of the support and custody of 
children, as opposed to those which merely set forth rights in property, our legislature and 
sound public policy dictate that the trial court must play a role”). 
 103. Knutsen, 989 A.2d at 1014. 
 104. Id. at 1018 (Dooley, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 1017. 
 106. See, e.g., Guss v. Guss, 472 A.2d 790, 792–93 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984); Scott v. Scott, 
578 S.E.2d 876 (Ga. 2003); Zeller v. Zeller, 640 N.W.2d 53 (N.D. 2002).  
 107. See, e.g., Moore v. McIntosh, 128 So. 3d 985, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (“When 
the parties’ settlement or visitation agreement expressly prohibits a move, thus establishing 
that the parties had previously litigated the issue, the party who seeks to relocate must show 
a substantial change in circumstances to justify the relocation.”); Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 
417, 420 (Fla. 1993) (“[I]n cases where the final judgment incorporates a prohibition against 
the relocation of the child thereby reflecting that the issue was litigated, the parent with the 
primary residential responsibility must show a change of circumstances in order to justify the 
relocation.”). 
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courts typically will not enforce a provision for an automatic change in 
custody should a parent move or should a child reach a certain age, some 
courts have enforced provisions for judicial reevaluation of custody upon 
the occurrence of such events.108
c.   Agreements to Arbitrate Custody 
 
In many states, special rules also govern the arbitration of custody 
disputes.109  These rules can affect the enforceability both of agreements to 
arbitrate110 and of the custody determinations that result from arbitration.111  
Agreements to arbitrate in some cases delegate decision making to religious 
tribunals.112  Parents may also agree to defer to the decision of a mutually 
agreed-upon expert, such as a child psychologist.113
Some states prohibit arbitration of custody disputes altogether.  These 
states refuse to enforce agreements to arbitrate custody and prohibit courts 
from taking the results of arbitration into account in their determination of 
custody.
 
114  In states that permit the arbitration of custody disputes, there is 
significant variation in the deference accorded to the custody decision 
arrived at by the arbitrator.  Some states either permit115 or require courts to 
review such determinations de novo to ensure that the custody award is in 
the child’s best interests, on the theory that parents cannot preempt the 
power of the state to protect children’s interests.116
 
 108. See, e.g., Arrabal v. Hage, 19 So. 3d 1137, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) 
(enforcing agreement providing for the automatic reevaluation of custody upon the child 
entering sixth grade, where the prevailing modification standard required a substantial 
change in circumstances before custody could be reevaluated). 
  Other states grant 
 109. See generally E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the “Creatures of the State”:  Contracting 
for Child Custody Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1139 (2000) (reviewing current approaches to enforcing agreements to arbitrate 
custody and arguing for greater enforcement of such agreements). 
 110. See, e.g., Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 744 (App. Div. 1993) (refusing to 
compel arbitration of custody despite parental agreement to arbitrate). 
 111. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425, 437 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (holding 
that court could not adopt rabbinical court’s custody award without making an independent 
determination that this award was in children’s best interests). 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 425; Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 740 (involving parental agreement to 
arbitrate custody in rabbinical court). 
 113. See, e.g., M.F.M. v. J.O.M., 889 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (involving 
parental agreement to be bound by custody recommendation of child psychologist). 
 114. See Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ohio 2001) (refusing to enforce agreement 
to arbitrate custody and noting that “[a] two-stage procedure consisting of an arbitrator’s 
decision followed by de novo judicial review ‘is certain to be wasteful of time and expense 
and result in a duplication of effort’” (quoting Nestel v. Nestel, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (App. 
Div. 1972))); see also Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 744 (refusing to enforce agreement to 
arbitrate custody); Crutchley v. Crutchley, 293 S.E.2d 793, 794 (N.C. 1992) (same). 
 115. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Popack, 998 P.2d 464, 469 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding 
that custody can be submitted to arbitration, but that court retains jurisdiction to reconsider 
custody de novo upon the request of either party). 
 116. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 620 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (remanding for 
determination of whether arbitrator’s determination was adverse to children’s interests); 
Kovacs, 633 A.2d at 437 (holding that trial court erred by adopting custody determination of 
religious tribunal without making independent determination that this custody outcome was 
in the children’s best interests); Harvey v. Harvey, 680 N.W.2d 835, 836 (Mich. 2004) 
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greater deference to an arbitrator’s custody determination, for instance by 
requiring that a parent show a threat of harm to a child in order to obtain 
judicial review of an arbitrator’s custody award.117
d.   The Trend Toward Parenting Plans and Shared Custody 
 
Against the backdrop of the longstanding judicial reluctance to enforce 
custody agreements, several states have recently adopted special rules that 
give greater deference to certain types of custody arrangements that are 
seen as promoting parental cooperation, such as parenting plans and 
agreements to share custody.  Parenting plans are similar to custody orders 
but typically include more detail than a traditional custody order; for 
instance, a state may require a parenting plan to specify the procedures by 
which parents will communicate with one another about their children118 or 
resolve future disputes.119 The term “parenting plan” was intended to 
replace the winner-takes-all label of “primary custodian” and to encourage 
both parents to remain involved in their children’s lives.120  Under recent 
legislation designed to promote the use of parenting plans, a number of state 
custody statutes now provide that if both parties agree to such a plan, then 
the court must approve of the plan unless it makes factual findings 
supporting the conclusion that the plan is not in the best interests of the 
child.121
Some states also give greater levels of deference to parents’ agreements 
to share custody jointly, instead of allocating primary custody to one or 
another parent.
  These statutes permit courts to override parenting plans on the 
basis that they are adverse to a child’s interests but create a presumption 
that any such agreement is in the child’s best interests. 
122
 
(holding that parents cannot circumvent the court’s custody jurisdiction by agreeing to abide 
by the determination of a referee or arbitrator). 
  The national move toward encouraging parents to submit 
parenting plans was driven by the goal of inducing both parents to 
 117. See, e.g., Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. 2009). 
 118. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.02(C)(7) (2013). 
 119. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705(2)(a)(3) (West 2006). 
 120. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 1.1.II cmt. A (2000) 
(“As parenting plans move parents toward richer and fuller plans for the child, the 
limitations of traditional ‘custody’ and ‘visitation’ terminology become apparent. These 
traditional terms represent, and help to perpetuate, an adversarial, win-lose paradigm of 
divorce.”); Peter V. Rother, Balancing Custody Issues:  Minnesota’s New Parenting Plan 
Statute, 57 BENCH & B. MINN. 27, 27–28 (2000) (characterizing parenting plan legislation as 
designed to promote parental cooperation and to replace the “all or nothing” approach to 
custody). 
 121. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.  § 46b-56a(f) (West 2009) (“If both parents 
consent to a parental responsibility plan under this section, such plan shall be approved by 
the court  . . . unless the court finds that such plan as submitted and agreed to is not in the 
best interests of the child.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705(3)(a) (“Upon the request of both 
parents, a parenting plan must be created in lieu of an order for child custody and parenting 
time unless the court makes detailed findings that the proposed plan is not in the best 
interests of the child.”). 
 122. See generally J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting:  
Custody Presumptions in Law and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213 (2014) (assessing trend 
toward presumptions favoring joint custody). 
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participate in childrearing after separation and divorce, as well as to work 
with one another in determining an optimal arrangement.123  A related 
development was a shift in attitude toward joint custody (sometimes now 
called “shared parenting”).124  Joint custody can consist of joint legal 
custody, which entails shared parental authority to make significant 
decisions about a child; joint physical custody, which entails shared 
physical custody of the child; or some combination of both.125  Once 
disfavored, joint custody is today encouraged by many states, especially 
where parents agree to it, on the basis that, as articulated by the California 
Family Code, “it is the public policy of this state to assure that children 
have frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents 
have separated or dissolved their marriage, or ended their relationship.”126
Thus, a number of states have enacted statutes that favor joint custody 
agreements by creating a “presumption affecting the burden of proof” that 
joint custody is in the child’s best interests if the parents agree to it,
   
127 or, 
more forcefully, by providing that where parents agree to joint custody, a 
court must order it unless it determines on clear and convincing evidence 
that joint custody is not in the child’s best interests.128  Other states, by 
contrast, give courts discretion to accept an agreed-upon joint custody plan 
as long as a court finds it to be in a child’s best interests, but do not require 
courts to give any particular deference to such a plan.129
A number of courts, however, have resisted the statutory trend requiring 
them to extend greater deference toward certain types of agreements that 
promote parental cooperation in the aftermath of separation or divorce, such 
as parenting plans or joint custody agreements.  The judicial habit of 
exercising unbounded discretion when overseeing custody arrangements 
 
 
 123. See id. at 226. 
 124. See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. 
REV. 497, 497 (1988) (critiquing trend toward presumptive or judicially-imposed joint 
custody). 
 125. See DiFonzo, supra note 122, at 217 (noting that “[a] number of scenarios have been 
swept under the joint custody umbrella,” and arguing that “the joint custody-sole custody 
distinction is best viewed along a continuum, not as a sharp divide”). 
 126. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b) (West 2004).  See generally Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. 
Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody:   The Interests of Children in 
the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 397–98 (2008). 
 127. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(c) (West 
2009). 
 128. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a(2) (West 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 36-3-101(a)(2)(A)(i) (West 2014).  Florida goes further, and creates a strong presumption 
of shared custody regardless of whether the parents agree. See FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 2006) (“The court shall order that the parental responsibility for a 
minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental 
responsibility would be detrimental to the child.”). 
 129. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 109(D) (West 2001) (“The court shall issue a 
final plan . . . based upon the [joint custody] plan submitted by the parents, separate or 
jointly, with appropriate changes deemed by the court to be in the best interests of the child. 
The court also may reject a request for joint custody and proceed as if the request for joint 
custody had not been made.”); Haas v. Bauer, 804 N.E.2d 80, 87 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) 
(interpreting statute as requiring court to determine whether joint custody agreement 
facilitates child’s best interests). 
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has been hard to break.  Thus, for instance, an appellate court in Wisconsin 
held that a family court could reject the parents’ postjudgment agreement to 
modify custody, reaching this result by interpreting a statutory provision 
that “the court shall incorporate the terms of the stipulation into” its revised 
custody order as indicating that the family court “may” incorporate the 
parents’ stipulation into its order but was not required to do so.130  The 
court reasoned that, despite the clear statutory language indicating that 
parents’ agreements to transfer custody should be enforced without further 
review, “the consequences would be absurd if [the statute] were read to 
prohibit an examination of the best interests of the child.”131  As a New 
Jersey court explained in reaching a similar conclusion, “[t]he best interests 
of the child must serve as a polestar that guides the statutory analysis.”132
B.   Parentage Agreements 
 
To understand the function of custody agreements and to assess the 
judicial reluctance to enforce such agreements, it is helpful to place custody 
agreements within the context of all agreements that purport to allocate 
parental rights.  Parental agreements form a spectrum.  At one end of this 
spectrum are custody agreements—that is, agreements that set forth 
custodial and visitation rights among those who already possess the status 
of legal parent.  At the other end of the parental agreement spectrum are 
parentage agreements—that is, agreements by which parents and would-be 
parents redefine parental status altogether, by creating or terminating 
parental rights.  In the middle of the spectrum are hybrid agreements, such 
as parentage agreements that both create parental status and set the terms of 
custody and visitation should the parents’ relationship dissolve. 
With parentage agreements as with custody agreements, courts are often 
troubled by the use of contract law to make binding decisions about the 
parent-child relationship, and object that parental contracts should not be 
permitted to trump the judicial assessment of children’s welfare.  This 
section discusses current judicial approaches to three types of parentage 
agreements:  co-parenting agreements, gamete donation agreements, and 
surrogacy agreements.  Despite continued resistance to parentage by 
contract, there is a growing trend toward the enforcement of certain types of 
parentage agreements. 
1.   Co-Parenting Agreements 
In recent decades, a new body of case law has arisen regarding the 
enforceability of co-parenting agreements.  Courts had been asked for more 
than a century to enforce agreements by which parents transferred rights 
over their children to third parties, with most refusing to do so, and a 
 
 130. In re Paternity of S.A. II, 478 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Parks v. Poulter, No. A-1947-08T3, 2010 WL 1329484, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Apr. 1, 2010). 
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minority finding the agreements enforceable if in the children’s interests.133  
While some jurisdictions have applied this earlier case law to co-parenting 
agreements,134
Much of the recent case law on co-parenting agreements involves 
agreements between unmarried same-sex couples.
 the two types of agreements differ in important respects.  
The earlier agreements, which I will call third-party custody transfer 
agreements, purported to transfer custody rights altogether from the parent 
to a third party, such as a grandparent or an adoptive parent.  Co-parenting 
agreements, by contrast, do not purport to terminate the custodial rights of 
the original legal parent.  Their goal in most cases is instead to share 
parental rights between the legal parent and a second parent, thus creating a 
parent-child relationship analogous to that of a traditional nuclear family. 
135  In many of these 
cases, the couple agrees to jointly share rights and responsibilities toward a 
child that one of the partners intends to conceive, or already has conceived, 
through assisted reproductive technology.  Co-parenting agreements are 
also entered into with increasing frequency by stepparents.136
In a number of instances, the co-parenting agreements that have surfaced 
in the case law have features that resemble premarital custody agreements.  
Such agreements are perhaps best described as a hybrid of an agreement to 
parent a child together during the parents’ relationship and an agreement 
that both parents will continue to have legal rights to the child in the event 
that the parents separate.
  In both 
situations, the goal of the agreement is to extend parental rights and 
obligations to a functional or intended parent who might otherwise have no 
legal status as the child’s parent.  These co-parenting agreements, unlike 
third-party custody transfer agreements, create parental status for a party 
without terminating the custodial rights of an existing parent. 
137
 
 133. See supra note 
  While some co-parenting agreements of this 
nature merely indicate that both intended parents will have continued legal 
ties to the child in the event of separation, others include provisions that 
35 and accompanying text; see also Masitto v. Masitto, 488 N.E.2d 
857, 860 (Ohio 1986) (awarding custody to grandparents over father on basis that “[t]he 
parents’ agreement that custody of their child should be given to a third person is 
enforceable ‘subject only to judicial determination that the custodian was in every way a 
proper person to have the care, training and education of the child’” (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 
97 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950))). 
 134. See A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 664 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (citing cases upholding 
custody transfers to third parties as basis for finding that co-parenting agreements are not per 
se unenforceable); In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ohio 2002) (citing Masitto for 
proposition that co-parenting agreements are enforceable if in a child’s best interests).  
 135. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 
S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at 241. 
 136. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Garrity, 226 Cal. Rptr. 485, 486 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(refusing to enforce premarital agreement that each party would act as parent to the other 
party’s children); In re Marriage of Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d 799, 801, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) 
(refusing to enforce parental agreement to grant visitation with stepparent). 
 137. See, e.g., E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889 (involving co-parenting agreement executed 
before and after child’s birth, and expressing both intent to co-parent and intent for 
nonbiological parent to retain her parental status should the parties separate). 
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specify the custody, visitation, and support arrangements that will apply 
should separation occur.138
The goal of including a custody-in-the-event-of-dissolution provision in a 
co-parenting agreement is distinct from that of doing so in the premarital 
custody context, in that the signatories to a co-parenting agreement are 
concerned, as those to a premarital custody agreement typically are not, that 
both parents continue to have some legal right to their intended child in the 
event that their relationship dissolves.  Nonetheless, it is significant that the 
parties to these hybrid co-parenting agreements—like those to premarital 
custody agreements—are concerned about disputes that might arise between 
them should their relationship deteriorate, and have attempted to employ 
contract law to ensure that their own ex ante decisions about their children’s 
interests prevail over whatever they might feel ex post. 
 
A related category of co-parenting agreements consists of those that 
resemble custody agreements between divorcing or separating couples.  
These agreements are reached between co-parents at the time their 
relationship dissolves or during a conflict that arises post-dissolution.139
The states vary widely in their response to co-parenting agreements.  
Only a few jurisdictions have published case law declaring that courts can 
directly enforce such agreements.
  
Some such agreements may be the product of a consensus on the part of the 
co-parents that they should both have continued ties to a child going 
forward, and thus constitute an ex ante attempt of the legal parent to self-
bind, and thereby to protect the expectations of (and thus perhaps to 
encourage continued investment by) her co-parent.  In other cases, the legal 
parent may have agreed to a custody arrangement in the face of a threat to 
litigate, such that the agreement may evidence not a collaborative decision 
about the child’s interests going forward so much as a decision to avoid the 
costs and risks of litigation. 
140  The enforcing state with the most 
clearly developed law on the subject is Ohio.  When faced with attempts to 
enforce co-parenting agreements, Ohio courts have applied the state’s rule 
regarding parental transfers of custody to third parties, under which 
“[p]arents may waive their right to custody of [a child] and are bound by an 
agreement to do so.”141  Under this approach, Ohio has found agreements to 
share custody with a same-sex co-parent enforceable as long as the agreed-
to arrangement is in the child’s best interests.142
 
 138. See, e.g., Mason, 660 S.E.2d at 61 (noting that “Parenting Agreement” executed 
when child was three years old, and when co-parents’ relationship was intact, “set forth 
provisions relating to . . . custody, visitation, and financial support should the women’s 
relationship terminate”). 
 
 139. See, e.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (involving right of de facto 
parent to enforce visitation agreement arrived at by the parties during post-dissolution 
litigation). 
 140. See Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at 247 (agreement enforceable if in best interests of child); 
A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663–64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (same). 
 141. Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at 249 (citing Masitto v. Masitto, 488 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio 
1986)). 
 142. See id. (remanding to trial court for determination of whether enforcement of co-
parenting agreement between same-sex parents was in children’s best interests). 
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Ohio places significant limits, however, on the enforceability of co-
parenting agreements.  It distinguishes between parentage and custody, 
holding that agreements can reallocate custody but cannot create parental 
status.143  Moreover, the cases recognizing such agreements have tended to 
involve parents who are not in conflict, as was the situation in In re 
Bonfield,144 where the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the validity of a co-
parenting agreement in the context of an intact co-parenting relationship in 
which the parents wanted judicial affirmation of their shared custodial 
arrangement.  In a subsequent case where the co-parents were in conflict, 
the Ohio Supreme Court limited the practical significance of same-sex co-
parenting agreements by finding that any agreements by the legal parent to 
share custody with her co-parent had been revoked, and finding it relevant 
in this assessment that the legal mother had permitted the donor father to 
play a role in the child’s life.145
In most of the states that take co-parenting agreements into account in 
allocating parental rights, courts do not enforce the agreements, but instead 
consider them as a factor relevant to assessing parental rights under a theory 
of de facto parentage.  Under the de facto parentage test set forth by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Holtzman v. Knott
 
146 and adopted by a 
number of states, a co-parenting agreement is some evidence of consent to a 
functional parenting relationship, which, if established, in turn permits a 
court to award the functional parent visitation with a child, as long as the 
court finds visitation to be in the child’s best interests.147  Other states have 
subsequently extended full parental status on the basis of de facto 
parentage.148
Under the de facto parentage approach, a co-parenting agreement alone 
does not suffice to create parental status in the absence of functional 
parenting.  The result is that intended parents cannot protect their 
 
 
 143. See id. at 248 (limiting recognition of co-parenting agreement to enforcement of its 
custody provisions, and refusing to deem co-parent the full legal “parent” of the children she 
had raised with her partner since birth). 
 144. 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002). 
 145. See In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ohio 2011). 
 146. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). 
 147. See id. at 421 (providing that functional parent can claim right to visitation where 
(1) biological or adoptive parent consented to petitioner’s formation of a parent-like 
relationship with child; (2) petitioner and child lived together in same household; 
(3) petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood, including contribution toward child’s 
support; and (4) petitioner has been in a parental role for a sufficient length of time to have 
developed a parental bond with the child); see also E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892–
94 (Mass. 1999) (upholding award of visitation to de facto parent under best-interests test 
and finding it proper for trial court to consider co-parenting agreement as evidence of:  intent 
to co-parent, absence of financial compensation for parental relationship, and biological 
parent’s ex ante assessment of child’s interests); cf. Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 61, 
72–73 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding shared custody award to a same-sex co-parent under 
third-party visitation statute, where the co-parent had entered into a co-parenting agreement 
with the birth mother and had acted as a functional parent); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 
959 (R.I. 2000) (holding that, under state paternity statute, nonbiological same-sex co-parent 
had standing, on basis of de facto relationship with child, to enforce visitation agreement).  
 148. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 562 (Colo. App. 2004); C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 
845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 2004); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005). 
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expectations against the possibility that their relationship will dissolve 
before both parents have had the chance to develop a functional relationship 
with the child.  For instance, where the nonlegal parent decides to walk 
away from her intended child shortly after the child is born, she cannot be 
held to her agreement to help support that child, even if the child was 
conceived with the expectation of that support.  This was the case in T.F. v. 
B.L.,149 where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which had 
previously recognized de facto parenthood and had permitted consideration 
of a co-parenting contract as a factor in determining de facto parenthood, 
refused to enforce parental support obligations on the basis of what it 
referred to as “parenthood by contract.”150  The Massachusetts court 
reiterated its resistance to parenthood contracts in the subsequent case of 
A.H. v. M.P.,151 holding that, because “parenthood . . . can[not] be 
conferred by a private agreement,”152 a court could not award visitation 
rights on the basis of a co-parenting agreement where the co-parent trying 
to enforce the agreement had lived with and cared for the child but had not 
taken on a sufficient proportion of caretaking responsibilities to merit de 
facto parental status.153
Several jurisdictions have refused to recognize co-parenting agreements 
altogether, often along with a refusal to recognize de facto parentage.
 
154  In 
these jurisdictions, then, functional co-parents alleging an agreement to co-
parent are left without any basis for asserting parental rights or enforcing 
parental obligations.  Other states that deny rights to de facto parents, 
however, have noted in so doing that the petitioners did not rest their 
arguments on an agreement to co-parent, thus suggesting that such an 
agreement might provide a viable basis for extending parental rights and 
obligations.155
2.   Gamete Donation Agreements 
 
There is a widespread consensus that an agreement by an anonymous 
donor of gametes—whether in the form of sperm or ova—to relinquish 
parental status is binding and enforceable.  In most states, largely as a 
matter of statutory law, anonymous donors terminate their parental status by 
agreeing to donate their gametes to intermediaries who then provide them to 
 
 149. 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004). 
 150. See id. at 1248–49. 
 151. 857 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. 2006). 
 152. Id. at 1074 (quoting T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1254 (Greaney, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
 153. See id. at 1072–73. 
 154. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to 
enforce co-parenting agreement or to adopt theory of de facto parentage). 
 155. See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 15, 22–23 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (declining to 
adopt theory of de facto parentage, and noting, in denying mother’s petition for child 
support, that she had not preserved for appeal her argument that the co-parents had entered 
into an enforceable contract to share parental rights and responsibilities); Stadter v. Siperko, 
661 S.E.2d 494, 496 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to adopt theory of de facto parenthood, 
but noting without comment that “there was no written pre-separation agreement concerning 
appellant’s parental rights”). 
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intended parents.156  While such laws were originally drafted to address 
anonymous sperm donation, many states have since updated their statutes to 
include ova donation as well, and others have achieved the same result 
through case law.157
Because of the consensus on anonymous gamete donation—as well as 
the infrequency of attempts by anonymous donors to contest their waiver of 
parental status—most of the case law on gamete donation involves 
parentage disputes between mothers and known sperm donors.  Many states 
apply the same rules to sperm donors regardless of whether they are known 
or anonymous.  Under a typical statutory provision, donation of sperm for 
the purpose of artificially inseminating a married woman other than the 
donor’s wife through a physician-directed procedure terminates the donor’s 
parental status.
 
158  Some states either extend this rule to the donation of 
sperm to an unmarried woman159 or make no reference to the recipient’s 
marital status.160  A few further provide that a donor to a recipient other 
than his wife can retain parental status where the donor and recipient enter 
into a written contract to this effect, but that in the absence of such a 
contract the donor has no parental rights or obligations.161
A number of cases have arisen in which mothers and known sperm 
donors have reached parentage agreements in derogation of a state’s default 
rules on the subject.  Some of these agreements provide that a donor of 
sperm to an unmarried woman will retain his parental status even where the 
state statutory regime provides otherwise.  In some of the cases, the donor 
was an acquaintance of the woman, and they had agreed to raise a child 
together, sometimes in conjunction with the woman’s female partner; in 
others, the donor and recipient were in an intimate, but unmarried, 
relationship.  In both situations, courts have largely, but not uniformly, 
decided to enforce the agreements providing the donor with parental 
status.
 
162
 
 156. See NAOMI CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES:  WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL 
REGULATION 93–96 (2009). 
 
 157. See id. 
 158. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (2009) (“A donor who donates to a licensed 
physician for use by a married woman is not a parent of a child conceived by means of 
assisted reproduction.”). 
 159. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(1) (2009). 
 160. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West Supp. 2009) (“An identified or 
anonymous donor of sperm or eggs used in A.I.D., or any person claiming by or through 
such donor, shall not have any right or interest in any child born as a result of A.I.D.”); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (West 2008) (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by 
means of assisted reproduction.”). 
 161. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 2013) (“Unless the donor of semen 
and the woman have entered into a written contract to the contrary, the donor of semen 
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the 
donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the father of a child thereby conceived and 
shall have no rights or duties stemming from the conception of a child.”). 
 162. See In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (finding, in a dispute between 
a known sperm donor and an unmarried biological mother, that the “agreement and 
subsequent conduct are relevant to preserving the donor’s parental rights despite the 
existence of the statute” terminating them); Browne v. D’Alleva, No. FA064004782S, 2007 
WL 4636692, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2007) (holding with respect to dispute 
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The judicial response to agreements purporting to terminate or limit a 
known sperm donor’s rights in the absence of statutes providing for such 
termination has been more mixed.163  In the early case of Thomas S. v. 
Robin Y.,164 an appellate court in New York recognized the donor as the full 
legal father, granting his petition for an order of filiation, despite an 
agreement prior to conception that he “would not assume a parental role” 
toward the child.165  Almost a decade later, another New York court 
reached a similar conclusion in Tripp v. Hinckley,166 holding that a sperm 
donor could not be limited to the terms of a preconception agreement 
making the mother and her partner the custodial parents of the child, with 
visitation to the father and his partner, but instead must be treated as a full 
legal parent with the right to whatever custodial arrangement a family court 
determined to be in the child’s best interests.167
Other states, by contrast, have enforced agreements by which known 
donors have terminated their parental rights and obligations.  In Leckie v. 
Voorhies,
 
168 decided the same year as Thomas S., an Oregon court enforced 
a written preconception agreement by which the donor relinquished his 
rights to paternity and custody and agreed to retain only “limited visitation 
rights” at “the convenience of” the mother and her partner.169  More 
recently, in Ferguson v. McKiernon,170
 
between known sperm donor and female couple that “if there is an agreement between the 
parties about the donor’s parental rights and that he would have them, it would be a violation 
of his due process right to apply the statute [terminating the donor’s rights] to him”); 
McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 244–45 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that application of a 
statute terminating a sperm donor’s parental rights would violate the federal Due Process 
Clause if the donor could establish that he and the mother had entered into a pre-conception 
agreement that the donor would retain paternal rights); L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 
(Va. 2013) (finding that despite the statutory termination of sperm donor’s rights where he is 
not married to the mother, “[d]ue process requires that unmarried parents . . . be allowed to 
enter into voluntary agreements regarding the custody and care of their children”); see also 
In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 919 (Tex. App. 2005) (finding that a sperm donor had 
standing to adjudicate paternity despite a statute terminating his parental rights, while 
declining to address relevance of pre-birth co-parenting agreement to this determination). 
But see In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1044 (Kan. 2007) (refusing to recognize parental status 
of donor who claimed oral agreement to retain parental status, where statute required such an 
agreement to be in writing); In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 36–37 (Tex. App. 2006) (refusing 
to recognize donor’s parental status on basis of alleged pre-birth agreement that he would 
play a role in the child’s life, where statute provided for termination of donor’s parental 
status and donor had not executed an acknowledgment of paternity). 
 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
 163. In jurisdictions with statutes terminating paternal rights when a licensed physician 
performs the insemination, a number of courts have refused to enforce contracts purporting 
to terminate parental rights in situations where insemination did not follow the statutorily 
mandated procedure. See, e.g., E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171, 1176–77 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 2011) (refusing to enforce agreement to terminate donor’s parental status with 
respect to child born of self-administered assisted reproductive technology, where donor and 
mother joined to request such termination). 
 164. 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994). 
 165. Id. at 361. 
 166. 736 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507–08 (App. Div. 2002). 
 167. See id. 
 168. 875 P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
 169. Id. 
 170. 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007). 
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enforced an oral agreement by which a known donor terminated his parental 
rights and obligations, where the mother decided five years after her twins’ 
birth to bring an action for child support.171  The court emphasized the 
value of enabling a woman to conceive a child using “sperm from a man 
she knows and admires, while assuring him that he will never be subject to 
a support order and being herself assured that he will never be able to seek 
custody of the child.”172
The court in Ferguson not only enforced the agreement relinquishing the 
father’s paternal status, rejecting the lower court’s decision that it violated 
public policy, but held that enforcement should not hinge on any analysis of 
the children’s best interests.  The court acknowledged that the children in 
this case would be disadvantaged by enforcement of the agreement, which 
would deprive them of financial support.  But it found that the agreement 
should be enforced nonetheless, without reference to the children’s 
interests.
 
173
This privileging of a contractual agreement over children’s interests 
represents a significant departure from the custody case law, as well as from 
much of the case law on co-parenting agreements.  As we have seen, to the 
extent that courts will enforce co-parenting agreements or consider them in 
determining parental status under a theory of de facto parenthood, any 
award of custody or visitation on this basis requires a finding that such an 
award is in the child’s best interests.  The Ferguson court was willing to 
overlook the children’s interests in the name of facilitating certainty, 
stability, and predictability in their parents’ arrangements, under the theory 
that promoting those goals would be beneficial both to the children 
involved and to children generally.  In much of the case law on custody and 
other parentage agreements, however, there is no escaping the possibility of 
a best interests assessment that will undermine parents’ and children’s 
expectations about their future. 
 
3.   Surrogacy Agreements 
Surrogacy, in which a woman agrees to carry a pregnancy for the 
intended parent or parents, falls into two categories.  In traditional 
surrogacy, the surrogate’s own ova are fertilized through artificial 
insemination, and she then carries the resulting pregnancy to term.  In 
gestational surrogacy, the surrogate is impregnated with fertilized ova from 
another woman, either an intended mother or a donor.  Because gestational 
surrogacy requires in vitro fertilization, the procedures involved are both 
more complex and more expensive than those required for traditional 
surrogacy. 
In the absence of any legislation addressing surrogacy, courts have 
uniformly refused to enforce traditional surrogacy agreements that purport 
 
 171. Id. at 1248. 
 172. Id. at 1247. 
 173. See id. at 1248. 
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to terminate parental rights prior to conception or birth.174  Courts have 
generally been willing to approve a surrogate’s post-birth consent to 
adoption by the intended parents.175  But where the surrogate has instead 
changed her mind about relinquishing her biological child, courts have 
consistently declined to enforce the surrogate’s preconception agreement to 
terminate her parental rights.  In In re Baby M,176 the highly publicized 
1980s surrogacy dispute in which the surrogate refused to relinquish her 
rights to her child as she had contracted to do, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court proclaimed that even if the mother was capable of knowingly 
consenting to terminate her parental rights to her unborn child in exchange 
for financial compensation, “[t]here are, in a civilized society, some things 
that money cannot buy.”177  The Baby M court declined to enforce the 
agreement on a number of grounds, among them that parents cannot by 
contract circumvent the jurisdiction of the judiciary to ensure that any 
custody arrangement agreed to by parents is in the best interests of the 
child.178
Courts have been more receptive toward gestational surrogacy 
agreements, both where the ovum was provided by the intended mother
 
179 
and where it was obtained from a donor.180  Not all states have found such 
agreements enforceable, however, and some that have refused to enforce 
such agreements have awarded parental status to the surrogate, particularly 
where there was no intended mother with a genetic tie to the child.181  In 
New Jersey, for example, a court following the lead of Baby M refused to 
enforce a woman’s preconception agreement to relinquish her rights to the 
child she carried to term, where the child was conceived through a donated 
ovum and the sperm of her brother’s partner.182  The contract was deemed 
unenforceable, and the surrogate was found to be the legal mother of the 
child to whom she had given birth.183
A growing minority of jurisdictions, including Virginia,
 
184 Florida,185 
Illinois,186 and Arkansas,187
 
 174. See, e.g., In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 895, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); R.R. v. 
M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796–97 (Mass. 1998); A.L.S. v E.A.G., No. A10-443, 2010 WL 
4181449, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010). 
 have enacted legislation rendering certain 
 175. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Sur. Ct. 1986). 
 176. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 177. Id. at 1249. 
 178. Id. at 1248 (“Worst of all, however, is the contract’s total disregard of the best 
interests of the child.”). 
 179. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993); Culliton v. Beth Israel 
Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Mass. 2001); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 
760, 764 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994). 
 180. See, e.g., In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286 (Ct. App. 1998); Raftopol v. 
Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 797 (Conn. 2011); J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ohio 2007). 
 181. See, e.g., A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
Dec. 23, 2009) (awarding maternal status to gestational surrogate who agreed to carry the 
biological child of her brother’s partner). 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2008 & Supp. 2013). 
 185. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2010). 
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gestational surrogacy agreements enforceable.  In a number of these 
jurisdictions, the agreement is enforceable only if the intended parents meet 
a number of statutory requirements, including establishing a medical need 
for surrogacy188 and, in some states, obtaining judicial preconception 
approval of the agreement.189  Some permit compensation to the 
surrogate,190 but others prohibit it.191
Virginia and Arkansas also permit the enforcement of traditional 
surrogacy agreements.
 
192  Virginia, however, in addition to requiring 
judicial preapproval of such agreements,193 allows a surrogate who is also a 
genetic parent to revoke her consent for up to 180 days after the final 
attempt at conception,194
Other states, by contrast, have enacted statutes prohibiting surrogacy of 
any variety, rendering surrogacy agreements void
 thus negating much of the protection and certainty 
that such an agreement provides to the child and intended parents. 
195 and, in some states, 
subject to criminal penalties.196  Moreover, despite a general trend toward 
enforcement of gestational surrogacy agreements, there has been resistance 
toward embracing a regime in which parentage is truly a matter of private 
contract.  Even in California, one of the jurisdictions most favorable toward 
gestational surrogacy, courts have insisted that they do not enforce 
gestational agreements when they award custody to the commissioning 
parents but rather look to such agreements as evidence of intent to parent, 
which is relevant under state parentage laws.197  California has rejected 
making the parental status of children born through surrogacy hinge on an 
assessment of the children’s interests, and in this sense favors private 
ordering in creating parental status.198
 
 186. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1-75 (West 2009). 
  But California courts have 
 187. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2010). 
 188. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(8). 
 189. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(A). 
 190. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(d)(3). 
 191. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(4); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(4). 
 192. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160. 
 193. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(A). 
 194. See id. § 20-161(B). 
 195. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-402 (2012); IND. CODE §§ 31-20-1-1, -2 (2014); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2009); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
18-05 (1991). 
 196. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.859 (criminalizing entry into or arrangement of a 
compensated surrogacy agreement); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) (same). 
 197. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289 (Ct. App. 1998) (“There 
is a difference between a court’s enforcing a surrogacy agreement and making a legal 
determination based on the intent expressed in a surrogacy agreement.”); see also Johnson v. 
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (looking to a surrogacy agreement to determine intent 
to parent and finding the agreement sufficiently consistent with public policy to take it into 
consideration in assessing intent to parent, while refraining from directly enforcing the 
agreement). 
 198. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 n.10 (characterizing parentage determination on the 
basis of a child’s best interests as raising “the repugnant specter of governmental 
interference in matters implicating our most fundamental notions of privacy”); Buzzanca, 72 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291 (rejecting proposition that parents who employ assisted reproductive 
technology should be screened in the same way as adoptive parents). 
2014] CONTRACTUALIZING CUSTODY 101 
nonetheless resisted a regime of parenthood by contract, making clear that 
surrogacy contracts are not enforceable per se, but are considered only 
insofar as they have bearing on parental intent or other factors relevant to 
parental status under the state’s parentage legislation.199
Thus, courts are conflicted on the enforcement of agreements allocating 
parental status, whether in the form of surrogacy agreements, gamete 
donation agreements, or co-parenting agreements.  While there is a trend 
toward recognizing certain forms of such agreements, this trend is far from 
uniform.  And even courts that afford some recognition to parentage 
agreements may express antipathy toward the notion of “parenthood by 
contract.”
 
200
II.   THE DIVERGENCE OF SCHOLARLY APPROACHES TO CUSTODY AND 
PARENTAGE AGREEMENTS 
  In the parentage case law as in the custody case law, courts 
convey significant discomfort about the prospect of contractualizing 
parenthood. 
In recent decades, there has been extensive scholarly treatment of the role 
of contract in shaping rights and obligations within the family.  The 
scholarly literature on the contractualization of marriage, however, often 
makes little mention of custody agreements; a typical move by those who 
assess the enforcement of marital contracts is to indicate in passing that 
different rules necessarily apply to contractual provisions regarding 
custody, since these affect children.  To the extent that the literature on 
marital contracts addresses custody agreements, it tends to endorse the 
judicial view that such agreements should not be enforced unless a court 
finds enforcement to be in a child’s best interests—a standard that renders 
custody contracts largely superfluous.  Even those who otherwise favor 
permitting family rights and obligations to be determined by private 
agreement often argue that children must pose the limit to the 
contractualization of family law. 
By contrast, family law scholars who focus on the definition of 
parentage—for instance, in the contexts of assisted reproductive technology 
and same-sex parents—tend to be considerably more favorable toward 
enforcing contractual arrangements.  Opposition to enforcing parentage 
contracts is strongest with respect to surrogacy, both traditional and 
gestational, because of concerns regarding the exploitation of women, harm 
to children, and the commodification of children and of parenthood.  With 
respect to other forms of parentage contracts, however, such as co-parenting 
 
 199. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289 (“In the case before us, we are not concerned, 
as [the intended father] would have us believe, with a question of the enforceability of the 
oral and written surrogacy contracts into which he entered with [the gestational surrogate].  
This case is not about ‘transferring’ parenthood pursuant to those agreements.  We are, 
rather, concerned with the consequences of those agreements as acts which caused the birth 
of a child.”). 
 200. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Mass. 2004); see also Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 289 (insisting that the court is not “enforcing” the surrogacy contract that it relies on to 
determine parentage). 
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agreements and gamete donation agreements, there is a widespread, while 
not uniform, consensus that such contracts should be enforced. 
This part explores the divergence in views about the merits of enforcing 
custody agreements, on the one hand, and parentage agreements, on the 
other.  It reviews the objections to enforcing custody agreements and shows 
that these apply with equal force in the parentage context.  This part 
concludes that the divergence in scholarly attitudes toward the two types of 
agreements is incoherent, and employs the parentage literature to illustrate 
both the advantages of enforcing custody contracts and the weaknesses of 
the prevailing arguments against such enforcement. 
A.   The Marital Contracts Literature:   
Scholarly Opposition to Custody Contracts 
1.   Increased Acceptance of Marital Contracts 
Over the past thirty years, family law has become increasingly privatized.  
By the late twentieth century, the progression “from Status to Contract” that 
Henry Maine had described a century earlier had finally entered the 
specialized domain of family relations.201  For most of the twentieth 
century, courts and scholars resisted the encroachment of contract into the 
family, insisting both that the state has an interest in determining the rights 
and obligations of family members and that the arms-length and self-
interested nature of contractual negotiations is antithetical to the intimacy, 
altruism, and mutual trust that should prevail between family members.202  
Since the 1970s, however, both courts and scholars have moved toward 
increasing acceptance of a contractualized approach to certain family rights 
and obligations.203
The trend toward the contractualization of the family began with the 
availability of no-fault divorce, and later included an increasing willingness 
to enforce both prenuptial agreements setting forth the financial rights and 
obligations of spouses when marriage comes to an end and private contracts 
between unmarried cohabitants.
 
204  As recently as the late 1960s, no state 
offered no-fault divorce,205 and courts routinely refused to enforce 
prenuptial agreements or agreements between unmarried cohabitants.206
 
 201. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 141 (Dorset Press 1986) (1861). 
 
The prevailing view was that because the state has an interest in marriage, 
individuals should not be able to contract around the rights and obligations 
that come with the status of being married, should not be encouraged to 
 202. See, e.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting 
contention that “spouses can be treated just like any other parties haggling at arm’s length”). 
 203. See generally Singer, supra note 1 (summarizing these developments); see also 
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 
(1998) (describing the trend toward the contractualization of family law, and proposing 
default marriage law rules consistent with the view of marriage as a relational contract). 
 204. See Bix, supra note 56, at 261–73. 
 205. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1470. 
 206. See id. at 1446, 1474. 
2014] CONTRACTUALIZING CUSTODY 103 
create private agreements that encourage divorce, and should not be able to 
create a private alternative to marriage through private contract.207
Today, every state offers no-fault divorce.
 
208  At least half of the states 
will enforce the financial terms of prenuptial agreements without second-
guessing the fairness of such bargains,209 while the remainder of states will 
enforce such agreements as long as the terms are both procedurally and 
substantively fair.210  And the majority of states will enforce both express 
and implied agreements by which unmarried cohabitants determine their 
financial rights and obligations toward one another.211
There are still significant limits on the contractualization of marriage, 
even with respect to the financial rights and obligations of family members.  
The reluctance to allow contract law in its purest form to enter into the 
domain of family relations is exhibited, for instance, in the view of nearly 
half of the states that prenuptial agreements should be enforced only if a 
court ensures that a given agreement was fairly procured and makes 
reasonable provisions for the less well-off spouse.
 
212  And even those 
jurisdictions that are most favorable toward the enforcement of premarital 
agreements typically do not permit the enforcement of terms that would 
cause one party to require public assistance213 or that diminish a child’s 
right to support.214
Moreover, while the developments of the past fifty years have enabled 
individuals to govern the terms of exit from marriage or marriage-like 
relationships, courts continue to be reluctant to enforce agreements that 
govern the ongoing relationship.
 
215  And judicial views about the state-
dictated duties of spouses within an intact marriage often render contracts 
for domestic services unenforceable, on the ground that spouses have a 
preexisting duty to provide such services.216
Nonetheless, family members are now able as never before both to exit 
marriage at will and to use private agreements to dictate the financial terms 
that will apply when their marriage ends.  These exit terms, in turn, often 
have a significant effect on the incentives, power dynamics, and 
  
 
 207. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love:  The Enforcement of Premarital 
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 148–72 
(1998) (describing initial resistance to private domestic agreements). 
 208. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 
2 (2012). 
 209. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983).  The Uniform 
Premarital Agreement Act has been adopted in more than half of the states. See Barbara A. 
Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 14 & n.14 
(2012). 
 210. See Bix, supra note 56, at 249, 264. 
 211. See id. at 272. 
 212. See id. at 264. 
 213. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6. 
 214. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(b) (“The right of a child to support may 
not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement.”). 
 215. See generally Case, supra note 49 (advocating greater enforcement of such 
agreements). 
 216. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 840–41 
(2004). 
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assumptions within an ongoing marriage.217
A substantial contingent of family law scholars has embraced the 
contractualization of marriage.
  Thus, the contractualization of 
marriage has the potential to reshape intact marriage as well. 
218  As many have noted, allowing contract 
to dictate the terms of marital and marriage-like relationships promotes 
diversity and pluralism of family forms, by providing individuals with the 
autonomy to determine what their relationships should look like.219  Such 
scholars argue that if both spouses want to remain financially independent 
during their marriage, and to individually retain whatever assets and earning 
power each spouse accumulates, a regime of enforceable premarital or 
marital contracts enables them to do so.  If, by contrast, a couple would 
prefer their marriage to take a more traditional form, with one spouse acting 
as the breadwinner and the other as the stay-at-home spouse, a prenuptial 
agreement can ensure that neither spouse is disadvantaged by such an 
arrangement in a jurisdiction that prefers to promote egalitarian marriages 
in which both men and women enter the workplace and acquire earning 
power.220
The power of contract goes beyond allowing legally recognized spouses 
to design their own marital rights and obligations.  It also enables adults 
who cannot or do not wish to marry, such as same-sex couples in certain 
jurisdictions, siblings, or friends, the power to form family ties without 
regard to the state’s ideal of what a family should look like.
 
221  For this 
reason, the increased willingness of courts to enforce agreements between 
adults in an intimate relationship has been widely welcomed as facilitating 
individual freedom to craft family forms that the state might, if given the 
chance, reject.222
Much of the continued scholarly resistance to the enforcement of marital 
contracts—in particular, to the enforcement of prenuptial and postnuptial 
agreements—rests on the potential unfairness of such agreements to the 
more vulnerable spouse, with a particular emphasis on potential unfairness 
to women.
 
223
 
 217. See generally Amy Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of Marriage:  Is There a Future 
for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998). 
  Feminists have argued that women tend to have weaker 
bargaining power than men, both before and within the marital union.  Amy 
 218. See, e.g., Case, supra note 49; Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 1, at 464–65; Shultz, 
supra note 12; Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397 
(1992); Stark, supra note 1. 
 219. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 1, at 1491 (recommending a marriage law that “explicitly 
contemplates varied, changing, contextualized forms of marriage”). 
 220. See, e.g., Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 1, at 464, 502 (describing how contract can 
protect spouses in traditional marriages). 
 221. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 12, at 220–40 (describing liberating possibilities of 
contractualizing family ties). 
 222. See, e.g., Bix, supra note 56, at 251 (“Just as we would not have government tell 
people whether to marry or whom, whether to have children or how many, it seems but a 
small step to say that individuals should have comparable freedom to select or modify some 
of the terms of their domestic ties.”). 
 223. See generally Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229 (1994) (arguing that enforcing such agreements exacerbates 
gender inequality). 
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Wax contends that women have less leverage than men within marriage in 
part because of their lower value on the remarriage market;224 other factors 
that potentially disadvantage women in marital bargaining include lower 
earning potential225 and less aggressive negotiation styles.226  As a result, 
marital agreements entered into before or during the marriage will often 
reflect women’s weaker bargaining position by setting forth terms that 
disadvantage women and leave them vulnerable when the marriage 
dissolves.227  The status-based rules of marital property division and 
spousal support are intended in large part to protect the dependent spouse in 
the marriage, such as the wife who sacrifices her career to care for children 
while her husband continues to progress in his career and develop his 
earning potential.  Pre- and postnuptial agreements often contract around 
rules meant to protect the dependent spouse in this situation, leaving her 
without protection when the marriage ends.228
Another common objection to enforcement of prenuptial agreements is 
that it can be difficult for couples entering into marriage to be rational about 
marital dissolution.  One cognitive limit suffered by couples entering 
marriage is an optimism bias; a well-known study by Lynn Baker and 
Robert Emery found that even law students well-informed about the high 
rate of divorce tend to believe that their own marriage will endure.
 
229  A 
second barrier to rational prenuptial contracting is the difficulty of 
foreseeing the contingencies that might occur during the course of the 
marital relationship.  Given the potentially long-term nature of marriage, 
spouses-to-be may have difficulty predicting the various events that might 
occur during the course of their relationship, such as career changes, 
unemployment, or illness of a spouse or of another family member.  Such 
contingencies may make agreements limiting spousal support or property 
division significantly more onerous for one of the spouses than initially 
anticipated.230
 
 224. See Wax, supra note 
 
217, at 544–50. 
 225. See id. at 612. 
 226. See id. at 589 (describing arguments to this effect).  But see Margaret F. Brinig, 
Does Mediation Systematically Disadvantage Women?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 5–
6, 10–11 (1995) (finding little support for the claim that women are more risk-averse and 
altruistic than men such that they are inherently at a disadvantage in marital bargaining, 
while noting that differences in earning power and hence in power within the marital 
relationship can affect marital bargaining power). 
 227. See Kathryn Abrams, Choice, Dependence, and the Reinvigoration of the 
Traditional Family, 73 IND. L.J. 517, 518 (1998) (“[W]e should question how choice is 
produced within heterosexual unions, where power relationships are complicated and often 
unequal.”). 
 228. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1549 (“[L]egal rules that grant unfettered discretion to 
private individuals to structure the process of marital dissolution . . . may end up 
empowering economically stronger family members at the cost of economically weaker 
ones.”). 
 229. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:  
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
439, 445 (1993). 
 230. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 254–58 (1995) (arguing that courts implicitly recognize this 
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Despite these objections, many scholars advocate enforcing marital 
agreements allocating rights to property and support.231  A number of those 
who agree that unfairness to women and problems of rationality pose 
significant concerns have proposed mechanisms for addressing such 
concerns while enabling couples to craft enforceable premarital or 
postmarital agreements.232  For instance, some recommend implementing 
procedural safeguards to ensure that the parties to premarital agreements are 
free from undue pressure and well-informed of the rights and duties that 
they are relinquishing and of the assets of their future spouse.233  This 
recommendation is often coupled with the proposal of some degree of 
substantive review to prevent the enforcement of agreements that will inflict 
injustice, particularly when this injustice is the result of events that were not 
foreseen by the parties at the time the agreement was executed.234  Such 
safeguards—which at once police marital bargains and provide mechanisms 
to ensure their enforceability—have been endorsed by the ALI235 and 
adopted, in some form, by nearly half of the states.236  Others have 
suggested strengthening the bargaining power of vulnerable spouses by 
changing the default rules of marriage, for instance by giving non-
breadwinners greater rights to spousal support or marital property,237 or, as 
Amy Wax proposes, by returning to a strong presumption of maternal 
custody.238
 
aspect of bounded rationality when they refuse to enforce prenuptial agreements where 
enforcement would be unduly burdensome as the result of unforeseen circumstances). 
  These proposals would facilitate premarital and marital 
bargains by addressing the objection that women and men have unequal 
bargaining power within the marital relationship. 
 231. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 12, at 329–30 (arguing that extension of the contractual 
ordering of marriage will best facilitate “private values and choices,” despite the risk that 
some of these choices will be the product of a disparity in bargaining power); Stake, supra 
note 218, at 415–29 (recommending that premarital agreements be both enforceable and 
mandatory); Wax, supra note 217, at 651–52 (addressing possibility that enforcement of 
antenuptial contracts might help to address the current inequality of bargaining power within 
marriage); Williams, supra note 1, at 827 (advocating enforcement of postnuptial 
agreements). 
 232. See, e.g., Brod, supra note 223, at 282 (arguing that “while premarital agreements 
generally harm women, such agreements also serve beneficial purposes” and proposing a 
combination of procedural and substantive mechanisms of review to mitigate against 
potential unfairness while permitting enforcement); see also Howard Fink & June Carbone, 
Between Private Ordering and Public Fiat:  A New Paradigm for Family Law Decision-
Making, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 28–36 (2003) (proposing a declaratory judgment process by 
which courts could declare ex ante that premarital agreements are sufficiently fair both 
procedurally and substantively to merit enforcement). 
 233. See Brod, supra note 223, at 286–91 (proposing requirement that each party to such 
an agreement be represented by independent counsel, “unless the agreement clearly attains 
economic justice for the vulnerable spouse”). 
 234. See id. at 288 (arguing that “the more economically unjust the agreement, the more 
demanding the court should be in determining whether the agreement was procured fairly”). 
 235. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.04–.05 (2000). 
 236. See Bix, supra note 207, at 151–58. 
 237. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, No-Fault Divorce and Child Custody:  Chilling Out the 
Gender Wars, 36 FAM. L.Q. 27, 42–43 (2002). 
 238. See Wax, supra note 217, at 641–42. 
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2.   Continued Resistance to Custody Contracts 
Scholarly support is significantly weaker when it comes to the 
enforcement of marital agreements about child custody, particularly those 
entered into either prior to or during marriage.  Family law scholarship on 
marital contracts largely either sidesteps the topic of custody agreements or 
recommends that these be treated differently from contracts allocating 
rights to property and support.239  The consensus is that custody agreements 
are exceptional, because these affect the rights of third parties—children—
who are not parties to the marital bargain and in whose welfare the state has 
an interest.240  Some extend this analysis to all marital contracts that 
potentially affect children, including those regarding property division and 
spousal support, as well as the right to exit from marriage, arguing that 
here, too, the private right to contract should be limited by state concerns 
about children’s welfare.241  But few question the prevailing view that, at a 
minimum, parents should not be permitted to employ custody agreements to 
circumvent the judicial power to ensure that custody arrangements coincide 
with children’s best interests.242
 
 239. See, e.g., Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 
 
1, at 475 (proposing widespread 
enforcement of marital agreements, but not with respect to custody provisions, on the basis 
that “[t]here are some consequences of divorce—such as child custody where the child’s 
interests must be protected—that do require judicial supervision”); Jeffrey Evans Stake, 
Paternalism in the Law of Marriage, 74 IND. L.J. 801, 807 (1999) (“[W]e agree that children 
cannot protect themselves, and therefore must be protected by the state.  We do not propose 
to change current law regarding children . . . .”); Williams, supra note 1, at 830 (proposing 
enforcement of postnuptial contracts with the exception of provisions relating to child 
custody or child support). 
 240. See Scott & Scott, supra note 203, at 1323 (noting that “children are not parties to 
the contract and the state has an important interest in their welfare”); Singer, supra note 1, at 
1552 (“Children’s interests may . . . be threatened by the shift from public to private ordering 
of the process for resolving family disputes.  Children are, quite literally, unrepresented third 
parties . . . .”); Stark, supra note 1, at 1525 (proposing that in a regime where parents would 
be able to enforce premarital “Marriage Proposals” setting forth the rules and principles that 
would govern property division and custody at divorce, these would presumptively reflect 
their children’s best interests, but “[c]ustody . . . would still be subject to a judicial 
determination of the ‘best interest’ of the child at divorce”). 
 241. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1553–55 (proposing “two-tier family law regime” under 
which private ordering is more limited in families with children). 
 242. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.  The only recent scholarship directly 
advocating enforcement of custody agreements rests primarily on parents’ constitutional 
right to make fundamental decisions about their children’s custody. See generally Linda 
Jellum, Parents Know Best:  Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody Agreements, 65 
OHIO ST. L.J. 615 (2004) (arguing for greater deference to parents’ custody agreements, on 
the basis both that parents are best positioned to make such decisions and that they have a 
constitutional right to do so); see also Spitko, supra note 109 (arguing that greater deference 
to parents’ agreements to arbitrate custody would help to protect parents’ autonomy and their 
constitutional right to direct their children’s upbringing).  Enforcement of custody 
agreements was also advocated by Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser in their seminal 
article about how default legal rules affect bargaining behavior in the context of divorce. See 
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 957 (1979) (“We believe divorcing parents should be given 
considerable freedom to decide custody matters—subject only to the same minimum 
standards for protecting the child from neglect and abuse that the state imposes on all 
families.”).  At the same time, however, Mnookin and Kornhauser observed that there are a 
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With respect to premarital custody agreements (there is little discussion 
of postnuptial agreements relating to custody),243 a further objection is that 
parents are unlikely to be able to predict their children’s interests in one or 
another custody arrangement before the children are born.  Unpredictability 
is a problem with all premarital agreements.  But to some, it is especially 
problematic for someone who may not yet be a parent to purport to know 
what is best for a child who does not yet exist and does not yet have an 
established relationship with either parent.244
Perhaps the most powerful objection to premarital custody agreements is 
that the very existence of such an agreement could be detrimental to a child.  
One argument here is that a parent who has agreed to relinquish the right to 
primary custody before a child is born might be less invested in the child as 
a result.
 
245  However, the incentive effect of a premarital custody agreement 
could also cut the other way—a parent who has agreed to forgo primary 
custody of a child in the event of divorce might have a greater incentive to 
make the marriage work, to the child’s benefit.246  The more intractable 
problem is the possibility that a child’s relationship with a parent could be 
harmed by the child’s knowledge that that parent had agreed, ex ante, to 
forgo primary custody in the event of divorce.247
Another concern with premarital custody provisions is that unequal 
bargaining power might enable the stronger party to impose a one-sided 
custody agreement as part of a premarital package that overwhelmingly 
benefits one spouse to the detriment of the other.  An example of such an 
agreement is provided by the Littlefield case, in which the much older and 
  This is indeed a risk of 
premarital custody agreements.  However, it is a risk that applies to any 
premarital agreement; the very existence of such an agreement, after all, 
indicates to a child that her parents have contemplated divorce—a reality 
that might undermine a child’s sense of security and stability.  Yet we 
enforce (and thereby encourage) premarital agreements nonetheless. 
 
number of potential problems with bargaining for custody under the current legal regime. 
See generally id. 
 243. See Williams, supra note 1, at 830 (excepting custody agreements from proposal for 
greater enforcement of postnuptial contracts). 
 244. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 140 (arguing that intended parents cannot predict 
interests of an unborn child); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08(e) cmt. i (2000) (“Along with the customary lack of 
realism most couples share about the likelihood of a separation or divorce, adults on the 
brink of marriage can be expected to be limited in their ability to evaluate their child’s needs, 
judge the other parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs, or gauge their own interests.”).  
The ALI Principles indicate that it is more appropriate for a court to take into account a 
custody agreement that was made after a child was born, or one that the parents agreed to ex 
ante but adhered to during their marriage. See id.  But the ALI declines to render such 
agreements enforceable. See id. 
 245. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 127–28. 
 246. A potential problem here would be the possibility that a parent would be trapped in 
an abusive marriage by the fear of losing custody—a possibility that this Article addresses in 
its proposal in Part IV. 
 247. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 127–28; Stake, supra note 218, at 436 (noting that 
“learning of their parents’ contingent allocation might cause emotional injury to the children 
by making them think that one parent does not care about them”). 
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wealthier husband-to-be presented his future wife with a premarital 
agreement that, in the course of providing the husband with every 
protection that an attorney could devise, mandated a joint custody 
arrangement, with equally shared residential custody, for any children of the 
marriage.248
The problem of unequal bargaining power is also emphasized by scholars 
concerned with the enforcement of custody agreements made at separation 
or divorce.  Here, a common focus of scholarly attention is the likelihood 
that the parent more invested in custody will trade access or custody for 
property or support.
  Where, as here, a premarital agreement is the product of an 
extreme power imbalance, its custody provisions may not be the product of 
careful deliberation regarding a child’s future interests, but might instead 
have been unilaterally imposed by the stronger party to create as much 
leverage as possible in the event of separation or divorce.  And even where 
some negotiation of custody terms occurs, the power imbalance might 
hamper the ability of the parent more likely to be invested in the child’s 
interests to make agreements that are beneficial for that child. 
249  Scholars to make this objection have built on 
Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser’s argument that the parent who is 
more invested in maintaining custody will often be so risk averse with 
respect to the custody outcome that, under the indeterminate and 
unpredictable best-interests standard, she will forgo rights to property or 
support in order to avoid even a small possibility of losing sole custody.250  
While there is some debate in the scholarly literature about whether it is 
true as an empirical matter that parents will trade custody for money,251 
many contend that it is, and either oppose enforcement of custody 
agreements on this basis252
 
 248. See discussion supra Part I.A.1. 
 or argue for changing the default rules of 
 249. See Scott & Scott, supra note 203, at 1244 (describing criticism that “in bargaining 
over divorce, parents are free to decide their children’s future in a negotiation in which 
custody and support are the currency of exchange.  The withdrawal of the state from its 
historic role in setting the terms of marriage and supervising the decisions of parents for their 
children thus harms the welfare of children”); Singer, supra note 1, at 1552–53 (discussing 
frequency of “bald-faced trade-off[s] of access to the children for support payments”). 
 250. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 242, at 978–79 (analyzing ways in which 
the uncertainty of the current default custody rule affects the bargaining power of the 
spouses); Scott, supra note 63, at 643–56 (arguing that the indeterminate best-interests 
standard encourages trade-offs between money and custody, which in turn increase the 
likelihood that divorce bargaining will facilitate strategic behavior, increase bargaining costs, 
and undermine the financial security of children). 
 251. See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:  
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 154–61 (1992) (concluding from empirical study 
of divorce decrees that “most divorce decrees do not reflect a trade-off between custody and 
money”); Brinig, supra note 226, at 10 (noting that “[t]here has been little empirical testing 
of Mnookin and Kornhauser’s ‘trading’ theory”); Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide 
Divorce Cases?  An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 
401, 513 (1996) (finding no evidence of custody-money trade-offs in settlements tracked as 
part of empirical study of judicial decision making in New York). 
 252. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 1, at 1550–56. 
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custody law to make such trade-offs, and related strategic behavior, less 
likely.253
Where parents exchange custody for money, this disadvantages children 
materially, in that the children who live with a primary custodial parent will 
suffer from the loss of property along with the parent who gave up her right 
to that property in exchange for custody.
 
254  This exchange also raises 
commodification concerns, as is most evident in those rare cases where 
divorcing fathers agree to forgo visitation altogether in exchange for a 
mother’s agreement to relinquish all rights to child support.  The scholarly 
sentiment against enforcing such agreements rests in part on the view that it 
is harmful to children’s self-image to permit what looks like the sale of 
parental rights by the parent less interested in retaining custody.255
Arguably, however, both the problem of unequal bargaining power and 
the related problem of trade-offs between custody and property are more 
likely to apply at dissolution than in the premarital context.  This is both 
because those entering into marriage tend to be less adversarial than those 
divorcing and because the spouse who invests more in the child—to the 
damage of her career prospects—is likely to have greater bargaining power 
at the outset of her marriage, when she has not yet sacrificed her earning 
power or agreed to have children or to care for them, than at dissolution.  
By the time of divorce, the damage to earning power inflicted by unequal 
roles in caretaking and other domestic chores—or by other sacrifices, such 
as the tendency of the spouse with weaker earning power to leave her own 
job in order to enable a higher-earning spouse to improve his or her career 
 
 
 253. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal 
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 761 (1988) (advocating a 
return to the primary caretaker presumption, and noting that under the prevailing approach to 
child custody, “many women bargain away needed property and support benefits to avoid 
the risk of ‘losing’ their children”); Scott, supra note 63, at 652 (contending that replacing 
the best-interests-of-the-child standard with the more determinate approximation approach, 
which awards custody in proportion to the amount of time each parent spent caring for the 
child while the parents’ relationship was intact, will help to “enhanc[e] the possibility that 
parties will reach a cooperative agreement about custody independent of their bargaining 
over property rights”); cf. Kay, supra note 237, at 42 (noting that the revised ALI approach 
to spousal support, which emphasizes compensation rather than need and attempts to make 
support awards less discretionary, provides an “important safeguard against the money-for-
children tradeoff” by reducing the uncertainty of spousal support awards and thus 
“lessen[ing] the incentive to use children as a bargaining chip”). 
 254. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1550 (“Substantial evidence suggests that the common 
divorce bargaining practice of a parent trading off financial claims for custody assurances 
has contributed both to inadequate child support agreements and to the impoverishment of 
children and their custodial parents after divorce.”).  There is some evidence that the 
increased uniformity and predictability of child support awards has reduced trade-offs 
between custody and child support. See Ira Mark Ellman, A Case Study in Failed Law 
Reform:  Arizona’s Child Support Guidelines, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 185 (2012) (“Before 
support guidelines, support amounts were just one of several critical issues negotiated 
between parties, and it was not uncommon for them to make tradeoffs between the child 
support amount and other aspects of the divorce settlement, including custody arrangements. 
The implementation of uniform guidelines that established the support amount in every case 
helped eliminate that dynamic and removed one potential complication in reaching a 
judgment on all divorce issues.”). 
 255. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 126–28. 
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prospects—has already taken place.  Moreover, at the outset of marriage, a 
party can still walk away from the relationship and decide not to become a 
parent with her intended spouse.  Once a child is born, the parent no longer 
has this option, and instead—precisely in proportion to her investment in 
the child—may well be so averse to losing custody that she feels she has no 
option but to agree to unfavorable terms. 
Thus, to the extent that the objection to the enforcement of custody 
agreements hinges on concerns regarding bargaining power and potential 
trade-offs, it would seem that premarital and marital custody agreements 
should be given more deference than those reached at dissolution.  Both 
scholarly opinion and judicial practice, however, take the opposite 
approach.  While there is resistance to enforcing any type of custody 
provision, there is significantly greater support for enforcing separation 
agreements regarding custody than there is for enforcing premarital custody 
provisions.  In fact, custody agreements made at separation or divorce are 
routinely approved with minimal oversight256
There has, in recent years, been some scholarly support for enforcing 
custody agreements, even those entered into prior to marriage.  Linda 
Jellum, for instance, argues that parents have a fundamental constitutional 
right to make decisions about their children, which is infringed by judicial 
refusal to enforce custody agreements.
 (but, significantly, are open 
to reevaluation, subject to prevailing modification standards, in the event 
that parents disagree down the road).  This suggests that the unpredictability 
objection, in conjunction with the child welfare objection—the notion that 
parents or intended parents cannot make good decisions about the future 
welfare of their children—are the most powerful factors behind the 
reluctance to support enforcement of previously made custody agreements. 
257 And Jeffrey Stake, in his proposal 
for mandating prenuptial agreements between every couple entering 
marriage, briefly discusses the advantages and disadvantages of including 
custody in such agreements, and concludes that perhaps adherence to the ex 
ante custody choices of future parents would be preferable to the current 
best-interests standard.258  However, Stake retracts that view in his 
subsequent scholarship, arguing instead that custody should prove the 
exception to the contractualized family law regime that he advocates.259
The vast majority of the scholarly literature on marital contracts either 
gives the issue of custody agreements short shrift or endorses the prevailing 
view that agreements about how and by whom children are raised must 
pose the exception to spouses’ rights to enforce private marital contracts.  
Perhaps the most telling rejection of custody contracting comes from 
Katharine Silbaugh, who argues that it is unfair to enforce the monetary 
 
 
 256. See Sharp, supra note 86, at 1264. 
 257. See generally Jellum, supra note 242. A more limited proposal is offered by Gary 
Spitko, who has advocated enforcing not custody agreements, but agreements to have 
custody disputes submitted to private arbitration, again as a matter of protecting parents’ 
fundamental rights. See Spitko, supra note 242.  The question of whether courts or arbiters 
are better positioned to assess best interests is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 258. See Stake, supra note 218, at 435. 
 259. See Stake, supra note 239, at 807. 
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terms of prenuptial agreements without enforcing the nonmonetary terms—
and thus that such contracts should be unenforceable altogether.  Silbaugh 
powerfully demonstrates that parents have a strong stake in their children’s 
custody, such that “if [custody] cannot be the proper subject of a 
contract . . . , a parent is left without the ability to protect her most profound 
interest in the family.”260
Silbaugh acknowledges that the problem she identifies could be 
addressed by rendering custody provisions—and other nonmonetary terms 
of premarital agreements—enforceable.
  Her argument in part is that under the current 
approach, where premarital property agreements are largely enforced but 
premarital custody agreements are not, we may be strengthening the 
bargaining power of the more monied spouse, given that premarital 
agreements tend to be more favorable toward such a spouse than the 
background law of support and property division.  The result is that a 
primary caretaker, for instance, will have even less leverage to negotiate 
custody terms than she would otherwise have. 
261  Thus, she notes that permitting 
contractual entitlement to custody could help prevent the situation described 
by Mnookin and Kornhauser, where the parent most invested in custody 
will trade custody for property or support in order to avoid the uncertainty 
of litigation.262  But she nonetheless rejects enforcement of custody 
contracts, in part for the reasons discussed above—the commodification 
concern; the possibility that parents will agree to custody arrangements that 
are worse for a child than what a court would devise; and that “there is little 
reason to privilege the parties’ understanding of what is best for not-yet-
living children” over the ex-post determination of “even a fallible court.”263
If Silbaugh’s argument illustrates the prevailing objections to enforcing 
custody agreements, it also demonstrates the damage inflicted on children 
and parents alike by the current approach.  Silbaugh proposes that we refuse 
to enforce marital contracts altogether, given the unfairness, and potential 
harm to children, of enforcing monetary provisions alone.
 
264  But courts 
largely continue to enforce the monetary provisions of premarital contracts 
while refusing to enforce terms related to custody.  The result is that what 
prevails today is the very regime that Silbaugh recommends against, one in 
which marital contracts—and the privatization of family relations—are 
increasingly accepted and enforced, with exceptions carved out for 
contracts related to custody.  As Silbaugh demonstrates, this lopsided 
system is blind to the “family economy,” and ignores the extent to which 
childrearing, children’s interests, and parental investment—as well as the 
power of the parent most invested in a child’s interests to bargain in ways 
that benefit that child—are profoundly implicated by the monetary aspect of 
marital arrangements.265
 
 260. See Silbaugh, supra note 
 
2, at 90. 
 261. See id. at 128. 
 262. See id. 
 263. Id. at 140. 
 264. See id. at 128–29, 133–35. 
 265. See generally id. 
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B.   The Parentage Literature:  Scholarly Support of Parentage Contracts 
The scholarly literature on parentage is more favorable than the marital 
contracts literature toward enforcing agreements concerning parental rights 
and obligations.  Parentage scholars are not unanimous on the advisability 
of permitting parental status to be created by contract, and often stop short 
of recommending a wholly contractualized approach to parenthood.  But 
scholars in this field have noted the advantages of parentage contracts and 
the extent to which these can help to address the central concern of twenty-
first century parentage law:  providing stability and certainty at a time when 
the law of parentage is in flux as never before. 
Much of the focus of current parentage scholarship is on determining the 
parentage of children born through assisted reproductive technology.  An 
overlapping field of concern is establishing the parentage of children who 
are raised by same-sex partners, single parents, or multiple (i.e., more than 
two) parents.  In both of these areas, there is considerable concern about the 
uncertainty and potential instability faced by intended parents and their 
children at a time when the default rules governing parentage may fail to 
provide clear guidance about parental status, or may set forth rules that are 
at odds with the lived experience of functional families. 
Many parentage scholars are currently engaged in devising mechanisms 
to assure intended parents who hope to create a family through assisted 
reproductive technology that their parental status will be recognized and 
enforced.  Some have argued for a contract-based approach to the parentage 
of children born through assisted reproductive technology, such that the 
parental status of such children, in contested situations, would be 
determined with reference to bargained-for parental intent.266  As Marjorie 
Shultz has argued, a default rule making bargained-for intent determinative 
of parental status has a number of advantages.  It reduces uncertainty for 
prospective parents;267 gives parental status to those who have carefully 
planned to raise children (and thus will presumptively be good parents);268 
and provides a gender-neutral basis for determining parenthood, instead of 
dictating parental status based on stereotypical assumptions about gender 
roles.269
A contractual approach to parentage is only one of many proposed 
approaches to determining the parental status of children born through 
assisted reproductive technology.  Other suggestions in the recent parentage 
literature include defining parentage with reference to parental intent;
 
270
 
 266. See generally Ertman, supra note 
 
5; Shultz, supra note 5; Katherine M. Swift, 
Parenting Agreements, the Potential Power of Contract, and the Limits of Family Law, 34 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (2007). See also Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology?  The 
History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 
(2004) (advocating extending contractual approach to parenthood beyond the context of 
assisted reproductive technology). 
 267. See Shultz, supra note 5, at 323–24. 
 268. See id. at 343. 
 269. See id. at 379–95. 
 270. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a “Parent”?  The Claims of 
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1991); Richard F. Storrow, 
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looking at parental consent;271 protecting functional parentage in addition to 
formal parentage;272 unbundling parental rights and responsibilities;273 or 
some combination of these possibilities.274  As Courtney Joslin has 
observed, not all intended parents will have the resources to draft a formal 
contract allocating parental rights.275  Joslin for this reason recommends 
looking to consent to parent, broadly defined, instead of requiring a 
contract; she argues that a consent-based approach to parentage would 
enable parents to allocate rights and obligations prior to birth, whereas a 
functional approach would not.276  But, along with many scholars who 
recommend non-contractual approaches to determining parental status for 
children born of assisted reproductive technology, she has no objection to 
looking to a written agreement as evidence of parental intent and 
determining parentage accordingly277 (with the caveat that she would not 
permit an intended parent to contractually limit her rights and obligations 
toward the child).278
Despite the relatively favorable attitude of the parentage literature toward 
recognizing parental intent in determining parental status, there are a 
number of scholars who oppose the enforcement of parentage contracts.  
The primary reasons for this opposition are threefold:  that parentage 
contracts may be at odds with children’s welfare; that the contractualization 
of parentage commodifies children, to their detriment; and that certain 
forms of assisted reproductive technology exploit women. 
 
The child welfare argument has been made prominently by Marsha 
Garrison, who argues for applying the same parentage rules to children born 
of assisted reproductive technology that we do to children born through 
traditional means.279
 
Parenthood by Pure Intention:  Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to 
Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002). 
  Significantly, Garrison makes this argument by 
drawing on the opposition to custody contracts in the marital contracts 
literature and case law.  She observes that we do not permit the enforcement 
 271. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 6, at 1222 (advocating extending “the consent = legal 
parent rule to all children born through assisted reproduction”); Polikoff, supra note 6, at 
234. 
 272. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:  The 
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 879 (1984); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and 
Form:  Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
419 (2013) (recommending that functional parenthood be recognized as a distinct category 
of parental status, and proposing a registration system as one basis for establishing status as a 
functional parent). 
 273. See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 272, at 475–77 (proposing that 
parental rights and obligations be disaggregated for functional, but not for formal, parents). 
 274. See, e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to 
Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433, 448 (2005). 
 275. See Joslin, supra note 6, at 1221–22. 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. at 1225–26 (stating that although “the parties should be encouraged to enter 
into written consents,” her “proposal does not mandate written consent”). 
 278. See id. at 1221–22. 
 279. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making:  An Interpretive Approach to 
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000). 
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of custody agreements for traditional families, on the basis that children’s 
interests are thought to be paramount to such agreements, and argues that 
parentage contracts should be granted no more deference than custody 
contracts, because they are no more likely to be aligned with children’s 
interests.280  In Garrison’s view, placing children first requires refusing to 
recognize parentage contracts and instead determining parentage as we 
would if the child had been born without assisted reproductive technology, 
applying the usual rules of maternity and paternity where possible and 
extending the principles underlying those rules where necessary.281  Her 
argument is that these rules are designed to benefit children, in part by 
assuring that they will be raised by two parents with care and support 
obligations.282
The more widely voiced objection to parentage contracts hinges on two 
concerns that overlap both with one another and with the concern about 
child welfare:  commodification and the exploitation of women.  While 
both of these concerns have implications for many forms of assisted 
reproductive technology (including, for instance, ova donation, which may 
entail both some health risks to the donor and the exchange of money for 
gametes),
 
283 they are voiced most commonly with respect to the practice of 
surrogacy.  During the early years of surrogacy, Margaret Radin argued that 
the practice of paying women to bear children for others harms 
personhood—and thus human flourishing—by treating both children and 
women’s gestational labor as mere commodities.284  Others have echoed the 
notion that surrogacy commodifies children by treating them as the objects 
of monetary exchange, likening surrogacy to a baby market.285  There have 
been a number of responses to the commodification concern.  Some argue 
that the exchange of money for a surrogate’s services should be permitted, 
because monetary exchange is not necessarily at odds with intimacy and 
human dignity.286  Others advocate limiting compensation for surrogacy in 
order to distance the practice from baby-selling, such that surrogates are 
compensated for their labor, but not for parting with their genetic 
offspring.287
 
 280. See id. at 892–94. 
 
 281. See id. at 896. 
 282. See id. at 882–89.  Garrison would thus, for instance, apply traditional paternity law 
to accord sperm donors to unmarried women all the rights and obligations of fatherhood, 
regardless of a contract terminating the donor’s parental status, in order to provide such 
children with two parents rather than one. See id. at 896–97, 903–912. 
 283. See Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1654 
(2008) (advocating limits on compensation to ova donors on non-commodification grounds, 
but recommending that some compensation be permitted, because the procedures involved 
take time to complete and entail “a certain amount of medical risk”). 
 284. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1909–11 
(1987). 
 285. See MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES 102–23 (2001). 
 286. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 
526–27 (2005); Ertman, supra note 5. 
 287. See Hasday, supra note 286, at 514–15 (describing this approach). 
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With respect to surrogate mothers, scholars have objected both that 
surrogacy exploits such mothers by coercing them to sell their children—or 
their reproductive labor—under conditions of scarcity,288 and that a woman 
cannot rationally consent to terminate her maternal rights prior to giving 
birth, because she cannot know ex ante how she will feel about terminating 
her rights once the child is born.289  One oft-voiced response to these 
objections is that restricting women from agreeing to surrogacy contracts on 
the basis that they cannot freely consent to such contracts reinforces the 
stereotypical notion that women are less able than men to make rational and 
autonomous decisions and more prone to be governed by emotions and 
other irrational factors.290
Despite these concerns, there is increasing scholarly support for 
enforcing surrogacy agreements, especially where there are limits in place 
to protect surrogates who have a genetic tie to the child.
 
291  While some 
scholars would enforce even traditional surrogacy agreements,292 others 
continue to have reservations about permitting a mother to terminate her 
parental rights to her genetic child prior to birth.293  And there are some 
scholars who argue that a gestational surrogate forms a parental bond with 
her child by virtue of carrying the child through pregnancy, and that she 
should be deemed a parent accordingly.294
But apart from the fraught area of surrogacy—and in particular, the 
question of whether a genetically related surrogate should be permitted to 
terminate her parental rights prior to birth—parentage scholars are largely 
favorable toward permitting intended parents to establish their parental 
status by agreement.
 
295
 
 288. See Radin, supra note 
  There is only minimal objection to permitting the 
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note 5, at 355 (arguing that refusal to enforce surrogacy contracts treats women as “non-
autonomous persons”). 
 291. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 286, at 527 (describing mechanisms to facilitate the 
enforcement of surrogacy agreements); Yehezkel Margalit, In Defence of Surrogacy 
Agreements:  A Modern Contract Law Perspective, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423 
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Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 282–84 (2006) (arguing for a 
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supra note 6, at 234, 243–46 (advocating both recognition of intent to parent in determining 
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sale of gametes, for instance, and terminating the parental status of those 
who sell their eggs or sperm;296 though some scholars call for greater 
regulation of gamete donation, their emphasis is largely on whether to 
permit anonymous donation or to impose other limits on the mode and 
frequency of donation.297  Relatively few advocate prohibiting the sale of 
gametes altogether.298  Scholarly support for enforcing the intentions of 
known gamete donors (that is, those who do not sell their sperm, but donate 
it to an acquaintance or relative) is similarly strong.  Despite some 
disagreement on this point, many argue for respecting the intentions of 
known donors and intended parents, both where the parties agree to 
terminate the donor’s parental status entirely and where they agree to 
preserve a limited role for the donor in the child’s life.299
C.   Bringing Together the Custody Literature and the Parentage Literature 
  The consensus is 
that we should respect the intended parents’ plans for the children they have 
arranged to bring into the world, both to provide those children with 
emotional and financial certainty and stability and to ensure respect for a 
diversity of family forms. 
Why is it that the marital contracts literature continues to resist the 
contractualization of custody, while the parentage literature increasingly 
embraces the move toward contract?  This section argues that, while there 
are differences between the two types of agreements, the divergence in 
scholarly attitudes is largely unfounded.  This section begins by 
demonstrating the overlap and interaction between custody agreements and 
parentage agreements.  It then addresses the objections to each type of 
agreement, showing that these are largely similar, and have no greater force 
in the custody context than in the parentage context. 
1.   Collapsing the Distance Between Custody and Parentage Agreements:  
The Role of Custody Agreements in Parentage Disputes 
There are some significant differences between custody contracts and 
parentage contracts that help to explain the radical distance between 
 
the parentage of children born through assisted reproductive technology and enforcement of 
agreements to provide a limited parental role to a donor of gametes). 
 296. But see Garrison, supra note 279, at 903–12 (advocating imposition of parental 
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Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375, 393 (1996); Shultz, supra note 5, at 340–41. 
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scholarly attitudes toward each type of contract.  The stakes are arguably 
higher in the parentage context, in that a parentage dispute is more likely to 
raise the possibility that a would-be parent will lose her parental rights and 
obligations entirely, as occurs when a court refuses to enforce a co-
parenting agreement.  Parentage scholars are currently engaged in devising 
mechanisms to protect children from the worst-case scenario in which they 
lose all contact with, or right to support from, a functional parent.  A classic 
custody dispute, by contrast, tends to involve the amount of time that 
children spend with each parent, rather than whether a parent will be 
permitted any contact with the child at all.  The children of parents involved 
in custody disputes typically retain contact with and a right to support from 
both parents, regardless of whether a court enforces any custody agreements 
into which their parents might have entered.  Thus, the need for parentage 
contracts may be greater than that for custody contracts. 
However, custody contracts can have important implications as well, for 
parents and children alike.  A custody agreement may determine which 
parent maintains primary contact with a child, raising the child for most of 
the year, and which parent is instead relegated to visitation on holidays and 
summers—thus largely limiting the child’s contact with one or the other 
parent.  It may limit the right of a parent to relocate while retaining custody 
of the child, or may provide for parental freedom to relocate—possibilities 
that may have a major influence on the child’s future and her contact with 
the noncustodial parent, and may alternately permit or prevent a parent from 
remarrying, moving closer to family and friends, obtaining an education, or 
advancing her career. 
Moreover, custody agreements play an increasingly significant role in 
parentage disputes.  Intended and existing co-parents will often draft 
agreements that spell out their rights and obligations in the event that their 
relationship dissolves, such as which parent will maintain primary custody, 
which parent will have visitation, and the contours of both visitation and 
support.  In a number of parentage disputes, the continuation or termination 
of one parent’s relationship with the child has hinged on the presence or 
absence of such an agreement, as well as on the court’s decision regarding 
whether to enforce the agreement.300
Scholars of both parentage and custody would thus do well to keep in 
mind the potential interplay between the two categories of agreements.  
Scholars of marital contracts should consider the role of custody contracts 
in parentage disputes, which may differ significantly from their role in the 
 
 
 300. See, e.g., A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663–65 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (permitting co-
parent to assert custody rights based on settlement reached when co-parents’ relationship 
dissolved); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 67–68 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (citing co-
parenting agreement providing for shared custody in the event of dissolution of co-parents’ 
relationship as evidence that the legally recognized parent intended for her co-parent to 
continue her relationship with their child should the co-parents separate); Rubano v. 
DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 966 (R.I. 2000) (permitting co-parent to enforce post-dissolution 
visitation agreement, and looking to such agreement as one among several factors in finding 
that the co-parent had the de facto parental status that was a predicate to the court’s 
jurisdiction to enforce the visitation agreement). 
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typical marital economy that many such scholars address.  Custody 
contracts at the same time provide a potentially useful tool for parentage 
scholars engaged in developing mechanisms for protecting the expectations 
of families that diverge from the traditional form of two married parents and 
their biologically related children. 
2.   Collapsing the Distance Between Custody and Parentage Agreements:  
Objections to Enforcement 
As we have seen, scholars largely support the enforcement of parentage 
agreements and resist the enforcement of custody agreements.  However, 
objections to enforcing the two types of agreements are sufficiently similar 
to render the divergence in approach incoherent.  This section discusses the 
three primary objections to the enforcement of custody agreements and 
shows that these apply with equal force in the parentage context:  the 
unpredictability objection, the duress objection, and the child welfare 
objection.  It addresses the extent to which these concerns play out 
differently in the custody context than in the parentage context, but 
concludes that these differences do not justify the current divergence in 
attitude toward the two types of agreement. 
a.   The Unpredictability Objection 
One of the strongest objections to the enforcement of custody agreements 
is that parents cannot predict the custody arrangement that will be in their 
child’s interests at a future point.  The unpredictability objection is raised 
most forcefully with respect to custody agreements that are entered into 
before the children are born, such as custody provisions of premarital 
agreements.  To use the language of contract law, the argument is that 
premarital custody agreements are not the product of rational consent—and 
therefore should not be enforced—because the contracting parties cannot ex 
ante have sufficient information to make a rational decision about children 
who do not yet exist.301  The unpredictability objection is also levied at 
custody agreements made at separation or divorce; courts and scholars alike 
have argued that the difficulty of predicting how a child will develop 
weighs against permitting separating parents to craft a custody arrangement 
that will bind themselves, and courts, down the road.302
The unpredictability objection is also raised in connection with the 
enforcement of premarital agreements generally.  Some argue that it is 
difficult for intended spouses to make rational decisions about any aspect of 
 
 
 301. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362, 1371 n.9 (Wash. 1997) 
(questioning whether premarital custody agreement respecting a child not yet born can ever 
be voluntary and knowing); Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 140 (“[T]here is little reason to 
privilege the parties’ understanding of what is best for not-yet-living children.”). 
 302. See, e.g., Guss v. Guss, 472 A.2d 790, 793 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (“A child’s best 
interests . . . cannot be prospectively determined.”); Knutsen v. Cegalis, 989 A.2d 1010, 
1014 (Vt. 2009) (“[C]hanges in custody must be based on real-time determinations of a 
child’s best interests . . . .”). 
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the dissolution of their marriage, and therefore that even premarital 
agreements regarding property should not be enforced.303  But the 
unpredictability objection is given most credence in the context of custody 
agreements.  A majority of jurisdictions will enforce premarital agreements 
as to property.304  But none will enforce premarital or marital custody 
agreements or post-dissolution agreements that attempt to dictate custody 
arrangements into the future.305
In the parentage context, by contrast, the child-oriented unpredictability 
objection is largely absent from discussions of parentage agreements.  Few 
scholars object to parentage agreements on the basis that it will be difficult 
for intended parents to know ex ante the types of relationships that they will 
have with their unborn children, and thus which of multiple possible 
parentage arrangements will be in those children’s interests.  The scholarly 
consensus here is that children and parents alike will be better off if parents 
are permitted to clarify parental status ex ante, instead of waiting until the 
child is born and seeing what sort of relationship develops.  In other words, 
the consensus is that children’s interests are better served by enforcing 
parental ex ante intent than by making parental status hinge on an ex post 
assessment of parental suitability.
 
306  Scholars largely agree that children 
benefit from stability and certainty in their relationships with their parents, 
and that mechanisms such as parentage agreements will therefore protect 
children’s interests by reducing the likelihood that a child’s parentage will 
be contested and brought into question after the child has been conceived or 
born, or after a child has developed a relationship with, or financial 
dependency on, an intended parent.307
There is little discussion in the parentage scholarship of the dangers of 
enforcing a parental intent that is formed before it can be determined 
whether it will be in a particular child’s best interests to be raised by one or 
another parent.  The literature on assisted reproductive technology favors 
looking to ex ante parental consent or intent to determine parental status, 
and does not, for the most part, contend that parental status should instead 
hinge on an ex post assessment of the parents’ fitness to raise a child.
 
308
 
 303. See supra notes 
  As 
many have observed, parents are generally permitted to procreate without 
229–30 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 231–38 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra Part I.A. 
 306. See, e.g., Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First the Parent or 
the Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 330–31 (2010) (contending that ex post determination 
of parental status is adverse to children’s interests). 
 307. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 6, at 1182 (arguing that recognizing ex ante intent to 
parent is necessary to protect children’s financial interests); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has 
One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:  Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian 
Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 353–54 (2002) (arguing that recognition of maternity on 
the basis of petition filed prior to or after birth will best protect children’s relationships with 
lesbian co-parents). 
 308. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 6, at 1225 (“[T]he law should provide that an individual 
who consents to alternative insemination by a woman with the intent to be a parent of the 
resulting child and with the consent of the woman is a parent of the resulting child.”). 
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any state assessment of their children’s interests.309  The scholarly 
consensus is that children’s interests are best protected by rules that look to 
ex ante intent in determining the parentage of children born through assisted 
reproductive technology.310
To the extent that the parentage literature raises the unpredictability 
objection to the enforcement of parentage agreements, this objection is 
typically framed in parent-oriented rather than child-oriented terms, and is 
made primarily with reference to surrogacy contracts.  A number of 
scholars argue that a woman cannot rationally consent ex ante to give up a 
child after birth, because she cannot predict the emotions that she will 
experience during pregnancy and birth.  This argument is raised both with 
respect to traditional surrogacy and with respect to gestational surrogacy, 
and seems to hinge on the relationship that develops between surrogate and 
child during the pregnancy.
 
311
This solicitude for the parent’s ex-post regrets is primarily reserved for 
gestational mothers, and rests largely on the characterization of pregnancy 
and giving birth as emotional in a way that other experiences are not.  Thus, 
the unpredictability objection is not typically raised with respect to gamete 
donation.  While a donor of ova or sperm might perhaps regret her decision 
to terminate parental rights to a genetic child, the scholarly literature is 
largely in favor of enforcing gamete donation agreements, and there is little 
objection to enforcement of such agreements on the ground that a donor 
could not accurately predict how he might feel after the child has been 
born.
  The objection is parent-focused in that there 
is relatively little discussion of the possibility that the child will be better 
off remaining with the surrogate who developed an emotional tie to the 
child; the argument is couched largely in terms of fairness to the mother 
who consented to terminate her maternal rights without accurately 
predicting how she would feel about doing so once the child was born. 
312
Scholarly objection to enforcement of parentage contracts on the basis of 
unpredictability is thus largely limited to the special case of gestational 
mothers.  The majority of parentage scholars, moreover, do not see child-
centered unpredictability as a barrier to enforcing parentage agreements.  
While the marital contracts literature takes for granted that parents cannot 
rationally consent to decisions about future custodial arrangements for their 
children (whether unborn or already in existence), the parentage literature 
makes the opposite assumption—namely, that parents and would-be parents 
 
 
 309. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (Cal. 1993) (rejecting 
determination of parentage of child born through gestational surrogacy on the basis of a best-
interests analysis); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (“Parents are not 
screened for the procreation of their own children . . . .”) (emphasis omitted); Shultz, supra 
note 5, at 341–42 (“Even under conventional legal rules, children do not get a say in who 
their parents will be, or for that matter, in whether they will be conceived or born.”). 
 310. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 6, at 1225 (explaining why the consent equals legal 
parentage rule protects children’s interests). 
 311. See supra notes 288–89 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 298–99 and accompanying text. 
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have sufficient rational capacity to make decisions about the parentage of 
their children, including children who do not yet exist. 
b.   The Duress Objection 
Another objection against enforcing custody agreements is that parents 
may enter into such agreements in situations that exert sufficient pressure 
on one of the parties to vitiate her ability to freely consent to the 
arrangement.  For example, in the scenario often cited to oppose the 
enforceability of prenuptial agreements, a bride may be presented with a 
premarital contract on the eve of her wedding, and may sign the contract 
despite aversion to its terms because she lacks the fortitude to cancel the 
wedding at that late date.313  The pressure on the party presented with a 
premarital agreement is often exacerbated by the power dynamic between 
the parties; the party presenting the prenuptial agreement will often be older 
and significantly wealthier than the party asked to sign it.  This was what 
happened, for instance, in Littlefield, where the bride signed a prenuptial 
agreement drafted by the attorney of her much wealthier groom.314  The 
agreement in that case favored the groom in various ways, including in its 
provision for fully shared custody between the spouses in the event of 
divorce.315
One response to the duress objection is that, under contract law, a parent 
who is coerced into agreeing to a custody provision can argue for voiding 
the contract on the basis of duress.  Nonetheless, there is concern among 
family law scholars that parents (or future parents) may agree to such 
contracts under pressure that is insufficient to vitiate enforcement under the 
duress standard, but suffices to undermine the parent’s ability to reject the 
proffered agreement or to have a say in crafting its terms.  Moreover, as 
Howard Fink and June Carbone have pointed out in their proposal to 
provide for ex ante judicial approval of premarital agreements, any 
mechanisms that are proposed to make premarital agreements more likely to 
be enforced—even those designed to ensure that such agreements meet a 
minimal standard of procedural and substantive fairness—strengthen the 
bargaining position of the more powerful party by providing a blueprint for 
creating an enforceable bargain.
 
316
While the duress objection and the concern about unequal bargaining 
power are valid, in the context of custody agreements, this objection is most 
applicable to precisely those agreements that courts are most likely to 
enforce—custody agreements entered into at separation or divorce.  Courts 
routinely enforce such agreements, even though the pressure on parents is 
often greater at dissolution than before a child has been born.  Before birth, 
the parent-to-be has the leverage of refusing to have a child in the first 
instance if custody terms are not acceptable.  Once the child has been born 
 
 
 313. See supra notes 223–28 and accompanying text. 
 314. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1997). 
 315. See supra notes 40–50 and accompanying text. 
 316. See Fink & Carbone, supra note 232, at 33–35. 
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and the parents’ relationship has dissolved, a parent’s desire to retain 
custody of a child can exert tremendous pressure on that parent.  As some 
have contended, this pressure weighs most heavily on the parent who is 
more invested in the child—it is precisely this parent who will be most 
averse to even the slightest risk of losing a bid for custody.  The result is 
that the parent who has a stronger desire for custody, and thus typically a 
closer bond with the child, will often trade off rights to property division 
and spousal support in order to obtain custody, to the detriment of custodial 
parent and child alike.317
Moreover, to the extent that duress is a particular concern in the context 
of custody agreements, we can address that concern by better policing for 
duress than we currently do, rather than refusing to enforce custody 
agreements altogether.  While no such mechanism can entirely remove the 
possibility that custody agreements will be the product of unequal 
bargaining power, this Article, in its proposal in Part IV, presents protective 
mechanisms that can help to prevent the enforcement of bargains that are 
the product of duress and undue pressure while enabling parents to craft 
non-coerced custody agreements that will govern in the event that the 
parents’ relationship dissolves.  There are a number of situations in which 
parents may enter into custody agreements that are the product, not of 
duress, but of reasoned decisions about what will be best for their children 
if their relationship does not last.  Parents are more likely to think 
reasonably about their children’s interests at a time when they are still 
cooperating with one another, whether this is prior to marriage, prior to the 
children’s birth, or at some later point during the children’s lives when the 
parents’ relationship is still intact.
 
318
The incoherence of the duress objection to custody contracts comes into 
focus when we compare discussions of duress in the parentage literature.  
The duress objection to parentage contracts, much like the unpredictability 
objection, is focused largely on surrogacy.  Parentage scholars who oppose 
enforcement of surrogacy agreements often express concern that surrogates 
will enter into such agreements under financial pressure.  While all 
contracts are entered into under conditions of scarcity—an employee 
typically agrees to an employment contract, for instance, because she needs 
the wages—the concern with surrogacy contracts is that these are 
exploitative, in that they may induce a woman to agree to take actions she 
  Where they indeed do enter into such 
a custody agreement, and there is no evidence of coercion or undue 
pressure, then the duress objection should not prevent enforcement of the 
agreement.  In fact, given the trend of judicial deference to separation 
agreements, enforcing premarital custody agreements is the best way to 
protect custody outcomes from being driven by the pressures that apply 
when a parental relationship dissolves. 
 
 317. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text. 
 318. See Scott & Scott, supra note 203, at 1323 (“[F]rom the ex ante perspective of the 
hypothetical bargain, parents’ interests can generally be assumed to be aligned with those of 
their future children, an assumption that probably cannot be made ex post in the context of 
the divorce itself.”). 
124 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
might greatly regret—put herself at risk of bodily harm, and relinquish 
rights to a child—on the basis of financial need.319
In response to concerns about surrogacy agreements entered into under 
duress, a number of scholars who support surrogacy have proposed special 
mechanisms to insure that only surrogacy contracts entered into with full 
volition are enforced.  These include limiting the compensation that 
surrogates can receive for their services; eliminating compensation for 
surrogacy altogether; and providing each surrogate with independent legal 
counsel to ensure that her decision to enter into a surrogacy agreement is 
voluntary and well-informed.
 
320
The duress objection is raised with significantly less frequency against 
other forms of parentage contracts, such as gamete donation agreements.  
Despite the fact that donors of sperm and ova often sell their gametes for 
financial gain, the majority of parentage scholars do not express concern 
that these donors faced undue pressure in deciding to relinquish their 
parental status.  The scholarly consensus is that gamete donation 
agreements should be enforceable, despite the fact that they involve 
decisions by genetic parents to relinquish rights to their unborn children in 
exchange for payment.
  Scholars make such proposals on the 
theory that it is possible, and desirable, to facilitate surrogacy agreements 
that are voluntary and rational, instead of proscribing all such agreements 
on the basis that some of them might be entered into under duress.  There is 
no reason not to take a similar approach to custody agreements, particularly 
those that currently meet the greatest resistance—agreements entered into 
before the children are born.  While indeed it is possible that some future 
parents might enter into custody agreements out of fear of a cancelled 
wedding or of losing their mate, it is also possible that future parents might 
enter into a prospective custody agreement on a level playing field, 
particularly when there are no trade-offs involved between custody and 
money. 
321
To the extent that the parentage scholarship criticizes the exchange of 
parental rights for payment in gamete donor agreements, the concern is less 
with the potential for duress than with commodification, an objection that is 
levied against surrogacy agreements as well.  The concern here is that 
permitting parental status to be exchanged for money harms children in 
both a practical sense and an expressive one by treating them as objects to 
be bought and sold, and creating a market in which the desirable genetic 
traits of future children are sold to the highest bidder.
 
322
The commodification objection is levied against custody agreements as 
well.
 
323
 
 319. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 
  Custody agreements rarely explicitly involve the exchange of 
284, at 1909–11. 
 320. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 286, at 526–27 (making proposals to this effect). 
 321. See supra notes 298–99 and accompanying text. 
 322. See Shanley, supra note 298, at 271–73. 
 323. Courts often employ a rhetoric of commodification to justify their refusal to enforce 
custody agreements. See, e.g., McClain v. McClain, 716 P.2d 381, 385 (Alaska 1986) (“A 
child is not a chattel to be bargained away for consideration.”). 
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custodial rights for money.  In some limited situations, a parent will agree 
to sever his parental rights in exchange for a waiver of his support 
obligations.  However, an agreement to terminate parental rights goes 
beyond the scope of a custody agreement, and is better characterized as a 
parentage agreement.  When a custody agreement properly understood (that 
is, an agreement that allocates parental rights) is entered into prospectively 
between adults who contemplate having children, there is unlikely to be 
even an implicit trade-off between custody and property, except insofar as 
the prospective parents may wish to make arrangements ensuring support of 
their future children.  Custody agreements entered into at divorce may, as 
we have seen, involve implicit trade-offs of custody for property and 
spousal and child support.  But these trade-offs are not a necessary part of 
any custody arrangement, and thus the custody provisions can—and this 
Article argues should—be severed from the rest of the parents’ 
agreement.324  We can further protect against such trade-offs by refusing to 
enforce custody arrangements that seem to be the product of an exchange of 
custody for money.325
The limited discussion of the duress objection in the parentage literature 
suggests that the possibility of duress should not pose an insurmountable 
objection to enforcement of custody contracts.  Strikingly, the duress 
objection is rarely raised with respect to the category of parentage 
agreement that most resembles a custody agreement:  co-parenting 
agreements.  Where intended parents agree to raise a child together and to 
share parental rights and obligations, scholars largely agree that such an 
agreement should be enforced.
  This would prevent the enforcement of any custody 
agreement that would amount, in either an expressive sense or a practical 
one, to the sale of a child. 
326  Typically, the parties to a co-parenting 
agreement include at least one parent who has legally recognized parental 
status and another who does not.327
There is little discussion in the parentage literature of the likelihood that 
a co-parenting agreement will be made under duress.  The assumption, to 
the contrary, is that parties who agree to a co-parenting arrangement do so 
in order to protect their expectations and those of the children they intend to 
raise together.  While co-parents may then contest such an arrangement 
when their relationship dissolves—thus giving rise to the question of 
whether the co-parenting agreement is enforceable—it was entered into at a 
time when the parents were in accord, such that even parents who contest 
  Thus, one parent agrees to extend 
parental rights to the other, who in turn agrees to take on parental 
obligations.  In some cases, the co-parenting agreement includes provisions 
governing the custodial arrangement in the event that the parental 
relationship dissolves. 
 
 324. See infra Part IV. 
 325. See infra Part IV. 
 326. See supra notes 266–78 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing relevant cases). 
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the enforceability of a co-parenting agreement rarely argue that it was the 
product of duress.328
The significant difference between a co-parenting agreement and a 
custody agreement between two parents who already have legal rights to a 
child is that the co-parents have a need that the others do not to ensure that 
both parents are legally recognized.  But co-parenting agreements are often 
driven in part by the intended co-parents’ desire to ensure that they will 
each retain rights to their children should their relationship dissolve.  In this 
respect, the power dynamic between two prospective co-parents does not 
significantly differ from that between prospective parents who will be 
legally recognized even in the absence of any agreement, but have decided 
to set forth the custodial arrangement that will govern if their relationship 
dissolves.  Just as a number of intended co-parents decide to spell out their 
custodial plans in the event that they separate,
 
329 intended parents who have 
no reason to doubt their legal rights to their future children may decide to 
do the same.  There is no reason to think that either of these types of 
custody agreements is especially likely to be the product of duress.  And 
there is good reason to believe that parents who enter into a custody 
agreement at a time when they are in harmony are especially likely to do so 
freely, driven not by pressure or fear but by a desire to protect both their 
own plans as parents and what they imagine to be the best interests of their 
future children.330
c.   The Child Welfare Objection 
 
The most commonly voiced, and most powerful, objection to enforcing 
child custody agreements is that these may be contrary to the interests of the 
child.  “Parties cannot by agreement relieve the court of its obligation to 
safeguard the best interests of the child. . . .  In issues of custody and 
visitation the question is always what is in the best interests of the children, 
no matter what the parties have agreed to.”331  This is the repeated mantra 
of courts that consistently refuse to enforce such agreements,332 and it is 
widely accepted by a number of marital contracts scholars.333  Since 
children cannot be parties to custody agreements, yet are deeply affected by 
them, it is argued that courts should retain the discretion to override such 
agreements in the name of the children’s interests.334
Much of the concern about unpredictability and duress is driven by 
concern about child welfare.  Scholars and courts alike object to enforcing 
custody agreements made ex ante in large part because they are concerned 
that parents cannot accurately determine their children’s interests in 
 
 
 328. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 329. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 330. See Scott & Scott, supra note 203, at 1323. 
 331. P.T. v. M.S., 738 A.2d 385, 396–97 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1999) (quoting 
Giangeruso v. Giangeruso, 708 A.2d 1232, 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997)). 
 332. See supra Part I.A. 
 333. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra Part I.A; supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text. 
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advance.335
The best-interests-of-the-child objection is raised in the parentage context 
as well.
  Similarly, reluctance to enforce a custody agreement made 
under undue pressure stems in part from the concern that such an agreement 
is not the product of a cooperative and reasoned decision about the 
children’s interests. 
336  But it is given significantly less credence here than in the 
custody context.  Some courts and commentators that have rejected the 
intent-based approach to parental status have suggested that the parentage 
of children born through assisted reproductive technology should be 
determined instead with reference to a judicial assessment of those 
children’s interests.337  And even some scholars in favor of defining 
parentage with reference to intent have expressed support for screening 
parents prior to engaging in assisted reproductive technology in order to 
protect children’s interests.338  The majority of parentage scholars to have 
considered the matter, however, reject the best-interests approach to 
determining the parental status of an existing child in situations other than 
adoption.339
The reluctance of parentage scholars to recommend including a best-
interests assessment as an element of parentage determinations helps to 
illustrate the problems of doing so in the context of custody agreements.  
Parentage scholars largely reject a system in which the government would 
have the power to determine who is fit to raise children.
  With respect to both assisted reproductive technology and co-
parenting agreements, parentage scholars largely agree that parental status 
should be determined with reference to parental intent, perhaps in 
combination with parental function, rather than by applying the best-
interests standard, particularly where the intended parents decided ex ante 
to bring a child into the world and to raise the child together. 
340
 
 335. See supra Part I.A; supra notes 
  As the 
parentage literature is well aware, such state supervision of parentage under 
244–45 and accompanying text. 
 336. See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 254–62 (2006) 
(arguing that children’s interests should factor into determinations of legal parenthood, such 
that the state should refuse to assign parental status to the biological parents of newborns 
who seem especially likely to be unfit parents). 
 337. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 798 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “the best interests of the child, rather than the intent of the genetic mother, is 
the proper standard to apply in the absence of legislation” to determine the parentage of a 
child born through gestational surrogacy). 
 338. Schultz, supra note 5, at 370 (conceding that “screening of prospective surrogates 
and parents might be required to protect the interests of children”). 
 339. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1, 54 (1997) (“The child’s best interest should not be relevant at the stage of identifying the 
parents; rather, it should be relevant only at the stage of determining custody”); David 
Meyer, The Constitutionality of “Best Interests” Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
857, 875–79 (2006) (enumerating concerns about best-interests approach to parentage); 
Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:  Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 277 (1975) (arguing against permitting the 
state to terminate parental rights under the “indeterminate and discretionary” best-interests 
standard). 
 340. Cf. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 n.10 (majority opinion) (determining parentage on the 
basis of children’s best interests “raises the repugnant specter of governmental interference 
in matters implicating our most fundamental notions of privacy”). 
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the indeterminate best-interests standard could prevent family formation by 
intended parents who do not fit the state’s view of what a parent, and a 
family, should look like.341  Imposing a state-directed best-interests 
assessment as a predicate of parentage for any intended parent engaging in 
co-parenting or assisted reproductive technology could very well limit the 
diversity of family forms, or withhold legal recognition from parents of 
whom the state does not approve.342
Similar objections can be raised against the state use of the best-interests 
standard to supervise parents’ custodial arrangements.  Some scholars, such 
as Naomi Cahn, have argued that it is more problematic to make parental 
status hinge on a best-interests assessment than to do so with respect to 
custody.
  Where a relationship with a child has 
already developed, the possibility that the state will refuse to recognize 
parental status on the basis of an assessment of the child’s interests 
undermines the security and stability of the parent-child bond. 
343  She proposes that courts determine parentage without any 
reference to children’s interests, taking as inclusive an approach to 
parentage as possible, and then allocate custody by assessing the children’s 
best interests.344
Why is it widely accepted that custody agreements must give way to a 
judicial assessment of children’s interests, while support for imposing the 
same requirement when determining parentage is significantly more 
limited?  As Marjorie Shultz observes in her discussion of parentage 
contracts, “under conventional legal rules, children do not get a say in who 
their parents will be.”
  While this Article agrees about the dangers of determining 
parentage with reference to a child’s best interests, it argues that the 
application of the best-interests analysis to custodial arrangements is 
problematic as well.  A court empowered to award, alter, or terminate 
custody with reference to the best-interests standard has significant power 
to shape, and limit, how and by whom children are raised, and how their 
caretakers live their lives.  The result, in the custody context as in the 
parentage context, is a level of insecurity that is detrimental to children’s 
welfare. 
345  Thus, she argues, it is not clear why children’s 
inability to consent to parentage agreements should prove problematic.346
The reason that we currently permit courts to award custody in 
accordance with children’s interests is that there is no other basis for doing 
so when two parents with equal legal rights to a child fight for custody.  In 
  
The same is true with respect to custody.  Children do not have a say in who 
raises them, and the state generally cannot supervise how and by whom 
children are raised unless parents put their children at risk of harm.  Why, 
then, should a custody agreement be subjected to judicial supervision in the 
name of children’s interests? 
 
 341. See Shultz, supra note 5, at 347–52. 
 342. See id. 
 343. See Cahn, supra note 339, at 48–59. 
 344. See id. 
 345. See Shultz, supra note 5, at 341. 
 346. See id. at 341–42. 
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the absence of any preference for one parent over another, courts have long 
looked to children’s interests to award custody in the event of parental 
dispute. 
But when parents have contracted for a child’s custody, there is no need 
for a court to engage in the best-interests assessment—the parents have 
provided a contractual alternative.  There may well be arguments for 
considering children’s interests despite the existence of any such 
contractual arrangement.  These arguments must address, however, why 
children’s interests should be permitted to override a custody agreement but 
not other barriers to judicial intervention, such as a parentage contract or the 
protection provided to parents through the intact family status that derives 
from some combination of marital status and biological relatedness.  If the 
child welfare concern suffices to override parental intent in the form of a 
custody agreement, why should it not override parental decisions about 
children in other contexts as well? 
This Article argues that the discrepancy between the parentage literature 
and the marital contracts literature on this point underscores the incoherence 
of insisting that custody contracts alone must give way to judicial 
determinations of children’s interests.  The Article does not argue—as some 
other scholars have347
III.   WHY CUSTODY CONTRACTS SHOULD BE ENFORCED 
—that we should enforce custody agreements in the 
name of protecting parents’ constitutional rights to raise their children as 
they see fit.  It does not frame the issue as pitting parents’ rights against 
children’s interests.  It argues, rather, that it is in the interests of children 
themselves for custody contracts to be enforced.  As this Article now 
discusses, custody contracts—much like parentage contracts—would enable 
parents to provide their families with a level of stability, security, and 
freedom from the threat of government intervention that would serve the 
welfare of children and parents alike. 
This part will use the perspective of parentage contracts to demonstrate 
that the benefits of enforcing custody contracts outweigh the concerns 
discussed in Part II.  It argues that the primary benefit of custody contracts 
is their potential—in conjunction with parentage contracts more broadly—
to provide all families with intact status, and thus put an end to our current 
two-tier system of family law. 
Part III.A demonstrates that we currently have two different systems of 
custody and parentage law:  one for traditional families that are deemed 
“intact,” and another for families that are deemed non-intact.  While intact 
families are given considerable autonomy and protection from state 
intervention, non-intact families are subject to a level of intervention and 
insecurity that is harmful for parents and children alike.  In an age when 
marriage can no longer suffice to keep families “intact,” custody contracts 
 
 347. See Jellum, supra note 242, at 644–54 (making a constitutional argument for 
enforcing parental custody agreements); Spitko, supra note 109, at 1189–97 (making a 
constitutional argument for enforcing parental agreements to arbitrate custody). 
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offer a mechanism for ensuring families the stability and certainty that 
marriage no longer guarantees. 
Part III.B then discusses other advantages to enforcing custody 
agreements.  Part III.B draws on the parentage literature to demonstrate that 
enforcement of custody contracts can help to promote gender neutrality and 
diversity of family forms.  Enforcement of custody contracts will also 
promote respect for parental autonomy, although such autonomy should be 
seen as secondary to children’s welfare. 
A.   The Best-Interests Standard  
and Our Two-Tier Approach to Family Law 
1.   The Best-Interests Standard and the Bias Against Non-Intact Families 
When a relationship between two legal parents disintegrates, in the 
absence of any enforceable contract that will govern care and upbringing of 
the children, a court will determine custody with reference to the children’s 
best interests.348  The family law literature, in the areas of both custody and 
parentage, has widely rehearsed the problems with the best-interests-of-the-
child standard.  The best-interests standard is at once deeply subjective and 
open-ended, with the result that it affords judges an enormous amount of 
discretion.349  Compounding the problem is the difficulty of determining, in 
many instances, which of myriad possible custodial arrangements between 
equally fit parents will best serve a child’s interests.  This inquiry tends to 
be future-oriented, in that courts will try to assess which custodial 
allocation will produce the best adult outcome for a developing child.350  
Courts are often uncomfortable engaging in such an analysis, which some 
have compared to gazing into a crystal ball.351
The difficulty of determining children’s best interests, along with the 
judicial discretion that the standard affords, render judicial decisions about 
child custody wildly unpredictable.  Scholars have long critiqued the 
  But when the best-interests 
standard applies, courts are obliged to engage in this analysis, and, in so 
doing, will often weigh every possible detail of the parents’ and children’s 
lives in an effort to accurately respond to a question that does not admit of 
any clear answer. 
 
 348. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of Children’s 
Rights:  The Search for a Just and Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q. 815, 815–16 (1999). 
 349. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 339, at 59 (“[T]he best interest standard . . . is 
indeterminate and biased in administration.”); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments:  Against the 
Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987) (“[T]he [best interest] principle is 
indeterminate, unjust, self-defeating, and liable to be overridden by more general policy 
considerations.”); Mnookin, supra note 339, at 203 (“Because what is in the best interests of 
a particular child is indeterminate, there is good reason to be offended by the breadth of 
power exercised by a trial court judge in the resolution of custody disputes.”). 
 350. See Sarah Abramowicz, Beyond Family Law, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 293, 312 
(2012) (“The best-interests analysis of child custody law is focused . . . on the connection 
between childhood experience and the adult self.”). 
 351. See, e.g., In re C.B., 618 N.E.2d 598, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“[D]eciding what is 
in a child’s best interest is difficult, if not impossible to predict without a crystal ball or the 
gift of foresight.”). 
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unpredictability that the best-interests standard creates;352 the result of this 
unpredictability, as Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser have argued, is 
that a parent strongly invested in maintaining custody of a child may be so 
adverse to even a small risk of losing custody that, rather than permit a 
court to determine a child’s best interests, she will trade off rights to 
property and support in exchange for custody.353  Mnookin considers the 
possibility that the best-interests standard is so flawed, and its effect on 
bargaining incentives so problematic, that we might be better off if judges 
flipped coins to determine custody arrangements.354
Moreover, as June Carbone has noted, child custody decisions at divorce 
have now become “ground zero in the gender wars.”
 
355  In the era of no-
fault divorce, custody decisions are often the only opportunity courts have 
to pass judgment on parents’ behavior and morality.356  As a result, 
wronged spouses may channel their anger into contesting a child’s custody 
and use that opportunity to obtain vindication and revenge.  And courts may 
use custody decisions as an opportunity to scrutinize and condemn 
culturally contested behavior that is often out of the judiciary’s reach, such 
as non-marital cohabitation or same-sex intimacy.357
Families that are subject to the unpredictable and open-ended best-
interests-of-the-child standard thus face a perpetual threat of litigation that 
carries the possibility of extensive state intervention in their intimate lives.  
Courts applying the best-interests standard will often infringe upon parents’ 
autonomy, and their constitutional rights, to an extent unimaginable in any 
other area of law.  Judges can, and do, award custody, or change an existing 
custody arrangement, on the basis of parents’ religious practices, speech 
acts, lifestyle, and musical preferences.
 
358  They can also order parents to 
engage in or refrain from engaging in certain activities as a condition of 
custody.359
 
 352. See generally Mnookin, supra note 
  Courts awarding custody have prohibited parents from having 
339 (contending that the difficulty of predicting 
how one or another custodial arrangement will affect children, the lack of consensus on the 
values that should govern custody decision-making, and the paucity of binding precedent 
that might constrain judicial decision-making regarding custody combine to create an 
indeterminate standard that makes the outcome of litigation difficult to predict). 
 353. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 242, at 979. 
 354. See Mnookin, supra note 339, at 290–91 (considering coin toss approach to 
determining custodial rights, on the ground that the best-interests standard “may yield 
something close to a random pattern of outcomes,” and that the coin toss approach is less 
costly and helps to avoid the pain associated with litigating custody, but noting that the coin 
toss approach seems unacceptable because it undermines the symbolic and participatory 
values of adjudication); see also Elster, supra note 349, at 42–43 (considering coin toss as a 
possible method for determining custodial rights and noting that while such an approach 
would weaken the bargaining power of the more invested parent, it would benefit children 
by reducing protracted litigation). 
 355. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS 193 (2000). 
 356. See id. 
 357. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Judging Families, 77 UMKC L. REV. 267, 288–
98 (2008) (discussing judicial consideration of non-marital cohabitation in custody decision-
making and noting potential for polarization on this issue along partisan lines). 
 358. See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 633–43 (2006). 
 359. See id. 
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romantic partners stay overnight,360 banned parents from discussing their 
religious views with their children,361 and required parents to take children 
to church,362
For such families, the threat of intervention posed by the best-interests 
standard is ongoing, and lasts until a child reaches the age of majority.  A 
number of jurisdictions have formulated rules that limit judicial authority to 
modify custody without good cause.  Nonetheless, under a typical 
modification standard, as long as one parent can show a significant change 
of circumstances affecting a child’s interests, the court is empowered to 
conduct a full-fledged best-interests-of-the-child analysis and to change 
custody accordingly.
 among other prohibitions and requirements. 
363  As a number of courts have noted, circumstances 
often change as children develop and as parents move on with their lives, 
making changes to their careers, education, and personal relationships.364
While many scholars have criticized the best-interests standard, few have 
observed the extent to which it creates a two-tier system of family law.
  
A parent subject to a custody order thus can never rest assured that her 
parenting decisions will not be held to the microscope, and brought into 
question, at some future point.  The best-interests-of-the-child standard thus 
destabilizes families subject to its rule and undermines both parents’ and 
children’s sense of security. 
365  
(As a number of scholars have noted, we also have a two-tier system of 
family law based on economic privilege;366
 
 360. See, e.g., Muller v. Muller, No. 259271, 2005 WL 2810399 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 
2005). 
 this Article agrees with that 
assessment, while seeking to illustrate another, often overlapping dimension 
in which we treat certain families differently from others.)  Families that are 
deemed intact—such as traditional families headed by married parents and 
their biological children—are given significant freedom from state 
intervention.  The parents within such families are permitted to raise their 
children as they see fit, and do not face state-imposed penalties for their 
parenting decisions unless they put their children at risk of serious harm.  
The children, for their part, are provided the security that comes from being 
 361. See Volokh, supra note 358, at 636–37 n.20 (collecting cases). 
 362. See, e.g., Johns v. Johns, 918 S.W.2d 728, 731 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996). 
 363. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.b. 
 364. See, e.g., Knutsen v. Cegalis, 989 A.2d 1010, 1014 (Vt. 2009) (“Mother and father 
could choose to relocate, change careers, enter into romantic relationships, or even have 
more children. All of these changes would properly contribute to a best interests 
calculus . . . .”). 
 365. But see Volokh, supra note 358, at 673–711 (demonstrating that families subject to 
custody orders are subjected to greater levels of state intrusion into freedom of speech and of 
religion than are intact families). 
 366. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided:  A History of the Bifurcated Law 
of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002) (demonstrating that parents who receive aid 
from programs that are associated with dependency, such as AFDC and TANF, are subjected 
to a much greater level of state intervention than are families who receive other forms of 
state aid, such as Social Security benefits); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public 
Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113 (2011); Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System 
of Family Law:  Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257–58 
(1964). 
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raised by parents who are not at perpetual risk of losing their right to 
custody of their children.  Subjecting intact families to the level of state 
intervention to which we routinely subject non-intact families would be 
unthinkable. 
Many family law scholars who address child custody—even those who 
criticize the best-interests standard—tacitly approve of this two-tier system.  
For example, Katharine Bartlett, in one of the early pieces advocating rights 
for third parties who form relationships with children, limits her proposal to 
families that have been “interrupted” in some way.367  (A similar distinction 
is currently built into a number of current third-party visitation statutes that 
accord more deference to parents in an “intact” family than to single or 
divorced parents.368
The decline of the nuclear family may mean that the fabric of social 
relationships is torn, but the patch must fit the tear.  Statutes allowing . . . 
visitation over the objections of parents of intact families are too great an 
intrusion on parents who have managed to raise their children in 
traditional nuclear families.
)  Bartlett writes that 
369
The language here indicates an approval of traditional nuclear families that 
have “managed” to remain intact—and an assessment of other families as 
“torn” or “broken”—that justifies greater incursions into parental autonomy 
where families are not intact.  The implication is that if parents can simply 
work harder at staying married, they can protect themselves from the 
intrusions to which less successful families are subject. 
 
Framing parents as deserving of punishment—or of lesser protection—
because they have failed to keep their families intact suggests that these 
“torn” and “broken” families are less deserving of dignity and protection 
than “intact” families.  This, in turn, harms the welfare of the children in 
such families, for reasons both practical and expressive.  Children raised 
within these “torn” families are subjected to a level of insecurity and 
parental anxiety that is unlikely to be beneficial.  In cases where the absence 
of an enforceable agreement results in protracted and repeated litigation, 
increased hostility and conflict between a child’s parents may impede the 
child’s course of development.  On an expressive level, children within 
such families are denied the dignity in their relationships with their parents 
that is afforded to children within intact families. 
The number of families that are intact, in the form of two married parents 
and their biological or adopted offspring, is rapidly dwindling.  This is in 
 
 367. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:  The Need 
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 
879, 946 (1984). 
 368. See, e.g., OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 43, § 109.4(A)(1)(c) (West 2001 & Supp. 2014) 
(limiting orders for grandparent visitation against the wishes of one or both parents to 
situations in which “the intact nuclear family has been disrupted” by the divorce, separation, 
death, or incarceration of the child’s parent or parents); id. § 109.4(B) (“Under no 
circumstances shall any judge grant the right of visitation to any grandparent if the child is a 
member of an intact nuclear family and both parents of the child object to the granting of 
visitation.”). 
 369. Bartlett, supra note 367, at 958 (footnote omitted). 
134 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
part the result of the decline in marriage, the rise of single or unmarried 
parenthood, and the prevalence of divorce.370
2.   A Historical Example of the Dangers of Judicial Discretion 
  But strengthening marriage 
and making it available to all can no longer suffice to render families 
intact—marriage no longer provides an adequate remedy to the problem of 
non-intact family status.  For today it is increasingly the case that even if 
two parents “manage,” as Bartlett puts it, to marry and to remain married, 
their family may never enjoy the intact status that will grant them protection 
from court interference.  Whenever a family engages in assisted 
reproductive technology, or decides to share some aspect of childrearing 
among more than two parents—and whenever one or more adults decide to 
raise children outside of marriage—the family will face a risk of being 
deemed non-intact, and subjected to court intervention accordingly. 
In order for custody agreements to adequately address the problem of 
non-intact status, it is necessary that they be given significantly greater 
deference than they currently are.  To illustrate the need for greater 
deference to custody agreements, this section examines the historical 
example of the custody dispute between activist Annie Besant and her 
separated husband, which arose from one of the first Anglo-American 
statutes that purported to permit separating parents to bind themselves 
through custody agreements.  In re Besant371
In 1873, the British Parliament enacted legislation that for the first time 
explicitly permitted courts to enforce custody provisions in deeds of 
separation.
 demonstrates that as long as 
courts can override parents’ custody contracts in the name of children’s 
interests, such contracts will do little to provide non-intact families with the 
stability, certainty, and freedom from state intervention that intact families 
enjoy. 
372  Until then, the prevailing Anglo-American rule had been that 
courts would not enforce a contract transferring or otherwise limiting 
parental rights, on the ground that parents did not have the power to transfer 
rights that they held only for their children’s benefit.373  Courts were 
especially adamant about refusing to enforce agreements where a father 
agreed to give custodial rights to the mother.374
 
 370. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Disintegration of Families and Children’s Right to Their 
Parents, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 10–16 (2011) (discussing decline in marriage rate, 
increase in divorce rate, and rise in single and unmarried parenthood). 
  Despite the rule that 
 371. (1879) 11 Ch. 508 (Eng.). 
 372. See Custody of Infants Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 12 (Eng.). 
 373. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 1 Barb. Ch. 639, 642 (N.Y. Ch. 1846) (refusing to enforce 
custody provision of separation deed); People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 411 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1842) (same); Talbot v. Shrewsbury, (1840) 41 Eng. Rep. 259, 263–65 (Ch.) 
(same); see also Andrews v. Salt, (1873) 8 Ch.App. 622, 636 (Eng.) (“We think that a father 
cannot bind himself conclusively by contract to exercise, in all events, in a particular way, 
rights which the law gives him for the benefit of his children, and not for his own.”). 
 374. See, e.g., Cook, 1 Barb. Ch. at 641 (refusing to enforce separation agreement giving 
mother custodial rights); Mercein, 3 Hill at 419 (discussing social perils that would follow 
from permitting father to allocate custodial rights to mother, including increased acceptance 
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custody contracts were not enforceable, parents employed them nonetheless 
throughout the nineteenth century, both in England and in the United 
States.375  When custody arrangements broke down, parents repeatedly 
went to court to enforce the custody agreements that had sanctioned these 
arrangements, only to be told that such agreements could not be 
enforced.376
It was against this backdrop of the turn toward private ordering on the 
part of parents, and the judicial refusal to enforce such agreements, that 
Parliament enacted the 1873 Custody of Infants Act,
 
377 which permitted 
courts to enforce custody provisions in separation deeds.  The statute 
explicitly instructed courts that transfers from fathers to mothers should be 
enforceable:  “No agreement contained in any separation deed made 
between the father and mother of an infant or infants shall be held to be 
invalid by reason only of its providing that the father of such infant or 
infants shall give up the custody or control thereof to the mother.”378
The statute included the caveat, however, that “no Court shall enforce 
any such agreement if the Court shall be of opinion that it will not be for the 
benefit of the infant or infants to give effect thereto.”
 
379  In this regard, the 
1873 Custody Act is similar to many current American statutes regarding 
the enforceability of custody agreements.380
The Besant case, the first major case to apply the 1873 Custody of 
Infants Act, was decided in 1879 and involved a custody dispute between 
Annie Besant and the husband from whom she had separated five years 
earlier, the Reverend Frank Besant.
  As in most jurisdictions today, 
this best-interests exception renders custody agreements largely 
superfluous, in that courts are free to ignore them and to instead impose a 
custody arrangement in accordance with their own assessment of a child’s 
best interests. 
381
 
of separation between married spouses); Talbot, 41 Eng. Rep. at 259 (refusing to enforce 
separation deed giving mother custody of daughter until age ten). 
  Annie separated from her husband 
when she first began to realize the extent of her atheist beliefs and decided 
that she could no longer accept the sacraments of the Church of England.  
Annie’s husband, who was a vicar in the Church of England, told her that 
he would not accept her into his home unless she would attend communion 
 375. See supra notes 373–74. 
 376. See supra notes 373–74; see also Abramowicz, supra note 28, at 58–62 (describing 
the refusal by nineteenth-century English courts to enforce contractual transfers of parental 
rights). 
 377. Custody of Infants Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 12 (Eng.). 
 378. Id. § 2. 
 379. Id. 
 380. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 381. See In re Besant, (1879) 11 Ch. 508 (Eng.).  For a reading of the Besant case as 
indicative of a return to greater deference to paternal rights in England of the 1870s and 
1880s, as well as of a tendency to limit custody awards to mothers deemed deserving, see 
Danaya C. Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody:  A History of the Birth of Family Law in 
England, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175, 257 (2002) (“If fathers were going to lose their 
paternal rights in favor of mothers, the courts were going to ensure that only those 
‘deserving’ mothers . . . those who fully adopted traditional norms and values, would be 
allowed to keep custody.”). 
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at his church.  She refused, and they separated.382  Taking advantage of the 
newly enacted 1873 law rendering custody agreements enforceable, the 
lawyers for Annie and her husband drew up a legal separation deed 
providing that Annie would have custody of their three-year-old daughter, 
Mabel, for eleven months of the year, and that her husband would have 
equivalent custody of their young son, with each parent given one month’s 
visitation per year with the noncustodial child.383
The custody arrangement set out in the separation deed lasted five years.  
Frank expressed unhappiness with Annie’s activities during this time, trying 
to stop her from publishing atheist and feminist tracts using his last name.  
But he abided by their custody agreement, until, in 1877, Annie published a 
pamphlet on birth control, for which she was arrested and indicted on 
charges of obscenity.  In response, Frank went to court to regain custody of 
their daughter, who had been raised by her mother from the age of three and 
was at the time almost eight years old.
 
384
As the father’s counsel correctly pointed out in the ensuing litigation, 
under the 1873 Custody Act newly permitting the enforcement of custody 
provisions in separation deeds, the court was free to ignore the deed entirely 
in the name of the child’s interests.  In arguing that it was in his daughter’s 
best interests to be transferred to his custody, the father argued that 
 
there cannot be a doubt that the future welfare of this child will be 
prejudiced by her being brought up in association with persons who hold 
the opinions which her mother professes and advocates—opinions which 
are looked upon by most people as wrong, and by her own sex as 
perfectly shocking.385
The court agreed with this assessment, and ordered the girl removed from 
her mother’s custody and transferred to that of her father.
 
386
What is striking about the Besant court’s justification for rejecting the 
parents’ custody agreement is that the opinion carefully disavows 
ideological bias even while basing its custody determination on just such a 
bias, a double-move often seen in custody decisions today.  The court 
repeatedly insists that it has no position on Annie’s atheism, yet clearly 
condemns her and removes her daughter from her care for this very reason: 
 
Not only does Mrs. Besant entertain those opinions which are reprobrated 
by the great mass of mankind (whether rightly or wrongly, I have no 
business to say, though of course I think rightly), but she carries those 
speculative opinions into practice as regards the education of the child.387
Here the court insists that it is neutral as to Annie’s religious views despite, 
in the same breath, condemning her for teaching those views to her child.  
 
 
 382. See ANNIE BESANT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 101–29 (1893). 
 383. See id. at 205–44. 
 384. See id. 
 385. Besant, 11 Ch. at 517. 
 386. See id. at 508. 
 387. Id. at 513. 
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The court makes a similar double-move when it casts Annie’s atheism as a 
violation of gender norms that will cause her to be socially stigmatized: 
She has endeavored to convince others, by her lectures and by her 
pamphlets, that the denial of all religion is a right and proper thing to 
recommend to mankind at large.  It is not necessary for me to express any 
opinion as to the religious convictions of others, or even as to their non-
religious convictions; but I must, as a man of the world, consider what 
effect on a woman’s position this course of conduct must lead to[; it must] 
cut her off, practically, not merely from the sympathy of, but from social 
intercourse with, the great majority of her sex.388
The court here once again condemns Annie for her atheism, and removes 
her child from her custody because of it, even while insisting that it is 
neutral as to her “non-religious convictions.”
 
389
The kind of disavowal we see here—where a court insists on its 
neutrality about religious and political views, even while basing its custody 
decision on those very views, on the ground that they will alienate a child 
from her community—persists today in myriad custody decisions that take 
religion, education, ideology, and morality into account in awarding child 
custody.  Indeed, the application of the best-interests standard today is just 
as prone to judicial bias in favor of majority views—along with disavowal 
of that bias—as it was in England of 1879. 
 
The tendency of courts to disavow their reasons for awarding custody 
makes it difficult for parents to confront, or to protect against, the role of 
ideological bias in determining custody.  A recent custody decision from 
Michigan, Ulvund v. Ulvund,390 provides an instructive modern example of 
such disavowal, and of its potential to disrupt parent-child ties despite a 
parent’s efforts to conform to judicial norms.391  After the couple in Ulvund 
divorced, sharing joint physical custody of their youngest child, the mother 
entered into a lesbian relationship.  At issue was the trial court’s decision to 
modify custody by awarding primary physical custody to the father after 
five years during which the child had spent the majority of time living with 
his mother.  In making its determination that such a modification of custody 
was in the child’s best interests, the trial court took the mother’s sexual 
orientation into account even while claiming that it was doing nothing of 
the sort.  The appellate court affirmed the trial court decision, finding that 
the trial court did not hold the mother’s sexual orientation against her.  It 
reached this conclusion even though, in assessing the list of statutory best-
interests factors, the trial court repeatedly found the mother’s sexual 
orientation relevant to its evaluation.  When the court assessed each parent’s 
ability to continue the child’s religious upbringing, for instance, it 
acknowledged that both father and mother were religious, and that both 
attended church and would take the child to church.392
 
 388. Id. 
  But it found in 
 389. Id. 
 390. No. 224566, 2000 WL 33407372 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2000). 
 391. See generally id. 
 392. See id. at *3. 
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favor of the father on the religion factor, because “although plaintiff attends 
church, she will eventually have to deal with the conflict between church 
doctrine and her choice of a homosexual lifestyle.”393  Then again, when 
considering the “catch-all” factor that is included in most custody statutes, 
the trial court found against the mother not, it insisted, because of her 
sexual orientation, but because she and her partner had decided not to 
express physical affection for each other in the child’s presence, while the 
father testified that he and his new wife did “express affection for each 
other in their home.”394  The court decided that it was better for the children 
to witness physical affection, and thus that this factor also weighed in favor 
of the father.395
The court’s disavowal of evident ideological bias in Ulvund—one of 
many similar decisions that go largely unnoticed—is similar to that of the 
court in the Besant case.  Just as Annie Besant lost custody of her daughter 
on the basis of her atheism despite the court’s insistence that it could not 
express an opinion on a parent’s religious preference, the Michigan mother 
lost custody on the basis, in large part, of her sexual orientation, even as the 
court insisted that it was neutral on the matter.  The Ulvund case illustrates 
the chilling effect that this type of unacknowledged judicial bias can have 
on parenting.  Reading between the lines, it seems that the mother in 
Ulvund might have attempted to shape her conduct in a manner that would 
meet the court’s approval.  Some courts have found physical affection 
between two women or two men to count against them in a custody 
determination.
 
396
Where courts assess best interests for purposes of awarding custody, they 
take into account not only each parent’s ties to the child, but a host of other 
factors, many of which judge each parent from the perspective of a 
culturally contingent understanding of what is best for children.
  Perhaps, then, the mother in Ulvund refrained from being 
affectionate with her partner in front of the child because she feared losing 
custody.  The court then turned this protective behavior against the mother 
and made it a basis for awarding custody to the father. 
397
 
 393. Id. 
  Courts 
awarding custody thus routinely intervene in parents’ behavior to an extent 
that would never be tolerated in an intact family.  As the Besant and Ulvund 
 394. Id. at *4. 
 395. See id. 
 396. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (citing evidence 
that mother and female partner exhibited physical affection in front of child in support of 
decision to transfer custody from mother to father); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-11, 1988 
WL 30173, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (same); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 
102, 108 (Va. 1995) (citing evidence that mother and female partner exhibited physical 
affection in front of child in support of decision to transfer custody from mother to 
grandmother). 
 397. For example, a number of jurisdictions instruct courts to consider each parent’s 
ability to further a child’s religious upbringing when determining the child’s interests.  And 
many jurisdictions also provide that courts assessing children’s interests should take into 
account each parent’s “moral fitness,” a category that explicitly invites award of custody to 
the parent who better conforms to prevailing norms. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 61.13(d)(3)(f) (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(f) (West 2011). 
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cases illustrate, the result is not only to deny custody to parents who fail to 
conform to community norms, but also to create a chilling effect on the 
behavior of any parent—even one in an intact family—who has any fear of 
one day coming before a custody court. 
Custody contracts have the potential to protect families such as the 
mother and child in Ulvund, or Annie Besant and her daughter in 
nineteenth-century England, from the destabilizing effect of living in an 
arrangement that the state no longer deems intact.  As the Besant case 
illustrates, contract can only provide this protective effect if it is given 
adequate deference.  As long as courts awarding custody can override 
parents’ agreements in the name of children’s interests, parents on the 
wrong side of a state’s normative views may find it impossible to provide 
their children with the stability, certainty, and freedom from state oversight 
that are granted to traditional marital families as long as they remain intact. 
B.   Advantages of Enforcing Custody Agreements 
Enforcing custody agreements would provide a number of advantages.  
Most significantly, enforcement of custody agreements would help to 
protect non-intact families.  Enforcement of custody agreements would also 
provide related benefits, including promoting gender neutrality, fostering a 
diversity of family forms, and conveying respect for parental autonomy. 
1.   Enforcing Custody Agreements Would Protect 
Against the Two-Tier System That Disadvantages Non-Intact Families 
This Article advocates enabling all parents to employ contract to afford 
their families the protections afforded to intact families.  Where a family 
has availed itself of contract to create an approximation of intact status even 
when the parents’ relationship dissolves, we should treat such families in 
the same way that we do traditional, intact families.  Doing so would 
dismantle the two-tier system of family law and provide the children of 
nontraditional families with the same protections afforded to the children of 
traditional families. 
Enforcing custody contracts would enable intended or existing parents to 
create an alternative to the perpetual threat of state intervention in the name 
of children’s interests should their relationship dissolve.  The need for 
enforceable custody contracts extends beyond traditional families 
contemplating divorce.  It extends, for instance, to the single woman who 
raises her child with the help of a known sperm donor who has agreed to 
limit his parental status to visitation; to the male couple that employs both a 
gestational surrogate and an egg donor who has agreed to play a role in the 
child’s life; and to any couple that agrees to jointly raise the legal child of 
one partner. 
Marriage cannot suffice to provide the intact status that families need.  
The solution is to permit contract law to work alongside marriage to render 
families intact.  In some instances, custody contracts would serve as a gap-
filling mechanism at a moment when the law is in transition, as is currently 
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the case with the law of same-sex marriage and assisted reproductive 
technology.  But it is likely that there will always be a need for custody 
contracts to help render families intact.  Intended parents may wish to use 
such contracts to maintain contact between a child and a biological donor; 
others may wish to protect ties between a child and a stepparent.  And 
custody contracts will always be useful to those intended parents who 
decide not to marry, or who marry but—like all couples—face the 
possibility of one day ending their marriage with divorce.  In all of these 
situations, custody contracts could provide a powerful mechanism for 
keeping the state out of the business of determining how and by whom 
children are raised, or—if we believe that the state should play such a 
role—for enabling all parents to avail their families of the same level of 
protection and security that we afford to traditional intact families. 
Some scholars oppose the enforcement of parental agreements on the 
basis that such an approach privileges parental rights over children’s 
interests.398  The aversion to parenting contracts is linked to an aversion to 
treating children like “chattel,”399 mere property to be transferred at the will 
of parent-owners.  Enforcement of custody contracts, however, like that of 
parentage contracts, does not necessarily prioritize parents’ rights over 
children’s needs.400
2.   Other Advantages of Enforcement 
  With proper protections in place, such enforcement 
can instead be seen as promoting child welfare, by providing the children of 
non-intact families with the same dignity, relationship stability, and 
freedom from uncertainty that is enjoyed by the children of intact families.  
From the perspective of children’s interests in a stable and predictable 
environment, enforcement of custody agreements no more privileges 
parents over children than does recognition of marital status in determining 
parental status. 
Enforcing custody contracts would also provide additional benefits, many 
of which resemble those that parentage scholars have argued would 
accompany the enforcement of parentage contracts. 
 
 398. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg:  A Child-Centered 
Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1820 (1993) (arguing that the 
intent-based approach to parentage “suggests that power over children ought to be defined 
by adults’ bargained for exchanges,” and advocating an approach to parentage grounded 
instead in caregiving and stewardship as considered from the perspective of the child’s 
experience and needs). 
 399. See, e.g., Rubano v. Dicenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 988 (R.I. 2000) (Bourcier, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that “a child is more than a mere chattel 
whose fate may be decided by a contract between two consenting adults” to explain 
disagreement with majority decision permitting award of parental rights on the basis of a 
visitation agreement between same-sex co-parents). 
 400. For a critique of the scholarly and judicial tendency to either balance parents’ 
interests against those of children in the arena of child custody decision making or to 
privilege the interests of parents, and an argument that child welfare should be the only 
consideration here, see James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination and Children’s 
Custody:  A New Analytical Framework for State Structuring of Children’s Family Life, 54 
ARIZ. L. REV. 79 (2012). 
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Marjorie Shultz has argued that a contract-based approach to parentage 
would promote gender neutrality in family law by enabling intended parents 
to create families that diverge from the traditional two-parent model in 
which the mother has the primary nurturing role.  As she notes, 
determinations of parentage often hinge on social norms about the relative 
nurturing potential of women and men, and on the notion that women are 
best equipped to raise children.  A contract-based approach to parentage, 
she contends, would permit parental status to be determined free from 
potential bias about gender and parentage.401
A contract-based approach to custody would similarly promote gender 
neutrality in family law.  Critics have long accused custody law of 
promoting gender stereotypes and basing custody decisions on such 
stereotypes.  Some argue that custody law favors women as caretakers, to 
the detriment of children’s bonds with their fathers, on the basis of the 
stereotypical assumption that children should be raised by their mothers.
 
402  
Others contend that gender stereotypes work to deny custody to women 
who fail to conform to those stereotypes.403
Proponents of parentage contracts also claim that these would promote a 
diversity of family forms, while at the same time ensuring that children’s 
relationships with their parents are protected regardless of whether their 
parents conform to traditional norms.
  The arguments that Shultz 
makes in favor of enforcing parentage contracts apply to custody contracts 
as well.  Determining custody with reference to parents’ own ex ante 
agreements would help to promote a gender-neutral approach to 
determining parental rights and obligations.  While parents may well make 
traditionally gendered decisions about who should have custody of a child, 
they would also be free to make decisions that do not conform to current 
gender norms. 
404
Finally, just as enforcing parentage contracts expresses respect for the 
autonomy of the contracting parties, the same is true of enforcing custody 
contracts.  Although it may be argued, as it has been in the context of 
surrogacy agreements,
  The same is true of custody 
contracts, which would free parents to create family forms that diverge from 
the norm without risking a loss in custody.  A custody contract could 
protect against the possibility that custody would be determined, or 
subsequently modified, on the basis of judicial preferences about family 
forms, such as a preference for a married couple over a single parent, for a 
married couple over an unmarried couple, or for opposite-sex rather than 
same-sex parents. 
405
 
 401. See Shultz, supra note 
 that vulnerable women may be pressured into 
custody agreements that they will later regret, such an argument can be 
5, at 397–98. 
 402. See, e.g., Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice:  Florida and the Nation, 42 
FLA. L. REV. 181, 191 (1990) (describing “widespread bias against fathers on the part of 
some judges who do not perceive men as being capable or appropriate primary caretakers”). 
 403. See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, The (In)visibility of Motherhood in Family Court 
Proceedings, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 565–87 (2012). 
 404. See supra notes 267–78 and accompanying text. 
 405. See supra notes 288–89 and accompanying text. 
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refuted on similar grounds.  As a number of scholars have observed, it is 
paternalistic to assume that surrogacy agreements are necessarily either 
coerced or insufficiently rational.406
The charge of paternalism should not cause us to refrain from protecting 
vulnerable contracting parties, particularly where children’s interests are at 
stake.  The problems of duress and irrationality in custody contracting, 
however, can be handled in much the same way as in premarital agreements 
about property.  Currently, such agreements are largely enforceable, and 
roughly half of the states provide protections against both procedural and 
substantive unfairness.
  It is similarly paternalistic to assume 
that actual or intended mothers cannot make rational decisions about their 
parental rights in the context of custody agreements. 
407
IV.   CONTRACTING FOR CUSTODY:  A PROPOSAL 
  Concerns about custody contracts that are 
obtained under coercive circumstances can be alleviated by developing 
mechanisms to protect against duress or excessive pressure in custody 
contracting.  Several proposed mechanisms are discussed in Part IV.  Such 
an approach would help to ensure that custody agreements truly reflect the 
parents’ assessment of their children’s interests, while facilitating 
enforcement of such agreements where this requirement is met. 
Custody contracts have the potential to render our system of family law 
more egalitarian.  Currently, we have a two-tier system under which intact 
families are given greater privileges and protections than non-intact 
families.  Intact families are granted significant deference in how children 
are raised, which in turn provides the parent-child relationship with stability 
and certainty.  Non-intact families, by contrast, are subject to a perpetual 
threat of state intervention in the name of children’s interests.  The result is 
to further destabilize precisely those child-parent relationships that are most 
in need of protection. 
Contracting for custody would enable parents to ensure that, even if their 
relationship with one another dissolves, they will enjoy the same stability 
and freedom from state intervention granted to traditional intact families.  
All parents would benefit, ranging from those who contemplate marrying 
and raising the couple’s own biological or adopted children to those who 
intend to raise children in a family that does not fit this traditional model.  
At a time when many marriages end in divorce, and many parents employ 
assisted reproductive technology in order to create their families, marriage 
is no longer a viable solution to rendering a family permanently intact.  
Contract can fill the gap, providing structure and certainty where marriage 
cannot. 
This part concludes by presenting a model for facilitating the 
enforcement of custody agreements while addressing concerns that have 
been raised about enforcement, including the concern that custody 
agreements may not be fully informed or voluntary and concerns about the 
 
 406. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
 407. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text. 
2014] CONTRACTUALIZING CUSTODY 143 
need to protect children’s welfare, particularly where parents have failed 
accurately to predict developments that have made an agreed-upon 
arrangement adverse to a child’s welfare. 
Part IV.A takes up the preliminary question of whether enforceability 
should hinge on the time at which a custody agreement was formed.  It 
concludes that custody contracts should be given deference not only when 
agreed to by separating parents, but also when parents are no longer in 
agreement about custody.  Part IV.B then discusses the ALI approach to 
premarital agreements as a model for enforcing custody agreements.  Part 
IV.C builds on this model to present a proposal for enforcing custody 
agreements subject to both procedural and substantive review. 
A.   Relevance of Time of Contract Formation 
One issue that arises in the marital context is whether custody agreements 
should be given more deference when they are agreed to at the point when 
the parents’ relationship comes to an end.  The current trend in custody 
jurisprudence is to give greater deference to custody provisions in 
separation agreements than to custody agreements made prior to or during 
marriage.  While, in most jurisdictions, all custody agreements can be 
rejected by a court in the name of children’s interests, agreements arrived at 
post-dissolution are much more likely to be enforced.  This is so either 
because post-dissolution custody agreements are given greater deference as 
a formal matter, or because, in practice, courts are most likely to approve of 
custody arrangements made at divorce or separation and to reject out of 
hand any agreement made before a child was born or before the parents’ 
relationship dissolved.408
While this Article suggests enforcing all custody contracts, it questions 
the prevailing view that those arrived at post-dissolution should be given 
the greatest deference.  The rationale for such deference is that parents who 
are divorcing are better able than intended parents to determine an 
arrangement that is in their children’s interests.  How, ask courts and 
scholars, could an intended parent possibly know what is best for a child 
who has yet to be born?
 
409
The potential utility of custody contracts would be greatest when they are 
employed by parents or intended parents in anticipation of changes that 
might occur in the future.  Parents can employ custody agreements to 
ensure that their own ex ante decisions will govern their children’s custody 
should their initial arrangement fall apart. They may prefer that, in the event 
that conflict arises, their parental rights will be determined by the decisions 
  One response is that, if an agreed-to custody 
arrangement is not in a child’s interests, the parents can, at the point when it 
comes into play, renegotiate the original agreement.  Another is that we can 
develop sufficient protective mechanisms to protect children from being 
harmed by enforcement of ex ante custody agreements without rendering 
such agreements altogether unenforceable. 
 
 408. See supra Part I.A. 
 409. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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they made at a time when they were working together to plan their 
children’s future, rather than by a court faced with competing claims by 
potentially hostile parties. 
Another reason for hesitating to favor separation agreements over 
custody agreements made ex ante is that it is precisely at the point of 
separation or divorce that the more vulnerable parent may have the least 
leverage.  Before a child is born, a potential parent can insist on a fair and 
child-protective custody arrangement as a precondition to raising a child 
with another intended parent.  A parent can also insist on a custody contract 
as a precondition for forgoing work or education in order to stay home with 
a child or devote more time to a child.  Such an arrangement might be 
especially useful, for instance, in the event that a child has special needs 
and requires more parental care than anticipated.  At the point of divorce, 
however, the parent who has devoted more time to raising the child may 
have less leverage in arriving at a custody agreement.  As discussed in Part 
III, the indeterminacy of the best-interests standard makes it impossible to 
predict with certainty how a court will decide a contested custody dispute.  
Particularly in those jurisdictions that favor joint custody, the parent who 
devoted less time to staying home with the child has little to lose by 
pushing for the maximum custody award available.  The result is that 
parents may trade off rights to property and support in exchange for 
custody, to the detriment of both the child and the primary custodial parent. 
A related issue is whether custody agreements should continue to be 
granted deference going forward, as a child develops during the years that 
follow the initial dissolution of the parents’ relationship.  Currently, the fact 
of a prior custody agreement is given little weight in a proceeding to modify 
an existing custodial arrangement.410  While the modification standard itself 
might be designed to favor the status quo, the same standard typically 
applies regardless of whether parents arrived at the custody arrangement 
themselves.411
Thus, we should facilitate enforcement of all custody contracts, 
regardless of when they were formed.  However, we should, at the same 
time, attend to the concerns that have been expressed about the risks of 
enforcing custody agreements.  To do this, we must craft an enforcement 
regime that will be sensitive to the pressures and informational weakness 
that might apply to a custody contract depending on when, and in what 
circumstances, it was entered into.  Given the profound effect of such 
contracts on children who did not consent to them, an appropriate 
enforcement regime would also feature mechanisms to protect against 
potential adverse effects on children’s welfare. 
  Here, however, as with custody agreements made prior to a 
child’s birth, the value in such agreements is largely in their power to 
provide certainty and predictability into the future.  To protect families from 
the destabilization and loss of autonomy that come with non-intact status, it 
is essential that custody agreements retain their force over time. 
 
 410. See supra Part I.A.2.c. 
 411. See supra Part I.A.2.c. 
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B.   The ALI Approach to Prenuptial Agreements 
As a Model for Enforcing Custody Agreements 
Many of the problems that arise with respect to the enforcement of 
premarital custody contracts also arise in the enforcement of premarital 
agreements regarding monetary terms.  These include the possibility that 
the contracting parties will experience, inter alia, uneven bargaining power; 
cognitive limits (such as the optimism bias that accompanies the inception 
of intimate relationships); and difficulty foreseeing how their own needs, as 
well as their children’s needs, might develop over time.  The primary 
difference between prenuptial monetary agreements—which courts often 
enforce—and prenuptial custody agreements—which they typically do 
not—is that in the latter category, children’s lives are directly at stake.  
Custody contracts thus raise the additional concern of how enforcement will 
affect the child in question. 
This Article proposes an approach to custody contracts that builds upon 
the ALI recommendations on enforcing prenuptial agreements, with 
changes and additions to reflect the special problems raised by custody 
agreements.  The ALI provisions on premarital agreements indicate that 
these should not apply to agreements regarding custody.412  Nonetheless, 
the ALI approach to premarital agreements can be adapted to apply to 
custody agreements as well.  The ALI provisions on premarital agreements 
were designed to facilitate ex ante contracting between intended or actual 
family members while addressing the ways in which family relationships, 
because of their intimacy, length, and frequent dependency, create problems 
for contract law, such as unequal bargaining power, cognitive bias, and 
unforeseeability.413
The proposed approach also builds upon the ALI provisions on parenting 
plans made by separating or divorcing parents, which recommend 
enforcement of such plans as long as they are knowing and voluntary and 
are not harmful to the child.
  The proposed adaptation of the ALI recommendations 
for premarital agreements would build upon the ALI’s approach to these 
issues while attending to the additional problems posed by contract terms 
that directly affect the interests of children. 
414
 
 412. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.07 (2000) (providing that terms “allocating custodial responsibility 
and decisionmaking responsibility for a couple’s children” are governed by the ALI 
provisions on custody and parenting, rather than by the provisions on prenuptial 
agreements).  As Part I.A.2 discusses, the ALI recommendation on custody allocation is to 
grant deference to custody agreements made at separation or divorce, but not to those made 
during or before marriage. See id. §§ 2.06, 2.08, 2.09. 
  This Article’s proposal differs significantly 
from the ALI provisions on parenting plans, however, in advocating 
enforcement not only of post-dissolution custody agreements that parents 
jointly present to a court for approval, but also of prior (including 
premarital or marital) custody agreements that at least one of the parents no 
 413. See id. § 7.05 cmt. b. 
 414. See id. § 2.06. 
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longer wants to enforce.415
The cornerstone of the ALI approach to premarital agreements—which 
reflects the approach adopted by nearly half of the states
  This, in turn, requires adjustments to reflect the 
special problems raised by enforcing custody agreements made ex ante 
rather than at the time of separation or divorce.  It is in this respect that the 
ALI provisions on premarital agreements provide a useful model. 
416—is to permit 
enforcement, while also policing such agreements more stringently than 
other contracts, both procedurally and substantively.  The ALI recommends 
that the party arguing for enforcement of a premarital agreement must 
establish that the agreement was both voluntary and well-informed.417  
Once the procedural fairness of the agreement is thus established, the party 
opposing enforcement must establish a substantive reason for doing so.  
This requires showing both that one of various enumerated events has 
occurred since the agreement was executed—a fixed number of years has 
passed; a child has been born to or adopted by the parties; or there has been 
an unanticipated change in circumstances with a substantial impact on the 
parties and their children—and that, in light of such event, enforcing the 
agreement would inflict a substantial injustice.418
Given the intrusion into parental autonomy and family stability that 
results when courts are permitted to override parents’ custodial decisions, 
an enforcement regime for custody contracts should focus judicial review 
more heavily on the procedural rather than the substantive aspect of such 
agreements.  This would help keep the state out of decisions about how 
children are raised, and would also let parents know ex ante what steps they 
need to follow in order to create an agreement that will be enforced.  
Nonetheless, given the importance of protecting children, we should include 
some element of substantive review as well. 
 
C.   The Proposed Procedural and Substantive Review  
of Custody Agreements 
1.   Procedural Review 
Commentators have expressed concern that both premarital agreements 
and divorce settlements are often the product of unequal bargaining power 
that substantially disadvantages the more vulnerable and financially 
 
 415. Compare id. (“The court should order provisions of a parenting plan agreed to by the 
parents, unless the agreement (a) is not knowing or voluntary, or (b) would be harmful to the 
child.”), with id. § 2.08(e) (providing that courts determining whether to deviate from the 
ALI approximation approach to custody in cases where parents cannot agree on a parenting 
plan should “take into account any prior agreement . . . that would be appropriate to consider 
in light of the circumstances as a whole, including the reasonable expectations of the parties, 
the extent to which they could have reasonably anticipated the events that occurred and their 
significance, and the interests of the child”). 
 416. See Bix, supra note 56, at 264. 
 417. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.04. 
 418. See id. § 7.05. 
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dependent spouse.419  They have argued, further, that courts often fail to 
recognize the factors that might have vitiated a spouse’s ability to freely and 
knowingly consent to such an agreement, and routinely enforce agreements 
that were the product of undue pressure or duress.420
Procedurally, then, we should rigorously review custody agreements to 
ensure that they are the product of informed consent, and that they were not 
made under undue pressure or duress.  The ALI approach to procedural 
review of premarital agreements could be adapted to this end, with 
modifications that address some of the special considerations that arise with 
respect to custody agreements.  As under the ALI premarital agreement 
regime, the party requesting enforcement of a custody agreement should 
have the burden of establishing that the agreement was obtained with the 
fully informed and voluntary consent of the other party.  The enforcing 
party could create a rebuttable presumption to this effect by showing that:  
(1) both parties were advised, and given the opportunity, to obtain 
independent counsel; (2) in situations where such representation was not 
obtained, the agreement clearly set forth both the full ramifications of the 
agreement and each party’s rights in the absence of any agreement; (3) the 
agreement, if premarital, was not presented within thirty days of the parties’ 
marriage; and (4) each party was given a period during which he or she 
could subsequently opt out of the agreement.  These procedural 
requirements largely track those of the ALI with respect to premarital 
agreements.
  If we are to enforce 
custody agreements on the theory that the parents at the time of the 
agreement worked together to determine an arrangement that they jointly 
felt to be in their child’s interests, courts must be rigorous in ensuring that 
the agreements were truly the product of free and informed consent.  The 
concerns about paternalism and freedom of contract that are often voiced in 
opposition to rigorous policing of financial agreements between spouses do 
not have the same weight in the context of custody agreements, because 
children are not parties to such agreements, but are profoundly affected by 
their parents’ custodial arrangements. 
421
If we want to make procedural review of custody agreements more 
rigorous, we could make it more difficult for the party wishing to enforce 
such an agreement to create a rebuttable presumption that the agreement 
was fully informed and voluntary.  For instance, we could provide for 
application of the presumption only where each party to the agreement was 
represented by independent counsel.  This would help to ensure that 
custody agreements are enforced only when they are the product of 
informed and voluntary consent, but could put such agreements out of reach 
of those who cannot afford this level of legal representation. 
 
 
 419. See, e.g., Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce:  A 
Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153 (1999). 
 420. See id.; see also Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 171, 199–201 (2013). 
 421. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.04. 
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Another potential mechanism to help ensure that custody agreements are 
enforced only when formed under procedurally sound conditions would be 
to require the court to assess whether the terms of the agreement indicate 
that it was obtained under undue pressure.  A number of commentators have 
recognized that unfair terms can often indicate that undue pressure was 
applied when a contract was formed.422
These requirements should apply to all custody agreements, premarital 
and otherwise.  The proposal in this respect diverges from the prevailing 
approach to both parental custody agreements and spousal agreements 
about property division and spousal support, which is to give the greatest 
deference to those agreements made at separation or divorce.  The rationale 
for imposing heightened procedural scrutiny to premarital financial 
agreements, but not to separation agreements on financial matters, is that 
spouses are presumed to know that they are in an adversarial position at the 
time their relationship dissolves, and thus are on notice that they need to 
look out for their own interests.
  Thus, for example, where a future 
spouse agrees to relinquish both her custodial rights and her rights to 
property or support in the event of divorce, this could, depending on the 
surrounding facts, constitute evidence that the agreement was the product of 
sufficiently unequal bargaining power that its custody terms should not be 
considered fully voluntary, and should not be enforced. 
423
Some additional potential protective mechanisms would apply with 
particular force to the dissolution context.  For instance, we could impose 
the further requirement that the party seeking enforcement of a custody 
agreement demonstrate that the custody agreement was not made in 
exchange for financial compensation.  Under this requirement, an 
agreement would fail on procedural grounds if one party could establish 
that she agreed to waive her rights to alimony or support in exchange for a 
right to custody, or that she agreed to waive some portion of her right to 
  However, parents working together to 
reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement regarding their children’s custody 
may be under the impression that they are not in an adversarial position, 
even if their relationship has already dissolved.  Or, in cases that are clearly 
adversarial, parents fearful of losing their children’s custody may feel 
pressured to agree to a suboptimal arrangement rather than risk losing 
custody altogether.  A party contemplating parenthood can back out of a 
relationship with a co-parent, and avoid the threat to deprive her of custody, 
to an extent that an existing parent cannot.  Thus, courts should be required 
to scrutinize the procedural fairness of all custody agreements, including 
those agreed to when parents separate. 
 
 422. The comments to the ALI provisions on parenting agreements make a similar 
recommendation, noting that “a significant disparity between the provisions of the parents’ 
agreement and what the court would have ordered without the agreement will often be 
probative of whether the agreement was truly understood and agreed to by both parties.” Id. 
§ 2.06 cmt. b. 
 423. See Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of 
Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1414–24 (1984) (describing, and 
contesting, the view that separation agreements require minimal procedural review because 
spouses contemplating divorce are on notice that their positions are adversarial). 
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custody in exchange for compensation.  Significantly, any such showing 
should also render the monetary aspect of the agreement unenforceable.  
These rules, together, would help prevent intended or actual parents from 
trading custody rights for money, whether as part of a transaction that 
commodifies a child’s custody in the sense of “selling” custodial rights or 
in a situation in which a parent takes advantage of the other parent’s 
aversion to losing custody to extract an advantageous financial 
settlement.424
Another important mechanism to ensure that custody agreements are 
enforced only when they are the product of free and informed consent 
would be to require courts to recognize the extent to which domestic abuse 
may impede a parent’s ability to freely consent to an agreement.  Some 
contend that courts do not adequately recognize the extent to which battered 
spouses may feel pressure to agree to unfavorable divorce settlements.
 
425
2.   Substantive Review 
 
Courts reviewing custody agreements for procedural fairness should be 
required to take such factors into consideration, perhaps by imposing a 
presumption that a custody agreement reached by a spouse subjected to 
emotional or physical abuse was not entered into with sufficient volition. 
The question of what sort of substantive review to apply to custody 
agreements is a more difficult one.  This Article proposes one possibility, 
while hoping to start a conversation about other possible approaches.  The 
goal is to create a regime in which custody agreements are more 
enforceable than they currently are, while still providing some protection 
for children.  The ideal level of substantive review would afford non-intact 
families a level of freedom from judicial intervention that approaches as 
much as possible the autonomy accorded to intact families, while 
recognizing and addressing the special problems that might arise, and risks 
that children might face, when parenting arrangements fall apart. 
At the substantive level, we should, at a minimum, refrain from enforcing 
a custody agreement where a court finds that to do so would likely be 
detrimental to a child’s emotional, intellectual, or physical development.426
 
 424. Arguably, where a parent trades financial support for custody, the best outcome for 
the child would be to sever the custody provision from the financial provision, and to enforce 
the custody terms but not the financial ones.  A parent who agrees to waive financial rights 
in exchange for custody is likely the parent who is most committed to the child.  For a 
proposed mechanism to facilitate the severing of the custody terms of divorce settlements 
from terms related to property and support, see Sarah Abramowicz & Michael Abramowicz, 
Severable Settlements (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
  
This approach would meet many of the current objections to the 
 425. See Bryan, supra note 419, at 1219–34. 
 426. This would resemble the ALI’s approach to the substantive review of parenting plans 
made at separation or divorce, while extending that approach to custody agreements as to 
which the parents no longer agree.  The ALI rejects the prevailing view that parenting plans 
should not be enforced unless a court finds them consistent with a children’s best interests, 
and provides instead that such agreements should be enforced unless a court finds that 
enforcement would be harmful to the child. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06. 
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enforcement of custody agreements, while greatly reducing the likelihood 
of judicial intervention on the basis of unpredictable and subjective views 
about childrearing.  There would be a strong presumption that custody 
agreements should be enforced, but a court would have the power to 
override an agreement likely to inflict harm on the child. 
An example of a custody provision likely to be detrimental to a child 
would be a joint custody agreement that would be disruptive and 
impractical, such as an agreement to rotate custody of an infant every two 
months.427
In certain predefined situations, we should presume that enforcement of a 
custody agreement would be harmful.  For instance, we could presume that 
a child would be harmed by an award of custody to a parent who has 
engaged in domestic violence, whether physical or psychological, and 
regardless of whether it occurred in the child’s presence.  Such a 
presumption would in part serve to protect a parent against feeling forced to 
stay in an abusive relationship out of fear of losing custody.
  An agreement to equally share custody of a school-age child 
could also be deemed harmful where, for example, the parents live in 
different locations and the child would be required to change schools 
repeatedly.  Even where the parents live in close proximity to one another, 
an agreement to share physical custody could be harmful if the level of 
conflict and hostility between the parents is sufficiently high. 
428  This 
presumption would also protect the child.  As scholars have long 
contended,429 and custody law increasingly recognizes,430
We could also create presumptions that certain types of agreements 
should not be enforced, even without a finding of likely harm to the child.  
The effect would be to revert to the best-interests standard in certain 
circumstances that are especially likely to be adverse to children’s interests.  
For instance, some might be concerned that a custody agreement could 
harm a child by denying primary physical custody to a parent who has had 
the bulk of contact with the child, such that the agreement, in the words of 
 a child can be 
harmed by living in an environment where domestic violence occurs, even 
if the violence is not directed at, or conducted in the presence of, the child. 
 
 427. Such an arrangement has, in fact, been imposed by trial courts in certain cases 
against the parents’ wishes, only to be reversed on appeal on the basis that such an 
arrangement could be detrimental to a child’s development. See Friendshuh v. Headlough, 
504 N.W.2d 104, 106 (S.D. 1993) (reversing trial court’s order, against parents’ wishes, that 
they rotate custody of their infant son every two months); see also In re Lukens, 587 N.W.2d 
141, 145–46 (N.D. 1998) (vacating trial court’s order that parents alternate custody of infant 
on a biweekly basis). 
 428. The procedural review proposed in this Article would also protect such parents by 
preventing the enforcement of an agreement where physical or emotional abuse vitiated a 
parent’s ability to consent. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1. 
 429. See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women:  The Impact of 
Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991) (critiquing 
child custody law for inadequately considering domestic violence in assessing children’s 
interests, and noting that the exclusion of domestic violence as a factor in custody decision 
making originated in the 1970s as part of the deemphasis of fault in divorce and custody 
law). 
 430. See generally, e.g., Merry Hofford et el., Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes:  
An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197 (1995). 
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the ALI provisions on parenting plans, “would drastically alter the child’s 
caretaking patterns.”431
Another concern might be that a child could be harmed by a custody 
agreement that curtails the child’s relationship with a parent.  We could 
address this concern by presuming that, when the child has already 
developed a relationship with a parent, we should not enforce any 
agreement that awards that parent less than a predetermined amount of 
physical custody.  Thus, for instance, when a father agrees to forgo all 
rights to visitation in exchange for a waiver of his obligation to pay child 
support, if the father already has a relationship with the child, the agreement 
to forgo visitation altogether would be unenforceable.
  To address this concern, we could create the 
presumption that, where there is one parent who clearly played the role of 
primary caretaker, a custody agreement should not be enforced where it 
awards less than a certain percentage of custody to that parent.  Although 
our concern here is with potential harm to the child, we should not create a 
presumption of harm.  It may well be in a child’s interests to reside 
primarily with a parent who had engaged in a minority of caretaking 
activity during the parents’ relationship, particularly where the parents have 
agreed to such an arrangement.  Thus, where an agreement is rendered 
unenforceable because it is drastically at odds with previous caretaking 
patterns in certain predefined ways, the court should not automatically 
reject the custody arrangement set forth in the contract, but instead should 
examine the child’s interests and determine custody accordingly, while 
taking the agreement into account as a factor bearing upon the child’s 
interests. 
432
A more complicated problem arises when custody agreements are not 
necessarily harmful, but are unworkable in some way.  For instance, parents 
might agree in advance to a detailed custody arrangement that turns out not 
to be feasible, such as where a specified schedule of visits may be 
impossible to reconcile with the child’s school schedule.  Here, we should 
keep in mind that the parents can always renegotiate such an arrangement, 
and that we want to encourage them to do so instead of enabling a parent to 
strategically use a claim of unworkability to vitiate an agreement altogether.  
However, we need to address how courts should respond when the 
arrangement cannot be enforced as written and the parents fail to reach a 
new agreement.  One mechanism to address this problem would be to 
permit enforcement of the general contours of a custody arrangement—such 
as the percentage of custodial time that a child would spend with each 
parent and the allocation of decision-making authority over various areas of 
the child’s life—while precluding enforcement of more detailed terms, such 
as when the child would visit each parent or which school the child would 
attend.  This would enable parents to protect their custodial ties to their 
 
 
 431. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.08 ill. 29. 
 432. Under the procedural branch of this Article’s proposal, such an agreement would 
also be unenforceable on the ground that it exchanges custody for a waiver of financial 
rights. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1. 
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children, and thus minimize the disruptive and destabilizing potential of a 
constant threat of custody litigation, while empowering courts to resolve 
any conflicts that arise in implementing an agreed-upon arrangement. 
A similar problem occurs when parents incorporate unworkable 
standards into a custody agreement, thus requiring a court to in effect 
adjudicate custody on the parents’ own terms.  A hypothetical example 
cited by Katharine Silbaugh as evidence of the adjudication difficulties 
posed by premarital custody agreements is a provision that custody should 
be awarded to the mother as long as she is a “loving and devoted parent,” an 
inquiry that would involve the court in a difficult fact-finding enterprise.433
Another difficult problem is determining whether to permit modification 
of a custody agreement once the agreement has been implemented.  While 
some states impose significant burdens on modification of custody 
arrangements, and many take the middle ground of requiring a substantial 
change in circumstances such that modification is in the child’s interests, 
others permit modification of custody upon a showing that a change of 
custody is in the child’s best interests.
  
To address this concern, we could provide that custody agreements can only 
allocate either custody or decision-making responsibility (including by 
deeming one or the other parent the decision maker about how to allocate 
custody), but cannot create the standards by which custody is adjudicated.  
Another possibility would be to permit parents to specify which of several 
preexisting custody standards should apply in the event of disagreement 
(parents could thereby, for instance, elect the approximation standard 
currently applicable only in West Virginia), while prohibiting the creation 
of novel custodial standards for courts to apply. 
434  To permit modification under the 
open-ended best-interests standard would undermine any security that 
custody agreements might provide to parents and children.  Of course, once 
a custody arrangement is implemented, it might become clear that the 
arrangement is detrimental to a child.  A parent who functioned well in a 
co-parenting arrangement may be unable to handle the burdens of parenting 
alone, for example, or a parent may enter a relationship with a new partner 
who engages in domestic violence.  But we should be wary of making it too 
easy to modify existing custody arrangements.  Whenever an existing 
custody arrangement is disturbed, children’s attachments and expectations 
are unsettled.  Moreover, as Joan Wexler observed in her landmark article 
recommending that custody modification be permitted only under very 
limited circumstances, courts purporting to address children’s interests will 
often modify custody to children’s detriment in order to police the behavior 
of custodial parents.435
 
 433. See Silbaugh, supra note 
  The case law contains numerous examples of courts 
that have removed custody from primary caretakers—in ways that often 
seem harmful to the children involved—because of behavior at odds with 
prevailing social norms, such as “promiscuous” behavior by a mother, entry 
2, at 131–32. 
 434. See supra notes 82–83. 
 435. See Joan Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE 
L.J. 757, 797 (1985). 
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into a same-sex relationship, or, as in Annie Besant’s case, adoption of 
unorthodox religious views. 
Thus, for custody agreements to achieve the goal of providing intact 
status to families in which parents’ relationships have dissolved, it is 
important to adopt a modification standard that gives significant deference 
to such agreements, while permitting modification where a child seems at 
risk of harm.  Here, as in our original enforcement of the agreement, we 
could presume that certain situations are harmful to a child, such as equally 
shared residential custody between parents who have demonstrated a high 
level of conflict in implementing the agreement, or the child’s residence in 
a home where domestic violence occurs.  To protect children’s affective ties 
and their interests in stability, we should also require courts that are 
considering modifying an agreed-upon custody arrangement to balance the 
harm of continuing the arrangement against the harm that would follow 
from disrupting children’s emotional bonds and their established pattern of 
care. 
A number of substantive concerns can also be addressed by carefully 
defining which agreements constitute custody agreements subject to 
enforcement under the proposal, and distinguishing these from agreements 
concerning parental status.436
A number of other limits could be imposed on the enforcement of 
custody agreements.  For instance, to protect against unpredictability, we 
might provide for nonenforcement of a custody agreement where an 
unforeseeable event has occurred to make enforcement contrary to a child’s 
interests.  Examples might include the illness of a parent or child, or a job 
loss that alters expectations about who will serve as a child’s primary 
caretaker.  The unforeseeability exception would limit judicial intervention 
in custody, while enabling such intervention when the agreement that the 
parents made on the basis of their own ex ante best-interests assessment has 
little bearing on what they predicted to be the child’s reality at the time of 
enforcement. 
  We can define custody agreements with 
reference to the limits that courts currently place on custody awards.  Under 
prevailing custody jurisprudence, parents rarely lose the right to visitation 
with their child.  Thus, custody agreements should be defined as those that 
allocate existing rights, without terminating or transferring them altogether.  
Under this definition, an agreement that terminates a parent’s status 
entirely, rather than defining the scope of that parent’s involvement, is not a 
custody agreement, but, rather, a parentage agreement. 
The more limits we impose on the enforcement of custody agreements, 
however, the closer we come to the current regime, in which such 
agreements are largely superfluous, especially when time has passed 
between execution and enforcement.  Thus, any such limits should be 
carefully considered, and imposed only when necessary. 
 
 436. While the author endorses enforcing parentage agreements as well as custody 
agreements, different rules should apply to each, and the two types of agreements should be 
able to work in tandem.  It is outside the scope of this Article to address the separate set of 
problems raised by enforcement of parentage agreements. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article does not seek to have the final word on how the enforcement 
of custody agreements should proceed.  Rather, the Article’s goal is the 
more modest one of setting forth the framework under which enforcement 
of custody agreements should be considered:  a two-level judicial review of 
custody agreements, with enforcement predicated on a finding that the 
agreement in question is procedurally fair and substantively unlikely to 
harm a child’s development.  This framework is built on the premise that 
children and parents will benefit from greater deference to parental custody 
agreements.  Such deference would enable all families to carve out the 
protections of intact status, and thus to be granted the autonomy, stability, 
and freedom from state intervention that today only a dwindling number of 
traditional nuclear families enjoy.  The assumption of the marital contracts 
literature that children’s interests are best protected by requiring judicial 
assessment of those interests even when a custody agreement exists does 
not survive close scrutiny.  The arguments for contractual enforcement 
developed in the literature, and to some extent the case law, on parentage 
agreements are more persuasive, and should be extended to the custody 
context. 
